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The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints
Abstract
[Excerpt] This is the seventh update of The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints. Since the first
of these studies was published nearly 20 years ago, U.S. tariff rates have fallen, nontariff measures on imports
have been removed, and trade has expanded markedly. This period has also seen increasing U.S. integration
into global supply chains, the subject of a special topic in this report.
The United States is one of the world’s most open economies. In 2010, the average U.S. tariff on all goods
remained near its historic low of 1.3 percent, on an import-weighted basis, essentially unchanged from the
previous update in 2009. Nonetheless, significant restraints on trade remain in certain sectors. The U.S.
International Trade Commission (Commission) estimates that U.S. economic welfare, as defined by total
public and private consumption, would increase by about $2.6 billion annually by 2015 if the United States
unilaterally ended (“liberalized”) all significant restraints quantified in this report. Exports would expand by
$9.0 billion and imports by $11.5 billion. These changes would result from removing import barriers in the
following sectors: sugar, ethanol, canned tuna, dairy products, tobacco, textiles and apparel, and other high-
tariff manufacturing sectors.
As in previous updates, the simulations presented in this report measure the effects of unilateral liberalization
of U.S. import restraints (i.e., the simulations assume that U.S. trading partners do not engage in any reciprocal
liberalization). However, the effects on the U.S. economy can differ significantly when both the United States
and its trading partners engage in reciprocal liberalization.
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Executive Summary 
This is the seventh update of The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints. 
Since the first of these studies was published nearly 20 years ago, U.S. tariff rates have 
fallen, nontariff measures on imports have been removed, and trade has expanded 
markedly. This period has also seen increasing U.S. integration into global supply chains, 
the subject of a special topic in this report. 
 
The United States is one of the world’s most open economies. In 2010, the average U.S. 
tariff on all goods remained near its historic low of 1.3 percent, on an import-weighted 
basis, essentially unchanged from the previous update in 2009. Nonetheless, significant 
restraints on trade remain in certain sectors. The U.S. International Trade Commission 
(Commission) estimates that U.S. economic welfare, as defined by total public and 
private consumption, would increase by about $2.6 billion annually by 2015 if the United 
States unilaterally ended (“liberalized”) all significant restraints quantified in this report. 
Exports would expand by $9.0 billion and imports by $11.5 billion. These changes would 
result from removing import barriers in the following sectors: sugar, ethanol, canned tuna, 
dairy products, tobacco, textiles and apparel, and other high-tariff manufacturing sectors.1 
 
As in previous updates, the simulations presented in this report measure the effects of 
unilateral liberalization of U.S. import restraints (i.e., the simulations assume that U.S. 
trading partners do not engage in any reciprocal liberalization). However, the effects on 
the U.S. economy can differ significantly when both the United States and its trading 
partners engage in reciprocal liberalization.  
 
Effects of Significant Import Restraints 
As in previous updates, the Commission used an economic model of the U.S. economy to 
analyze the economic effects of removing significant U.S. import restraints. The 
Commission identified sectors with significant import restraints on the basis of high tariff 
rates, restrictive tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), and other restrictive import policies, such as 
preferential rules of origin (table ES.1).2 Among agricultural products, the most restrictive 
restraints are currently applied to sugar and dairy products such as butter and cheese. 
Among manufactured goods, the most restrictive restraints are in the apparel, footwear, 
and leather sectors. 
 
Removal of All Significant Restraints 
As noted above, the Commission estimates that simultaneous liberalization of all 
significant import restraints quantified in this report would increase annual domestic 
welfare by $2.6 billion by 2015 (table ES.2). This result is consistent with recent 
Commission studies in this series of the gains available from liberalization: the 
Commission’s estimates have trended downward as U.S. tariffs and quantitative restraints 
 
                                                     
1 These include footwear and leather products; glass and glass products; ball and roller bearings; 
ceramic tile; china tableware; costume jewelry; writing instruments; hand tools; tires; and pesticides and 
agricultural chemicals. 
2 Generally, preferential rules of origin for textiles and apparel under FTAs and trade preference 
programs give special customs treatment to imported textiles and apparel made with selected inputs originally 
from the United States and/or partner countries. 
x 
TABLE ES.1  Sectors with significant restraints 
 Selection criteria 
Broad sector High tariffs Restrictive TRQs Othera 
Dairy ☒ ☒ ☐ 
Ethanol ☒ ☐ ☒ 
Sugar ☐ ☒ ☐ 
Tuna ☒ ☒ ☐ 
Tobacco ☒ ☒ ☐ 
Textiles and apparel ☒ ☐ ☒ 
Other manufacturing sectors ☒ ☐ ☐ 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
   aOther restraints include origin quotas for ethanol and preferential rules of origin for textiles and apparel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE ES.2  Welfare gains from liberalization of significant import restraints in 2015, relative to the 
model’s baseline projection (millions of dollars) 
Sector Change in economic welfare  
Simultaneous liberalization of all significant restraints 2,602 
  
Liberalization of individual sectors  
   Food and agriculture  
      Ethanol 1,513 
      Dairy 223 
      Tobacco 63 
      Sugar 49 
      Canned tuna 16 
  
   Textiles and apparel 514 
  
   Other manufacturing sectors  
      Footwear and leather products 215 
      Costume jewelry 12 
      Writing instruments 8 
      Ball and roller bearings 5 
      Tires 5 
      Hand tools 3 
      Ceramic tile 3 
      China tableware 2 
      Glass and glass products –1 
      Pesticides and agricultural chemicals –3 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
 
 
xi 
FIGURE ES.1  Tariff rates and estimated welfare gains have fallen over the life of the report, 1993–2011 
 
Source: DataWeb/USDOC and Commission estimates. 
 
Note: The average tariff is the import-weighted tariff across all tariff codes. The year of the report does not 
represent the year modeled. The current update (2011), for example, projects the U.S. economy to 2015. 
The pattern of welfare gain is suggestive only, as the model specification and product scope have changed 
over time, which can affect the comparison of welfare gains across these reports.  
 
have been liberalized (figure ES.1). One significant change since the 2009 Import 
Restraints report is the increasing cost that barriers to ethanol imports would impose on 
domestic welfare, given the projected rising demand for such imports owing to the U.S. 
Renewable Fuel Standard, which requires increased ethanol use after 2011. The second 
main change is that textile and apparel restraints have become less restrictive following 
the 2008 elimination of the last U.S. quantitative restraints on imports in that sector. 
 
Commission estimates indicate that while liberalization reduces output and employment 
in directly affected sectors, it benefits sectors that use liberalized products and benefits 
the economy as a whole. Liberalization lowers the prices of imported goods, thereby 
driving down domestic prices for similar goods as well; producers in affected sectors 
respond by reducing output. Because liberalization increases overall U.S. productivity, 
output gains in other sectors generally outweigh the losses in the directly affected sectors, 
and U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) rises (table ES.3). Similarly, employment in 
liberalized sectors typically falls, but this is completely offset in the model by 
employment gains in other sectors. Exports rise throughout the economy because of 
lower prices for domestic goods in liberalized sectors and higher productivity elsewhere. 
Imports also rise overall, driven by lower import prices and greater purchasing power 
(from the increased GDP). 
 
The broad sectors of the economy shown in table ES.3 reflect these effects from 
liberalization. Output contracts in the broad sectors with the most significant restraints: 
agriculture and nondurable manufacturing (which includes textiles, apparel, footwear, 
and leather goods). Other goods-producing sectors (mining, construction, and durable  
 
xii 
TABLE ES.3  Elimination of all significant import restraints: Effect on the entire U.S. economy and broad 
sectors, 2015 (percent change) 
Sector Employment Output Imports Exports 
Entire U.S. economy 0.0 (+) 0.4 0.3 
     
Broad sectors     
   Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (+) –0.1 –0.3 1.5 
   Mining (+) (+) (+) 0.5 
   Construction (–) (+) (a) 2.0 
   Nondurable manufacturing –0.4 –0.4 1.5 –1.5 
   Durable manufacturing 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.7 
   Transportation, communication, and utilities 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.0 
   Wholesale and retail trade 0.1 0.2  (a) 0.5 
   Finance, insurance, and real estate (–) (–) (–) 0.7 
   Government and other services (–) (–) (+) 0.7 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
Note: (+) and (–) denote small positive and negative changes of less than 0.05 percent. 
 
   aTreated as nonimportable for purposes of the model. 
 
manufacturing) expand, as do services such as transportation and retail trade that are 
closely linked to the movement of goods. Other services contract, although slightly, as 
resources in these industries move to other sectors in the economy that become more 
efficient after liberalization. 
 
Effects of Sector-by-Sector Liberalization 
The Commission study looked at sectors that have significant import restraints in order to 
identify the economic effects of import liberalization on consumers, companies, and 
workers in each sector, and to estimate the effects on upstream and downstream sectors. 
Key results for the sectors in table ES.2 (the five agricultural sectors, textiles and apparel, 
and the 10 other high-tariff manufacturing sectors), as well as services, are summarized 
below.  
 
Ethanol 
(ethyl 
alcohol) 
Because of rapidly increasing quantities of ethanol mandated by the U.S. 
Renewable Fuel Standard, both U.S. ethanol production and U.S. imports 
of ethanol are projected to rise markedly by 2015. The projected higher 
import quantities and the continued moderate restrictiveness of ethanol 
restraints combine to make these restraints the most costly (in welfare 
terms) among all sectors considered. The Commission estimates that 
liberalizing ethanol import restraints would increase welfare by $1.5 billion 
and increase imports by 45 percent in 2015. Although liberalization would 
reduce the domestic industry’s output and employment from their 
projected 2015 levels by 4–5 percent, these changes are minor considering 
that the ethanol industry employment and output are both projected to 
more than double between 2005 and 2015, with or without liberalization. 
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Textiles 
and  
apparel 
The Commission estimates that liberalizing import restraints in textiles and 
apparel would increase welfare by $514 million. This value is much lower 
than the estimate in the previous update, because imports are no longer 
subject to quantitative restraints. Liberalization would reduce output and 
employment in this sector by 9–10 percent, which would magnify the 
already substantial declines projected to occur without liberalization. 
Import liberalization would also eliminate exports of U.S. goods that are 
stimulated by preferential rules of origin. This change would lead to large 
declines in exports of U.S. products such as thread, yarn, fabric, and cut 
pieces of fabric to be sewn into clothing. 
Dairy Dairy remains one of the sectors with the most restrictive restraints. The 
restrictiveness of dairy TRQs, however, has declined since the previous 
update. As a result, while liberalization of import restraints in dairy is 
estimated to increase U.S. welfare by about $223 million, this gain is 
considerably lower than the one estimated in the previous report. Dairy 
shipments and employment are expected to slip by about 1 percent each 
after liberalization, while imports of dairy products would increase by 
63 percent. Butter, cheese, and condensed dairy products would experience 
the largest changes. 
Tobacco Liberalization of import restraints on tobacco and tobacco products is 
estimated to increase welfare by about $63 million, which is somewhat 
lower than in the previous report due to less restrictive tobacco TRQs. 
Imports of tobacco are expected to rise markedly from liberalization (by 
73 percent), while imports of cigarettes are also expected to increase, but 
by a much smaller percentage (7 percent). Output and employment in 
tobacco would decline by 3 percent. Producers of cigarettes would benefit 
from cheaper imported tobacco, but would be hurt by increased cigarette 
imports; on net, output of cigarettes would rise by less than 1 percent.  
Sugar Removing tariffs and TRQs on imports of raw and refined sugar is 
estimated to increase welfare by about $49 million. This is a significantly 
lower welfare gain than in the previous update, reflecting the smaller gap 
between U.S. and world sugar prices used in this projection. Total sugar 
imports would increase by 32 percent after liberalization. Output of raw 
cane sugar would decline by 8 percent. Cane refiners would benefit from 
increased imports of raw cane sugar, their main intermediate input, at 
lower prices, and would increase shipments by 3 percent; beet sugar 
refiners would not similarly benefit, because their intermediate input is not 
generally traded internationally. Confectioners, benefiting from the decline 
in refined sugar prices, would increase production and exports. 
Canned 
tuna 
Ending import restraints in canned tuna would increase welfare by 
$16 million, which is similar to the gain estimated in the previous update. 
Imports of canned tuna would increase by 20 percent, and output would 
decline by 8 percent. Employment in the broader canned fish industry 
would fall by 7 percent. 
Other 
high-  
tariff 
sectors 
Ten other sectors were identified as subject to relatively high tariffs. The 
welfare effects of eliminating these tariffs are estimated to range from a 
gain of $215 million for footwear and leather products to a loss of 
$3 million for pesticides and agricultural chemicals. These gains are 
comparable in size to those estimated in the previous update. Most sectors  
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are expected to see increased imports and exports, lower output and 
employment, and lower consumer prices. 
Services The United States is very open to the imports of services from other 
countries. Nonetheless, some U.S. measures restrict services imports in 
certain industries, such as transportation (restrictions on foreign ownership 
and on transporting freight within U.S. borders), communication (foreign 
ownership restrictions), and some professional services (state-level 
accreditation standards). The report describes import restraints in services 
qualitatively, but it does not attempt to offer a quantitative analysis of the 
effect of their removal due to the obstacles to quantifying the restrictions. 
 
U.S. and Global Supply Chains 
Many goods and services are no longer designed, produced, and sold within a single 
country. Instead, the activities needed to bring a product from conception to consumption 
are increasingly spread across multiple countries. The international production networks 
that link companies carrying out these activities, and that allow firms to move goods and 
services efficiently across national borders, are referred to as global supply chains. Over 
time, several factors have spurred the development of these chains. Chief among these 
are falling trade costs (due to trade liberalization, lower transportation costs, and better 
logistics), technological change (such as improved telecommunications), and institutional 
development in areas such as property rights. As countries have become more integrated 
into these chains, they have become more specialized in specific tasks based on 
comparative advantage. The United States is no exception, and supply chains have 
generated changes in U.S. production and trade that have had major effects on many U.S. 
consumers, workers, and companies. 
 
By most measures, U.S. companies have become increasingly involved (“integrated”) in 
global supply chains. The value of U.S. manufacturers’ purchases of imported inputs as a 
fraction of their total input costs roughly quadrupled between 1980 and 2006. According 
to available data and Commission calculations, imported inputs account for over one-fifth 
of all intermediate inputs used in the most integrated U.S. industries, such as apparel, 
motor vehicles, and computers and electronic products. Since many of these goods are 
subsequently exported, the share of imported inputs that were embodied in U.S. 
merchandise exports more than doubled between 1977 and 2002. 
 
Services such as transport, warehousing, and logistics are integral to the smooth operation 
of global supply chains.  U.S. firms are among the leading providers of such services 
worldwide.  Other services have become increasingly traded across borders in global 
supply chains.  Despite this growth, the value of intermediate services (such as 
communications, business services, and computer services) imported by U.S. companies 
remains much lower than the value of imported intermediate goods (such as parts and 
components). Global services trade may be poised for future increases as companies seek 
to reduce costs by splitting apart such functions as human resources management, 
customer support, accounting and finance, and procurement, and moving some tasks 
where they can be provided more efficiently or at lower cost. As the United States is the 
world’s largest provider of services, it could gain substantially from growing 
international trade in business, financial, and technical services in global supply chains. 
 
 
 
xv 
TABLE ES.4  Country sources of value added in U.S. imports, exports, and absorption, 2004, percent 
Activity U.S.  China Japan East Asia Canada Mexico 
Latin 
America Europe Others Total 
Imports 8.3 7.7 10.4 12.0 11.0 4.9 6.3 26.1 13.2 100.0 
Absorptiona 89.0 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.3 0.6 0.7 3.2 1.4 100.0 
Exports 87.1 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.7 0.9 1.1 3.3 2.1 100.0 
Source: Commission calculations. 
 
   aU.S. absorption refers to total U.S. use (by manufacturers, consumers, etc.) of intermediate and final 
goods and services from all sources. 
 
As a good crosses multiple borders in a global supply chain, many countries contribute 
value to the final product. Tracing the sources and destination of such value in U.S. trade 
flows makes it possible to present a comprehensive view of U.S. participation in global 
supply chains and to quantify other countries’ contributions to the goods and services that 
the United States imports, consumes, and exports. This study found that the United States 
exchanges the most value in global chains with Canada, Mexico, the EU, Japan, and 
China, and in industries such as electronics, chemicals, motor vehicles, and apparel. 
According to Commission calculations, a significant share of the value of U.S. imports 
(8.3 percent) consists of value contributed by U.S. workers and firms that has returned 
home after finishing or assembly abroad (table ES.4). In international comparisons, the 
United States has the highest percentage of returning value added among all countries,3 
reflecting the large U.S. market and its tight integration into global supply chains, 
particularly in the motor vehicle sector. U.S. workers and companies contribute 
89 percent of the value of all goods and services used (“absorbed”) in the economy, and 
they contribute a similar share to U.S. exports. 
 
Participation in global supply chains affects U.S. firms, workers, and consumers. 
Although this report does not estimate these effects, a review of the literature suggests 
that global supply chains present both opportunities and challenges. Companies can raise 
their productivity when they specialize in narrower tasks that take advantage of their core 
competencies. Consumers also tend to benefit from lower prices, increased variety, and 
faster access to goods. The effect on workers, however, is more ambiguous. The United 
States increasingly specializes in mid- to high-skilled tasks, a trend that benefits high-
skilled workers but puts downward pressure on the wages of low-skilled workers. 
Evidence shows that workers whose jobs are offshored experience wage declines, 
particularly when they must change industries or occupations, while other workers 
benefit from the effects of higher productivity. There is no consensus yet on how strongly 
particular types of workers have been affected, either positively or negatively, but several 
studies identified in this report suggest that the overall effect on U.S. workers of 
increased U.S. involvement in global supply chains has been small but positive. 
Employment opportunities for U.S. workers arising from global supply chains include 
home-office activities of multinational firms, such as R&D, product design, logistics, 
marketing and sales; exports of skill-intensive services, including financial services, 
business services, and travel services; and exports of advanced-technology goods, such as 
electronic components and chemistry-based consumer goods. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3 The world average share of returning value added in imports is 4.0 percent. Chapter 3 provides 
additional information on the sources of value added in other countries’ imports.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
This is the seventh update in the series of reports entitled The Economic Effects of 
Significant U.S. Import Restraints. Since 1989, when the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (Commission or USITC) began investigating this topic,1 U.S. import 
restraints have imposed increasingly smaller costs on the U.S. economy in terms of net 
economic welfare, output, employment, and trade. Estimates in this seventh update 
remain consistent with these trends. The current estimate of the total cost to U.S. 
consumers of all significant U.S. import restraints is $2.6 billion, down from $4.6 billion 
in the previous update in 2009.2 The estimated effects on specific U.S. sectors of 
removing the remaining restraints—a process known as “liberalization”—are also 
generally lower than in the sixth update, although ethanol is an important exception. 
 
The decline in trade barriers in recent decades, both in the United States and abroad, has 
been a key contributor to the restructuring of global production and the rise in global 
supply chains. Led by the U.S. automobile industry’s integration with Canadian 
companies in the 1960s, and followed by the apparel industry and later electronics 
companies, an increasing number of industries and corporate activities employ global 
supply chains as important sources of goods and services. The special topic on global 
supply chains in this report examines the development of these international networks, 
analyzes current U.S. participation in them, and discusses the effects, both positive and 
negative, that this participation has had on U.S. companies, workers, and consumers. 
 
Scope and Organization of the Report 
Chapter 2 provides updated estimates of the economic effects of liberalizing significant 
U.S. import restraints on U.S. companies, workers, and consumers. It also assesses the 
increase in net economic welfare from this liberalization. As requested in the original 
letter, this report considers all U.S. import restraints, except those originating from 
antidumping or countervailing duty investigations, section 337 or 406 investigations, or 
section 301 actions. The focus of the quantitative analysis in this report is on measures 
that are applied at the border, such as tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) applied to 
imports of goods. Restraints on imports of services are discussed qualitatively.3 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on sectors with the most restrictive restraints. As discussed in the next 
section, “restrictive import restraints” are defined as those that increase the price of 
imports or limit their quantity, including tariffs, quantitative restraints, and preferential 
 
                                                          
1 The United States Trade Representative (USTR) originally requested this series of reports in May 
1992. Before this series of investigations, the Commission conducted a similar study in three phases for the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance during 1989–91. In August 2010, the USTR, in addition to requesting a 
seventh update of this report, requested a review of global supply chains and U.S. participation in them. See 
app. A for facsimiles of both the 1992 and 2010 request letters.  
2 USITC, Import Restraints: Sixth Update, 2009, xii. 
3 Restrictions to trade in services tend to be nontariff measures, which are often applied “behind the 
border” and so are more difficult to quantify. Researchers have begun to model services restraints and 
nontariff measures in computable general equilibrium models, which is the class of model employed in this 
report. Some studies show large gains from liberalization of these restraints, but the results are highly 
variable and there is no consensus on the best way to measure such restraints. See USITC, Import Restraints: 
Sixth Update, 2009, 101–7. 
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rules of origin.4 Historically, the most restrictive barriers have occurred in a small 
number of sectors: textiles and apparel, footwear, and a few agricultural products. In fact, 
three of the top four sectors listed in this seventh update as offering the greatest potential 
gains from liberalization also occupied the top spots in the first update in 1995 (table 
1.1).5 Two notable changes are the rapid rise in the ranking of ethanol in this list and the 
substantial decline in the ranking of textiles and apparel. In each case, recent 
modifications to U.S. policies have driven these changes, as discussed in chapter 2. 
 
Unlike U.S. import restraints, which have remained relatively consistent for a long 
period, U.S. participation in global supply chains, the focus of the special topic in this 
report, has evolved rapidly. Chapter 3 presents a discussion of current U.S. participation 
in the context of the rapid development of global chains. This chapter contains four main 
sections. The first section describes the nature of global supply chains and the economic 
forces that have contributed to their growth. The second section summarizes and analyzes 
U.S. participation in global chains. The third section examines the effects of global 
supply chain participation on U.S. companies, workers, and consumers. The last section 
includes case studies of four industries (apparel, motor vehicles, televisions, and 
logistics) that demonstrate the divergent ways U.S. firms engage in, and often lead, 
global supply chains. 
 
Approach 
This report uses substantially different analytical approaches to examine its two main 
topics. The analysis of significant import restraints in chapter 2 is largely based on an 
economic model that examines the effect of liberalizing significant import restraints in a 
medium-term economic projection to 2015. The examination of global supply chains in 
chapter 3, by contrast, draws largely from existing literature and case studies. Chapter 3 
also presents measures of U.S. engagement in global supply chains based on a new 
Commission database that tracks the sources of value embedded in products that are 
traded globally in these chains. The differences in approach were determined by the 
different objectives specified for the two topics in the original request letter and the letter 
for the current update, which asked for a detailed model-based examination of import 
restraints paired with an accessible overview of U.S. involvement in supply chains. Both 
chapters benefited from testimony presented during the Commission’s public hearing on 
December 16, 2010, and written submissions from interested parties.6 
 
Significant Import Restraints 
To model the effects of trade policy liberalization in chapter 2, this study relies on the 
U.S. Applied General Equilibrium (USAGE) model.7 As indicated by its name, USAGE  
 
                                                          
4 Preferential rules of origin determine the eligibility of products to receive preferential access (reduced 
rates of duty) under free and preferential trade agreements. Among all products, preferential rules of origin 
for apparel are the most restrictive, and impose the highest costs, because they have the most stringent 
eligibility requirements, such as a requirement that a minimum share of value be added in the country of 
origin or that a “substantial transformation” of the product occur in that country. 
5 The model framework has changed over time, which may affect the rankings of specific products. The 
model framework is largely unchanged between the fifth and seventh updates, however, so the rapid increase 
in the prominence of ethanol is likely not due to model differences. 
6 See app. C and D. 
7 For an overview of the USAGE framework, see app. E and USITC, Import Restraints: Sixth Update, 
2009, app. E. For a complete specification of the USAGE model see Dixon and Rimmer, “USAGE-ITC,” 
June 2002. 
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TABLE 1.1  Sectors offering the greatest potential gains from liberalization in this seventh update and their 
ranking in some previous updates 
  Sector Rank 
First update, 
1995 
Third update, 
2002 
Fifth update, 
2007 
Seventh update, 
2011 
  Ethanol (a) (a) 5 1 
  Dairy 2 3 3 2 
  Footwear and leather products 5 4 4 3 
  Textiles and apparel 1 1 1 4 
Source: Commission estimate. 
 
   aNot included as a high-tariff sector. 
 
is a single-country model of the U.S. economy. It incorporates general equilibrium 
relationships, which ensure that supply and demand conditions are met at all times in 
baseline projections and simulations based on the model, including the projection and 
simulation described in the next paragraph.8 The model includes 539 industrial sectors, 
and it incorporates the linkages among these sectors, consumers, the government, and 
foreign economies. These linkages enable the Commission to specify the effect that trade 
policy changes have on different, but interrelated, parts of the U.S. economy. For 
example, the model specifies how changes to tariff rates on imports of ethanol  affect 
employment not only in the ethanol sector, but also in the corn sector (from which most 
U.S. ethanol is produced), or other agricultural sectors. 
 
The analysis of U.S. import restraints proceeds in three steps. These steps include (1) 
identifying sectors with significant restraints; (2) projecting the U.S. economy to 2015, to 
provide a baseline against which to measure the effects of liberalization; and (3) 
simulating the extent to which liberalizing the significant restraints will restrain or foster 
the trends present in the projected U.S. economy.  
 
The USAGE model generates a dynamic projection of the U.S. economy in which 
industries can accumulate physical capital over time; the speed at which capital adjusts in 
each sector depends on economic conditions in the projection. Similarly, households can 
accumulate financial assets (or, as in the current macroeconomic environment, reduce 
financial liabilities owed to foreigners). Prices (which include interest rates and wage 
rates) and capital stocks do not adjust instantaneously in the model; as in the real world, 
prices and quantities take time to adjust. Because the current projection extends only to 
2015, the adjustment process will not be complete in the projection. To estimate the 
results of liberalizing significant restraints, the model applies a static shock 
corresponding to the portion of significant barriers that remain in 2015.9 Consistent with 
previous updates, the model assumes that wage rates adjust more flexibly over time. In 
these simulations, the real wage rates adjust so that aggregate employment remains 
unchanged as a result of the liberalization.10 
 
Tariff rates are the first, and simplest, criterion used to identify sectors having significant 
restraints. The analysis uses a standard statistical measure to determine large differences 
from the average level. For the purpose of the analysis in chapter 2, tariff rates are 
                                                          
8 General equilibrium analysis seeks to account for the ways in which the prices and production of all 
goods are interrelated in a system of multiple intersecting markets in accordance with the laws of supply and 
demand. 
9 For example, the tariff on tires is projected to fall to 2.3 percent ad valorem in 2015, so the model 
simulates the removal of a 2.3 percent barrier in 2015. 
10 This assumption insulates model results from the business cycle, allowing a better comparison of the 
effects of U.S. barriers over time, as in figure ES.1.  On the other hand, the assumption may underestimate 
the economic changes and welfare gains from liberalization in economic downturns.  
1-4 
considered significantly restrictive if they exceed the average tariff by one standard 
deviation, which for 2010 included sectors with tariff rates greater than 3.9 percent.11 
Agricultural sectors have some of the highest tariff rates, while textiles and apparel 
account for the largest number of sectors with significant import restraints (see chapter 2 
for a breakout of these sectors). Textiles and apparel sectors also have restrictive rules of 
origin, which magnify the effects of liberalizing these sectors. 
 
In addition to tariff rates, selection is also based on the restrictiveness of TRQs for those 
sectors that are subject to them. A TRQ is a method of trade protection under the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture that imposes a low “in-quota” 
tariff rate on imports of specific goods from specific countries until an annual allocation 
is met. Any imports beyond the TRQ allocation are subject to higher over-quota tariff 
rates. In the model, restrictiveness is measured by the amount that TRQs raise the price of 
imported goods, which is largely determined by the over-quota tariff rate, the gap 
between U.S. and world prices, and the “fill rates” or the extent to which imports from 
specific sources approach or exceed their quantity allotments. As with tariffs, not all 
sectors subject to TRQs were deemed to have significant restraints. 
 
The origin quota, applicable only to imports of ethanol, can have an effect similar to that 
of a TRQ in that it can raise the U.S. price above the price prevailing in the country of 
origin. The origin quota allows certain countries duty-free access to the U.S. market for a 
specified amount of ethanol produced from imported feedstocks. Such feedstocks can 
originate in third countries, such as Brazil. (See chapter 2 for details.) 
 
As noted above, the simulation analysis begins by generating a projection of the U.S. 
economy to 2015 to provide a baseline against which the effect of liberalizing significant 
import restraints can be compared. The projection has two main components. First, 
official U.S. government forecasts are used to project the macroeconomy to 2015, based 
on the most up-to-date forecasts available in 2010 and 2011. This projection ties down 
key U.S. macroeconomic variables such as consumption, investment, government 
spending, and imports and exports, and also projects growth in world gross domestic 
product (GDP).12 Using these macroeconomic projections, the model also generates 
baseline projections of output, employment, trade, and prices in each of the 539 sectors of 
the model that are consistent with the market structure of each industry. 
 
Second, the baseline projections are further refined for the individual sectors that appear 
in this report. When available, as with dairy, textiles, and apparel, projections are shaped 
by current forecasts from other government agencies or industry sources. Projections in 
other sectors, such as tuna and cigarettes, are based mainly on trends observed in output, 
imports, exports, and prices in the 2005–10 period. Trends are modified when changes in 
2005–10 are not representative of expected changes in the near future. For example, 
ethanol output and imports are projected to rise more rapidly between 2010 and 2015 
than in the preceding five years because the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard requires 
increased ethanol use after 2011. Appendix E presents more detail on the sources and 
values of these projections. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 In detail, the average tariff rate among the 539 sectors considered in this study was 1.26 percent ad 
valorem based on the cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.) import value, and the standard deviation was 2.62 
percent. 
12 App. E describes the sources and values of key macroeconomic variables in the projection. 
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The baseline assumes that current U.S. import restraints will remain in place. At the same 
time, however, it incorporates known trade policy adjustments, such as changes to tariff 
rates and TRQ quantity allocations contained in U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) tariff 
staging schedules and in other trade agreements and provisions under preferential trade 
arrangements (PTAs). These agreements provide the projected values of trade policy 
variables (such as tariff rates and TRQ fill rates) through 2015.13 For each product, the 
projected restrictiveness of the TRQs depends on the projected gap between U.S. and 
world prices as well as projected fill rates, which are specific to each exporting country. 
For many products, both price gaps and fill rates have declined in recent years, a trend 
that has made the TRQs less restrictive than in previous updates of this report and has 
reduced their effect on U.S. prices and net economic welfare. Table 1.2 summarizes the 
restrictiveness of import restraints in each sector in the model projection for 2015.14 
Dairy and sugar sectors have the most restrictive restraints. Box 1.1 discusses recent 
market changes in products subject to TRQs. 
 
After the baseline projection is developed, the simulation can estimate the effects of 
liberalizing significant restraints, including tariffs, TRQs, the ethanol origin quota, and 
restrictive rules of origin. The liberalization of these restraints is modeled by setting the 
relevant tariffs to zero, removing TRQ quantitative restrictions, and removing preferential 
rules of origin in the textile and apparel sectors.15 The model simulation solves for the 
new equilibrium with these changes in place. The simulation calculates new equilibrium 
values, consistent with supply and demand constraints, for all 539 sectors, although this 
report lists estimates for only the sectors of interest, along with key “upstream” and 
“downstream” sectors.16 
 
Estimates of the effects of liberalizing each sector are presented relative to the changes 
expected to take place between 2005 and 2015 in the baseline projection. For example, 
U.S. output of butter is projected to grow 22 percent between 2005 and 2015 in the 
absence of policy liberalization. Liberalization of dairy restraints would lower U.S. butter 
output by 2 percent, for an overall increase of 20 percent between 2005 and 2015. As the 
focus of this section is the economic effect of liberalization on consumers, firms, and 
workers, the key variables of interest are net economic welfare (i.e., total purchasing 
power of U.S. consumers), output, and employment, in addition to imports and exports. 
  
                                                          
13 For imports from countries without such agreements, future tariffs and TRQ allotments are based on 
their 2010 values. 
14 U.S. FTAs require tariffs for many products to be reduced by stages in accordance with “staging 
schedules.” This means that a number of tariffs decline in mid-projection. As a result, by 2015 some tariff 
rates are below the 3.9 percent cutoff used to determine the most restrictive sectors in 2010. In addition, two 
other sectors (motorcycles, bicycles, and parts; and watches, clocks, and parts) were identified as having 
significant restraints based on their 2010 tariff rates, but have been excluded from the simulations. See chap. 
2 for details. 
15 Liberalizations of tariffs, TRQs, and the origin quota directly affect imports into the United States. 
The removal of preferential rules of origin, in contrast, primarily affects U.S. exports by lowering foreign 
demand for U.S. inputs exported to U.S. FTA partners and preferential trading partners. See chap. 2 for 
details. 
16 An “upstream” sector provides output that is used as an input by a “downstream” sector.  
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TABLE 1.2  Restrictiveness of U.S. import restraints in 2015 projection (percent increase in price from 
restraints) 
Sector U.S. tariff a U.S. TRQ b Total c 
Food and agriculture       
   Ethanol 5.2 d 0.0  5.2 d 
   Dairy 6.2  6.5  13.0  
      Butter 6.8  6.8  14.1  
      Cheese 8.1  5.2  13.7  
      Condensed and evaporated dairye 4.6  11.5  16.6  
      Dry dairy products 3.7  5.3  9.2  
      Ice cream 1.5  5.8  7.4  
      Fluid milk 3.7  2.6  6.3  
   Tobacco 3.7  4.6  8.5  
   Sugar 1.3  12.2  13.7  
   Canned tuna 10.5  0.0  10.5  
       
Textiles and apparel       
   Yarn, thread, and fabric 3.6  0.0  3.6  
   Other textiles products 5.8  0.0  5.8  
   Apparel 9.6  0.0  9.6  
       
Other manufacturing sectors       
   Ball and roller bearings 5.5  0.0  5.5  
   Ceramic tile 5.9  0.0  5.9  
   Costume jewelry 5.8  0.0  5.8  
   Footwear and leather products 9.8  0.0  9.8  
   Glass and glass products 3.8  0.0  3.8  
   Hand tools 4.1  0.0  4.1  
   Writing instruments 4.7  0.0  4.7  
   Pesticides and agricultural chemicals 2.7  0.0  2.7  
   China tableware 6.3  0.0  6.3  
   Tires 2.3  0.0  2.3  
Source: Commission estimates based on tariff rates and TRQ commitments in the USAGE model 
projection for 2015. 
 
Note: The table provides projected 2015 tariff and TRQ values, which may differ from their 2010 values. 
For example, projected tariffs may be below their 2010 values because of tariff staging in U.S. trade 
agreements. 
 
   aMeasured as an ad valorem equivalent share of the c.i.f. value of imports.  
   bMeasured as an export tax equivalent, the degree to which a TRQ increases the export price of a 
commodity (i.e., the price before entry into the United States). 
   cThe total effect includes the interaction of tariffs and TRQs, and in most cases exceeds the sum of these 
effects. 
   dIncluding the additional “other duty or charge.”  See chap. 2 for details. 
   eExcluding concentrated milk protein products. 
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BOX 1.1 Decline of U.S. imports entering under TRQs 
Imports subject to TRQs have declined substantially in volume in recent years. Among all such goods, 
sugar is the only major commodity for which imports are substantially above their volume in 2004 (see 
figure below).a  Imports of most other commodities have trended downward.b Lower quantities indicate 
that over the past decade TRQs have become a smaller barrier to imports of most of the products to 
which they are applied, as is reflected in estimates throughout this update. 
 
Quantity of in-quota imports subject to U.S. TRQs, 2000–2010 
 
 
 
Source: USITC DataWeb/USDOC.  
Note: Ethanol imports based on Commission estimates of imports entering under the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative dehydration program. Liters converted to kilograms based on the density of ethanol. 
Only imports of sugar and ethanol exhibited any notable increases in volume between 2004 and 2010. 
USDA relaxed sugar TRQs in 2006 after Hurricane Katrina damaged U.S. refineries.c After the 2006 
spike, increases in sugar imports have come largely from Mexico, which as a result of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is no longer subject to these TRQs. The changes in ethanol 
imports were more transitory. Implementation of the Renewable Fuel Standard resulted in the 2006 
import increase.d Initially, domestic ethanol supply was limited, but imports declined sharply after 2008 
as the domestic industry expanded. 
 
Declining imports in other sectors largely reflect changes in global market conditions and do not reflect 
major changes in intent or action on the part of the U.S. government. In the beef and dairy sectors, while 
import values have held fairly steady since 2004, import quantities have fallen substantially. Global 
market forces have simultaneously reduced supply to the United States while driving up world prices;  
 
   aEthanol imports are included in the figure and discussion because they are subject to quantitative 
restraints under an origin quota, although this is not a TRQ. 
   bImport values of some commodities increased from 2004 to 2010 because agriculture prices have 
risen markedly (48 percent overall). USDOL, BLS, Import/Export Price Indexes (accessed April 1, 2011). 
   cUSDA, ERS, Sugar and Sweeteners Market Outlook, 2006, 42–43. 
   dFor additional ethanol market information, see chap. 2 of this update and USITC, Import Restraints, 
Sixth Update, 2009, 24–25. 
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BOX 1.1 Decline of U.S. imports entering under TRQs—Continued 
factors include drought in Australia and New Zealand and increased demand in emerging markets such 
as Russia and Asia.e As a result, beef TRQs have become much less restrictive, and so have not been 
included as a sector with significant restraints in this (or the previous) update of this report. Only 
Uruguay continues to fill its quota, but it accounts for a small share of U.S. beef imports. 
 
Cheese is a good example of a dairy sector with declining import quantities. The quantity of imported 
cheese has gone down every year since peaking in 2004 (see figure below). The reductions have been 
quite broad, affecting multiple types of cheese and multiple import sources. Imports from Australia have 
fallen dramatically (e.g., from 91 percent of the quota allocation for swiss cheese in 2005 to 4 percent in 
2010). Among all sources, only Norway filled its quota allocation in 2010. As world prices have risen, 
consumers have purchased more U.S. cheese, generating increased domestic production and exports.f 
 
Quantity of imported cheese subject to U.S. TRQs, 2000–2010 
 
 
 
Source: USITC DataWeb/USDOC. 
 
Note: American varieties include cheddar, colby, and american cheese. European varieties include 
gouda, edam, blue-mold, gruyère, swiss, and emmentaler.  
 
   eUSDA, FAS, Dairy: World Market and Trade, 2010, 2–3. 
   fFor more market information, see the dairy discussion in chap. 2. 
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U.S. and Global Supply Chains 
Chapter 3 provides an overview and analysis of global supply chains. Much of the 
discussion—the overview, a number of case studies, and a review of the ways that firms’ 
participation in supply chains affects the U.S. economy—draws on a wide variety of 
literature on the subject, including economic journals, business and management studies, 
trade publications, government reports, and studies from institutions for the promotion 
and understanding of global value chains.  
 
In addition, the chapter presents new indicators of U.S. integration in global supply 
chains based on the amount of value contributed by workers and firms in each country to 
the production of goods and services. A breakdown of a country’s contribution to a 
specific good or service—whether to its design, production, assembly, or delivery—can 
provide a succinct snapshot of that country’s role and its integration with other countries 
in a particular sector, such as motor vehicles. For example, for U.S. imports of auto parts 
from Mexico, the database used in this report estimates the share of the import value that 
was added in Mexico and the value that was added in other countries that produce and 
export semifinished components to Mexico. The database also estimates the amount of 
foreign value that is incorporated into motor vehicles and parts consumed in the United 
States, as well as the foreign value incorporated into motor vehicles exported by U.S. 
companies. 
 
Ultimately, these measures reveal how dependent U.S. consumers and companies are on 
value produced in major countries and regions abroad. The analysis of value provides 
important detail unavailable in official trade statistics. For example, the import value of 
an iPhone from China was $179 in 2009, but a recent study shows that as little as $6.50 
of this value was added in Chinese assembly operations, with the rest of the value being 
added in upstream activities in Japan, Korea, and the United States, which supply parts 
and components for the phone.17  
 
Such product-specific analysis of value is beyond the scope of the current report, which 
provides industry-level analysis based on U.S. and foreign input-output tables that are 
linked by global trade statistics. Input-output tables report the “value added” by each 
industry, which equals the portion of value that exceeds the cost of intermediate inputs, 
and includes workers’ wages and company profits. Because a global supply chain 
consists of a network in which each company purchases inputs and then adds value to a 
good or service, value added exactly captures the contribution of workers and firms in a 
particular industry and country to the value of a good. The sum of the value added by 
workers and companies in every country in the chain equals the value of goods produced 
by the network.18  
 
Tracking value added in products that travel across multiple borders requires knowledge 
of industrial linkages within countries and between them. In fact, this analysis requires 
three distinct types of information. First, it is necessary to track how intermediate goods 
and services produced in one industry are used, and subsequently exported, by other 
industries in the same country. As with value added, these domestic linkages are 
summarized in input-output tables. Second, it is necessary to distinguish intermediate 
inputs that flow across national borders, which are identified in this study by examining 
detailed trade data and assessing which products are intermediates and which are 
(chiefly) used as final goods. Third, it is necessary to track linkages from one industry to 
                                                          
17 Xing and Detert, “How the iPhone Widens the United States Trade Deficit with the People’s 
Republic of China,” 2010.  
18 Koopman et al., “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due,” 2010, 6. 
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another across international borders, such as the amount of Japanese steel imported by 
U.S. automakers. Because such data for the United States are not publicly available, this 
study employs the assumption, common in studies of global supply chains, that all 
industries in a given country use the same proportion of intermediate inputs from a 
specific source.19 Although this assumption introduces some uncertainty into the 
calculations, it is at this time the only way to make these estimates for the United States 
without using confidential data collected from individual companies.20 
 
The database employed in this study is based on a global set of linked input-output tables 
for the year 2004 available through the Global Trade and Analysis Project (GTAP) in 
Purdue University, along with the detailed trade data and assumptions described in the 
previous paragraph. More recent estimates are not available, because tracking global 
economic linkages requires inter-country input-output data.21 This study, however, does 
examine more recent U.S. trends with similar, but less informative methods employing 
only U.S. input-output data.22 
 
While the global database has limitations, it is based on the most accurate and 
comprehensive data available, and has been shown to provide estimates quite similar to 
those of related studies of global value-added flows.23 Because the exact value of 
imported intermediate inputs used by each sector cannot be known with certainty, 
estimates in chapter 3 are most precise at the aggregate level for U.S. imports, 
consumption, and exports. Sectoral estimates illustrate the degree of integration of one 
U.S. industry in global supply chains compared with that of other U.S. industries, but the 
exact value of foreign content for specific industries cannot be determined without further 
information on industrial use of imported intermediate inputs. Box 3.4 discusses how 
improved data could improve our understanding of U.S. participation in global supply 
chains and its effects. 
 
                                                          
19 This is equivalent to assuming that if 5 percent of U.S. imported steel comes from Japan, then Japan 
accounts for 5 percent of imported steel in both the auto sector and the construction sector (and all other U.S. 
sectors). Studies that maintain this same assumption include Daudin et al., “Who Produces for Whom in the 
World Economy?” 2009; Johnson and Noguera, “Accounting for Intermediates,” 2010; and a number of 
studies based on the World Input-Output Database, such as Foster et al., “Patterns of Net Trade in Value 
Added,” 2011. 
20 For discussion of the limitations of this approach and a call for U.S. statistical agencies to make the 
information more readily available, see Feenstra et al., “Report on the State of Available Data,” 2010, 5–6.  
21 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Institute of Developing 
Economies in Japan, and the World Input-Output Database have initiatives to incorporate more recent data, 
though none will be completed before 2012. 
22 The chief limitation of the U.S.-specific methods is their inability to distinguish U.S. value that 
returns from abroad embodied in imported goods and services. Such returned U.S. value can be substantial in 
sectors such as motor vehicles, electronics, and machinery. (See table 3.3.) In the U.S.-specific methods, all 
returned U.S. value is erroneously counted as foreign value. 
23 The database in this study is based on Koopman et al., “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due,” 2010. 
Related studies with similar estimates for global value-added flows include Daudin et al., “Who Produces for 
Whom in the World Economy?” 2009, and Johnson and Noguera, “Accounting for Intermediates,” 2010. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Effects of Removing Significant Import 
Restraints 
This chapter examines the effects of removing significant U.S. import restraints on U.S. 
consumers, companies, and workers. Removing these barriers to trade is expected to 
increase domestic welfare, exports, and imports. At the same time, however, it is 
expected to reduce output and employment in sectors most directly affected by the 
liberalizations. 
 
For each industry with a significant restraint, the chapter presents updates on market 
conditions, explains and evaluates the import restrictions, and assesses the effects of 
removing those restrictions. Estimates are produced by the dynamic USAGE model and 
are assessed relative to a baseline of projected industry growth to 2015.1 As in previous 
updates, this chapter first presents the effects of simultaneously liberalizing all sectors 
with quantified import restraints, and then presents the effects of individual liberalization 
of specific sectors. Not every sector with a significant restraint receives an individual 
writeup; those are reserved for sectors with multiple restraints or more complex 
restraints. Sectors affected chiefly by high tariffs are discussed together at the end of the 
chapter. 
 
Relative to the previous update, the largest changes in the present update were driven by 
trade policy changes affecting textiles and apparel and by U.S. regulatory changes in the 
ethanol sector. The elimination of quantitative restraints on imports of textiles and 
apparel from China and Vietnam in 2008 substantially reduced the cost (in net welfare 
terms) of textile and apparel restraints. By contrast, the estimated cost of restraints on 
ethanol imports increased, because demand for ethanol is projected to rise rapidly in the 
near future following mandates for increased use of renewable fuels. The long-term 
decline in imports subject to tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) also played a moderate role, 
particularly in dairy sectors. 
 
Although the model estimates that the magnitudes of change will differ by sector, the 
changes in the markets for liberalized goods are broadly similar. Removing a measure 
such as a TRQ reduces the landed, duty-paid price of the affected U.S. import. The 
decline in the import price is related to the restrictiveness of the trade measure, with the 
elimination of more restrictive measures inducing larger declines. To compete with 
lower-priced imports, U.S. producers of similar commodities reduce their prices. 
Therefore, these producers supply less to the domestic market, and output and 
employment decline in these industries; some producers may go out of business. 
Remaining U.S. producers of the good become more competitive in the world economy 
and increase exports. 
 
Users of the liberalized good benefit from the changes. As the prices of imported and 
domestic goods fall, consumption of the liberalized good increases. Consumers benefit 
because they can continue to buy the same quantity of the good at a lower price and have 
money remaining for other uses. Producers who use the product as an input become more 
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. Overall, the gains typically outweigh 
the costs, although there are distributional effects. For example, workers employed in 
                                                          
1 See chap. 1 and app. E for more details about the analytical framework and the baseline projection. 
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import-competing industries face the prospect of job loss and lower wages. Households 
broadly benefit from lower-cost consumption, but not every household gains. Those 
facing dislocation bear greater costs, barring any special assistance that they may receive. 
The same distributional effects hold for capital owners (owners or investors in firms) in 
different sectors of the economy. 
 
Effects of Removing All Significant Import Restraints 
Effects of Liberalization on the Aggregate Economy Relative to 
Projected Trends, 2005–15  
Although the U.S. and global recessions between 2007 and 2009 resulted in temporary 
GDP declines, the model baseline projects that the U.S. GDP will expand by 20.8 percent 
between 2005 and 2015 (or 1.9 percent per year), with U.S. international trade growing 
substantially faster in that period (table 2.1).2 Relative to this baseline, liberalizing all 
significant import restraints at once, including eliminating all preferential rules of origin 
(ROO) in textiles and apparel, is estimated to increase U.S. GDP by $2.2 billion, imports 
by $11.5 billion, and exports by $9.0 billion. Expressed in percentage terms, these 
economy-wide effects are small relative to the projected growth in the period. For 
example, U.S. imports would expand by 24.4 percent with liberalization instead of 24.0 
percent without it. The net economic welfare gain (a measure of increased consumer 
purchasing power) for the entire economy from simultaneous liberalization of quantified 
restraints is estimated at $2.6 billion. As noted in chapter 1, wage rates adjust in the 
simulation so that the trade liberalization has no effect on aggregate employment. 
 
Effects of Liberalization on Individual Sectors Relative to Projected 
Trends, 2005–15  
When all significant U.S. import restraints are eliminated at once, almost all liberalized 
sectors show the expected patterns of declining domestic production, employment, and 
prices, along with increases in imports and exports (table 2.2).3 Among all liberalized 
sectors, textiles and apparel shrinks the most, with an overall output decline of nearly 10 
percent. The large declines in these sectors occur because the elimination of preferential 
ROO sharply reduces foreign demand for U.S.-produced apparel inputs, and so overall 
exports decline by more than 50 percent. 
 
Appendix table E.4 provides additional detail for individual products. As in the aggregate 
sectors, liberalization would reduce output in nearly all affected products, although 
output of a few products expands because liberalization allows for cheaper imports of 
intermediate products. For example, cane sugar refiners benefit from the liberalization 
because they gain access to larger quantities of cheaper imported inputs (foreign raw cane 
sugar), while beet sugar refiners and the sugar farming sector suffer losses from 
liberalization.4 
                                                          
2 These projected macroeconomic changes provide the baseline for all liberalizations in this chapter. 
See chap. 1 and app. E for additional details about the macroeconomy in the baseline projection. 
3 Price changes can be found in app. table E.4. 
4 Beet sugar refiners do not benefit because there is little international trade in sugar beets. 
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TABLE 2.1  U.S. national economy: Summary data and simulation results 
  
Item 
Summary data Projected 
change, 
2005–15 (%) 
Effect of 
liberalization 
(%) 2007 2008 2009 2010 
  Millions of employeesa   
Employment 137.6 136.8 130.8 129.8 8.9 0.0c 
  Billions of real $   
GDP  14,061.8 14,369.1 14,119.0 14,660.4 20.8 (+) 
Importsb 2,375.7 2,553.8 1,964.7 2,353.9 24.0 0.4 
Exportsb 1,661.7 1,843.4 1,578.4 1,837.5 59.0 0.3 
Sources: USDOC, BEA, National Economic Accounts; USDOL, BLS, CES Survey Database (accessed July 
13, 2011); Commission estimates for projection and liberalization. 
  
Note: (+) denotes a small positive change of less than 0.05 percent. Effects of liberalization represent 
deviations from the projected changes. 
 
   aEmployees on nonfarm payrolls. 
   bIncluding goods and services. 
   cTotal change in employment is fixed at zero. 
 
TABLE 2.2  Simultaneous liberalization of all significant restraints: Effect on liberalized sectors in 2015 
(percent) 
Sectora Employment Output Imports Exports 
Food and agriculture     
   Ethanol –4.4 –4.6 44.4 (b) 
   Dairy –1.0 –1.2 62.7 5.2 
   Tobacco –0.5 –0.5 21.8 4.2 
   Sugar –1.8 –1.3 31.0 10.4 
   Canned tuna –6.6 –8.2 20.1 13.0 
     
All textiles and apparel –8.9 –9.8 1.9 –51.9 
   Yarn, thread, and fabric –9.2 –8.6 –1.7 –30.3 
   Other textile products –4.4 –4.9 1.4 –46.4 
   Apparel –15.9 –15.9 2.2 –89.1 
     
Other manufacturing sectors     
   Ball and roller bearings –3.7 –3.7 10.6 0.7 
   Ceramic tile –4.4 –4.4 2.4 0.6 
   Costume jewelry –2.3 –2.3 4.9 1.1 
   Footwear and leather products –1.7 –1.6 4.1 0.4 
   Glass and glass products (+) (+) 5.6 4.0 
   Hand tools –0.2 –0.2 2.0 0.2 
   Writing instruments –1.8 –1.7 4.0 1.5 
   Pesticides and agricultural chemicals 0.1 0.1 3.1 1.6 
   China tableware –4.0 –4.0 4.1 0.5 
   Tires –0.3 –0.3 1.6 0.4 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
Note: (+) denotes a small positive change of less than 0.05 percent.. Effects of liberalization represent 
deviations from the projected changes. Results in this table may differ from those in later tables in this 
chapter that show the effects of sector-by-sector liberalization. 
 
   aSee app. table E.6 for sector definitions. 
   bNot applicable because exports decline to zero in the baseline. See ethanol discussion below. 
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Ethanol 
The great bulk of U.S. ethanol (ethyl alcohol) production is derived from corn.5 Ethanol 
can be mixed with gasoline to lessen the emissions created by fuel combustion in 
gasoline engines, and it can also be used as a gasoline extender or substitute. U.S. 
production of ethanol in 2010 reached a record 13.1 billion gallons, valued at $22.0 
billion (table 2.3). Production in 2010 was near U.S. capacity, which totaled 
approximately 13.5 billion gallons as of January 2011.6 The United States is the leading 
global producer and consumer of fuel ethanol, accounting for 58 percent of world 
production and consumption in 2010.7 The U.S. ethanol industry employed 9,727 
workers in 2010. In recent years, U.S. imports of ethanol have dropped precipitously, 
while exports have expanded in equal measure, due to rising world prices and lower 
imports from Brazil, previously a major global exporter.8 
 
Much of current U.S. use of ethanol is driven by legislation enacted in 2005 and 2007, 
and these acts will drive even greater use in the future. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 
established the Renewable Fuel Program (RFP), which mandated that renewable fuels, 
including ethanol, be blended with gasoline.9 The Energy Independence and Security Act 
of 2007 made several changes to the Energy Policy Act and established the Renewable 
Fuel Standard (RFS).10 The RFS requires substantial use of ethanol, and the mandate 
increases rapidly over time. Mandated quantities more than tripled between 2006 and 
2010, and will nearly triple again by 2022. The RFS also requires that specific quantities 
must be produced from particular feedstocks, such as cellulose or non-corn starch. The 
RFS can be filled by ethanol from domestic production as well as from imports. 
Therefore, these mandates may increase demand for imported ethanol produced from 
some feedstocks that are not produced in high volume in the United States. 
 
The RFS requires that 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel be mixed into domestic 
gasoline supplies by 2022 (figure 2.1). Of this amount, 21 billion gallons must be of 
advanced biofuel—16 billion gallons of cellulosic biofuel, 1 billion gallons of biomass-
based diesel, and 4 billion gallons of unspecified advanced biofuel that can be produced 
from non-corn-based feedstocks, such as sugarcane. Cellulosic ethanol is not produced in 
commercial quantities anywhere in the world. Sugarcane ethanol is not produced in 
significant quantities in the United States. Brazil is by far the world’s leading producer of 
sugarcane ethanol and has been a significant supplier of U.S. ethanol imports, both 
directly and through certain Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) countries under a special 
quota for ethanol dehydrated in beneficiary countries. The feedstock for the remaining 15 
billion gallons of renewable fuel is unspecified; this is the only category available to corn 
ethanol, which is produced in abundance in the United States. However, biofuel in more 
restrictive categories may fill the requirement in less restrictive categories. For example, 
sugarcane ethanol can fill the RFS category (unspecified renewable fuel) that applies to 
corn ethanol. 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 There are two different processes used in the United States to produce ethanol from corn: dry corn 
milling and wet corn milling. The production of ethanol from cellulosic biomass is still under development 
and has yet to be commercialized. 
6 RFA, Statistics (accessed March 16, 2011). 
7 Calculated based on data from LMC International. 
8 Exports include non-beverage ethanol for uses other than fuel. 
9 Pub. L. No. 109-58. 
10 Pub. L. No. 110-140. 
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TABLE 2.3  Ethanol for fuel use: Summary data and simulation results  
Item 
Summary data   Projected 
change,   
2005–15 (%) 
Effect of 
liberalization (%) 2007 2008 2009 2010   
Employment (employees) 7,029 9,182 9,603 9,727  202.2 –4.4 
Production (millions of $)a 14,316 12,386 14,316 22,026  374.5 –4.7 
Imports (millions of $) 855 1,249 358 33  888.4 44.8 
Exports (millions of $) 7 374 245 883  –99.9 (b) 
Sources: Employment compiled from the USDOL, BLS, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
(accessed February 24, 2011); imports and exports compiled from official statistics of the USDOC; 
Commission estimates for projection and liberalization. 
 
Note: Model sectors are determined by U.S. input-output classifications and may differ from summary data. 
Projected changes are based on quantity trends. Effects of liberalization represent deviations from the 
projected changes. See app. E for details and table E.6 for sector definitions. 
 
   aCalculated based on quantity data from the USDOE, EIA, and price data from LMC International. 
   bNot applicable because exports decline to zero in the baseline. 
 
FIGURE 2.1  The RFS: Mandated ethanol use rises rapidly 
 
Source: Energy Policy Act; Energy Independence and Security Act. 
 
Note: Data for 2006 and 2007 represent the mandate under the RFP. 
 
Beginning in 2009, the RFS addresses four separate categories of biofuel, listing specific 
amounts of each that must be blended with U.S. gasoline. Some volume requirements 
have already been reallocated, due to continued delay in the commercialization of 
cellulosic ethanol, though overall RFS totals have not changed.11 In 2010, the RFS was 
equivalent to 8.01 percent of projected U.S. gasoline and diesel consumption.  
 
“Blenders”—firms that mix ethanol into gasoline—are eligible for a partial exemption 
from the U.S. federal excise tax of 18.4 cents per gallon assessed on motor fuels. To earn 
this tax exemption, referred to as the volumetric ethanol excise tax credit (VEETC), the 
                                                          
11 The 2010 volume requirement for cellulosic biofuel was lowered from 100 million gallons to 6.5 
million gallons, and the 2011 volume requirement was lowered from 250 million gallons to 6 million gallons. 
Because the RFS total remained the same, the changes effectively increased the requirement for the 
unspecified advanced biofuel category in these years. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which 
administers the RFS, expects the shortfall to be filled mainly by biodiesel. EPA, EPA Finalizes Regulations, 
February 2010, 4; EPA, 75 Fed. Reg. 76792, December 9, 2010. 
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blenders must mix ethanol derived from renewable resources into a gallon of fuel.12 The 
VEETC, which replaced previous tax credits, became effective January 1, 2005.13 Set at 
51 cents per gallon of ethanol in 2008, the VEETC was reduced to 45 cents per gallon as 
of January 1, 2009, and has been extended until the end of 2011.14 Thus, gasoline blended 
with 10 percent ethanol has received a tax exemption equal to 4.5 cents per gallon since 
2009. The VEETC applies to both domestically produced and imported ethanol. 
 
Nature of Trade Restraints 
The United States administers two trade policy tools for imports of ethanol for fuel use: 
duties and an “origin quota,” explained below. There are two duties applicable to imports 
of fuel ethanol. General duty rates of about 2 percent apply to countries with normal trade 
relations (NTR) status.15 Duty-free treatment applies to beneficiary countries under all 
U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs), including 
beneficiaries under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), provided the country is 
a least-developed beneficiary country.  
 
An additional “other duty or charge” (ODC) of 54 cents per gallon is assessed on fuel 
ethanol imports from most countries.16 The ODC was established in 1980 to offset a tax 
credit (currently the VEETC), since the tax credit applies to imported as well as 
domestically produced fuel ethanol.17 The ODC currently is greater than the VEETC and 
expires together with the VEETC at the end of 2011. 
 
Under an origin quota certain countries receive duty-free access to the U.S. fuel ethanol 
market for a specified amount of ethanol dehydrated from non-beneficiary feedstocks.18 
Such feedstocks can originate in third countries, such as Brazil. In-quota imports from 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) beneficiaries, CAFTA-DR and U.S. 
island possessions enter free of duty.19 The over-quota imports are not considered to be a 
product of those countries and are assessed the rate applicable to the feedstocks’ country 
of origin. The quota has never been filled; the fill rate was 75 percent in 2008, 26 percent 
in 2009, and 0.7 percent in 2010.20 The sharp drop in the fill rate resulted from a decline 
in the availability of feedstock from Brazil. 
 
                                                          
12 Ethanol derived from petroleum, natural gas, or coal is not eligible for the tax exemption. 
13 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 301. 
14 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, §15331 (a) (1) (C). The VEETC 
expires at the end of 2011. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, §708, 124 Stat. 3312 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
111publ312/pdf/PLAW-111publ312.pdf. 
15 U.S. imports of fuel ethanol enter under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) subheadings 
2207.10.60 and 2207.20.00. The general duty rate for HTS subheading 2207.10.60 is 2.5 percent ad valorem; 
for HTS subheading 2207.20.00, it is 1.9 percent ad valorem. 
16 Least-developed GSP beneficiaries, CBERA and CAFTA-DR beneficiaries, ATPA beneficiaries, 
Canada, Israel, Mexico, and Peru are not subject to this duty. This additional duty is found in chap. 99, subch. 
I of the HTS. The applicable tariff subheading for the extra duty is 9901.00.50. 
17 Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499. The ODC initially was set at 10 cents per 
gallon. 
18 Steel Trade Liberalization Program Implementation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-221, § 7. Under the 
quota, CBERA beneficiaries as of the date of the implementation of the quota (1989) may import and 
dehydrate hydrous ethanol, mainly from Brazil, and export the finished product free of duty to the United 
States. The quota applies to duties under HTS chaps. 22 and 99. The quota is set at 7 percent of U.S. domestic 
use in the previous year. The quota quantity is 875.4 million gallons for calendar year 2011. The quota was 
452.2 million gallons in 2008, 621.5 million gallons in 2009, and 739.8 million gallons in 2010. 75 Fed. Reg. 
82069. 
19 CAFTA-DR reserves a part of the CBERA quota for El Salvador and Costa Rica. 
20 Data provided by the Customs and Border Protection Agency. For more information on the quota, 
see USITC, Import Restraints, Fourth Update, 2004. 
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Projected Industry Trends, 2005–15 
The baseline simulation projects a substantial increase in output and imports of ethanol 
by 2015, driven by the RFS mandates discussed above. U.S. production of corn-based 
ethanol is projected to expand from about 4 billion gallons in 2005 to 15 billion gallons 
by 2015, while cellulosic ethanol production expands to 3 billion gallons.21 As U.S. 
output is not expected to meet the quantity mandated by the RFS in 2015, imports of 
ethanol derived from sugarcane are also expected to expand significantly, totaling 1.5 
billion gallons by 2015. While the United States has recently exported some ethanol, 
these exports are anticipated to end by 2015 as domestic supply is diverted to satisfy the 
RFS mandates. As a result, projected U.S. exports in 2015 fall back to their 2005 level of 
nearly zero. 
 
Projecting the state of the ethanol market in 2015 is complicated by substantial 
uncertainty about policy and the evolution of the petroleum, biofuels, and agricultural 
markets. On the policy front, the demands of the RFS and the future of the VEETC and 
the ODC after their slated expiration at the end of 2011 have important implications for 
the restrictiveness of import restraints for imported ethanol. To meet the demands of the 
RFS, the current projection anticipates that substantially more sugar-based ethanol will 
need to be imported to reach the 2015 renewable fuel targets. However, it is also possible 
that waivers will be granted that relax some RFS targets, lessening the need to rely on 
imported ethanol to reach these targets. The projection assumes that the existing ODC 
will be renewed or a similar plan introduced by the end of 2011. If the ODC does indeed 
expire at the end of 2011, the benefits conferred by the origin quota would be largely 
eliminated; if imports under the origin quota disappeared, so would any effect on import 
prices. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the future of the U.S. ethanol market, box 
2.1 analyzes the effects of liberalization in plausible alternative projections. The box 
shows that reduced import prices following the elimination of the ODC would 
substantially reduce the estimated restrictiveness of the ethanol restraints.22 
 
Effects of Liberalization Relative to Projected Trends 
Liberalization of tariffs and origin quotas would increase U.S. welfare by $1,513 million, 
compared to an increase of $356 million in the previous report. The increase in welfare is 
driven principally by the projected increase in ethanol imports in 2015 as compared to 
2013 in order to satisfy the requirements of the RFS. Removing the origin quota would 
reduce import prices of ethanol by 15 percent, as compared to 25 percent in the previous 
update of this report.23 The elimination of origin quotas represents approximately 84 
percent of the gain in welfare from liberalization. Summary results from liberalization are 
shown in table 2.3; sectoral impacts of the liberalization are shown in figures 2.2 and 2.3 
and in appendix table E.5. 
 
The largest effects would occur in the ethanol sector itself, while modest effects are 
anticipated in related commodities. Elimination of tariffs and the origin quota would  
 
                                                          
21 The supply of domestic ethanol derived from other feedstocks is expected to grow, but is not 
anticipated to play an important role by 2015. In 2005, cellulosic ethanol was not produced in commercial 
quantities. 
22 The Import Restraints reports do not model the implications of changes in domestic tax policy. Thus, 
this update does not estimate the effects of eliminating the VEETC. 
23 The 25 percent price gap used in the previous (sixth) update was based on the difference between 
Brazilian and U.S. prices in 2009, when U.S. imports entering under the origin quota (employing Brazilian 
feedstock) were common. 
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lower the landed, duty-paid price of imported ethanol by 20 percent from the projected 
2015 baseline value (appendix table E.5.), increasing imports by 45 percent. The 
anticipated decline in domestic output is 2.2 percent, somewhat less than the prior study’s 
estimated decline of 2.6 percent, due primarily to the more modest price effect of the 
origin quota. Output of commodities other than ethanol that are produced by the corn 
milling industries are anticipated to expand slightly, as these markets become relatively 
more attractive with the decline in price for ethanol. Production of corn is also expected 
to contract by about 1 percent as a result of the decline in domestic production of corn-
based ethanol. Ethanol is predominantly produced by the dry corn milling industry; the 
contraction in ethanol production causes employment in dry corn milling to decline by 
about 6 percent. The decline in corn-based ethanol also leads to a 1 percent contraction in 
employment in feed grains production, which includes corn. 
  
BOX 2.1 Effects of liberalization in alternative projections of the U.S. ethanol market 
 
The targets specified in the RFS generate uncertainty about the future U.S. market for ethanol that is 
largely absent from projections in other sectors (such as dairy) that the Commission considers in this 
update. To address this uncertainty, the Commission has examined the effect of plausible alternative 
projections of the U.S. ethanol market in 2015. The prices and quantities in these alternatives differ from 
those in the current projection used in the main text. 
 
The price of imported ethanol is one important area of uncertainty. The current projection assumes a 15 
percent gap between the U.S. price of ethanol and the lower world price. To evaluate such effects, the 
Commission considered two possibilities: (a) a 25 percent gap, which matches the value used in the 
previous update of this report, when such imports were more prevalent, and (b) the elimination of the 
price gap, consistent with the expiration of the ODC (which would eliminate incentives to import under 
the origin quota). If the price gap for imported ethanol were 25 percent, welfare gains from liberalization 
would rise from $1,513 million to $2,585 million. If there were no price gap in 2015, however, the welfare 
benefits would total only $240 million. 
 
U.S. market conditions for ethanol in 2015 will also depend on the future world price of petroleum. Since 
ethanol is a substitute for petroleum, prices of the two goods are tightly linked. Future petroleum prices in 
the current projection are based on the 2015 central forecast by the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) of $88 per barrel (in 2005 dollars).a The EIA also projects low and high prices of oil 
for 2015 of $48 and $134, respectively. If future oil prices were only $48 per barrel, estimated welfare 
from liberalization of ethanol import restraints would expand slightly, to $1,567 million, because U.S. 
ethanol production would decline while imports would rise relative to the base case. With high oil prices, 
the benefits of liberalization would contract slightly, to $1,282 million. 
 
Other developments, particularly technological improvements, could have important effects on the 
ethanol market in 2015. For example, if cellulosic ethanol or other advanced technology biofuels were to 
expand to commercially significant quantities more quickly than anticipated, this could substantially 
reduce the need for imported ethanol. Similarly, any relaxation in the RFS standards for 2015 could also 
reduce import demand. Reductions in U.S. imports of ethanol would lower the welfare gains from 
liberalization. 
 
                                                          
   aUSDOE, EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2010, 2010, table C1. 
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FIGURE 2.2  Percent change in imports of ethanol, baseline projection and liberalization, 2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
FIGURE 2.3  Percent change in output of ethanol, baseline projection and liberalization, 2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
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Dairy Products 
The U.S. dairy industry comprises farms that produce milk and facilities processing milk 
into foods such as butter, cheese, ice cream, yogurt, and infant formula. The facilities also 
produce numerous products used mostly as inputs into processed foods, such as nonfat 
dry milk (NDM), whole milk powder, whey, lactose, milk protein concentrates, casein, 
and milk albumin.24 U.S. shipments of dairy products declined during the U.S. recession, 
from $84.6 billion in 2007 to $78.8 billion in 2009 (table 2.4). U.S. international trade in 
dairy products, which continues to be small relative to total domestic production, was 
also substantially affected by the downturn. Imports fell to below $2 billion and remain 
suppressed, while dairy exports have almost returned to their 2008 peak of $3.5 billion.  
 
U.S. imports of dairy products largely consist of either high-end consumer items, such as 
European specialty cheeses and novelty ice cream, or intermediate inputs not produced 
domestically in sufficient quantities, such as casein and milk protein concentrates. Major 
U.S. dairy exports in 2010 were largely bulk commodity goods, such as NDM, cheese, 
whey, milk albumin, lactose, and butter. 
 
Nature of Trade Restraints  
The dairy sector is subject to relatively high average tariffs and the greatest number of 
quantitative restraints of any sector in this report, with 27 separate dairy TRQs.25 
Moreover, import restraints affect a wide variety of dairy products, including fluid milk 
and cream, butter, cheese, powdered milk products, ice cream, infant formula, and dairy-
based animal feeds.26 The restraints operate in conjunction with a complex system of 
federal, state, and local laws to maintain price and production supports for the domestic 
dairy industry. Federal programs include domestic price supports, milk marketing orders, 
the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP), and domestic and international food aid 
programs.27  
 
Dairy products imported into the United States that were not subject to TRQs, including 
certain varieties of cheese (mainly cheese made of sheep and goat’s milk) and certain 
inputs to processed foods, accounted for roughly one-half of the total value of U.S. dairy 
imports in 2009 and 2010.28 Dairy imports not subject to TRQs typically face low or  
 
                                                          
24 For detailed information on the U.S. dairy industry and globally traded dairy goods, see USITC, 
Conditions of Competition for Milk Protein Products in the U.S. Market, 2004. 
25 U.S. domestic and trade policies for dairy products were developed in the 1930s in response to price 
declines in the Great Depression. As part of the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
that went into effect on January 1, 1995, a system of TRQs replaced fixed import quotas that were 
inconsistent with WTO disciplines. 
26 In addition, some food preparations and chocolate products covered in chaps. 18, 19, and 21 of the 
HTS that contain dairy products also face import restraints. 
27 The DEIP covers NDM, butterfat, and various cheeses. It helps U.S. dairy exporters match prevailing 
prices in certain export markets by paying cash bonuses. The DEIP is designed to develop export markets 
where U.S. products are not competitive because of subsidized dairy products from other countries. As part of 
its WTO commitments resulting from the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, the United States has established 
annual export subsidy ceilings by commodity with respect to maximum permitted quantities and maximum 
budgetary expenditures. USDA did not fund the DEIP from the beginning of fiscal year 2005 until May 2009 
because U.S. export prices for NDM, butter, and many varieties of cheese were globally competitive. For 
more information on DEIP, see USDA, FAS, Fact Sheet, November 2009. 
28 The National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF) estimates the percent of U.S. dairy imports not 
subject to TRQs to be somewhat higher, equal to 62 percent in 2009. The difference is likely to be the result 
of how dairy imports are defined. NMPF, written submission to the USITC, February 4, 2011, 5. 
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moderate tariffs. Casein, caseinates, milk protein concentrates, and milk albumin were 
imported largely free of duty and accounted for more than one-third (34 percent) of all 
dairy imports in 2010 (table 2.5). 
 
TABLE 2.4  Dairy products: Summary data and simulation results 
Item 
Summary data Projected 
change,  
2005–15 (%) 
Effect of 
liberalization 
(%) 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Employment Employees   
Total dairy 129,600 131,900 131,100 (a) 7.5 –1.0 
   Butter (b) (b)  (b) (
a) 11.0 –2.1 
   Cheese 40,000 42,200 41,600 (
a) 13.8 –1.6 
   Dry/condensed milk products 15,000 14,200 13,100 (
a) 24.1 –2.8 
   Fluid milk 55,600 57,300 58,000 (
a) 5.5 –0.3 
   Ice cream  19,000 18,200 18,400 (
a) –10.3 –0.2 
    
Shipments Millions of $   
Total dairy 84,562 90,610 78,783 (a) 19.9 –1.2 
   Butter 2,520 2,729 2,437 (
a) 22.3 –2.0 
   Cheese 29,754 34,234 28,053 (
a) 27.3 –1.6 
   Dry/condensed milk products 13,935 15,122 13,017 (
a) 32.3 –4.2 
   Fluid milk 29,384 30,623 27,348 (
a) 15.7 –0.2 
   Ice cream  8,969 7,902 7,928 (
a) –3.0 –0.1 
       
Imports       
Total dairy 2,229 2,533 1,977 1,984 –33.5 62.6 
   Butter 65 49 44 46 –6.1 51.9 
   Cheese 1,108 1,168 1,005 967 –27.9 64.7 
   Dry/condensed milk products 1,010 1,270 873 913 –45.0 65.0 
   Fluid milk 8 8 8 8 –71.4 35.7 
   Ice cream  39 38 47 49 43.6 24.1 
       
Exports       
Total dairy 2,754 3,501 2,024 3,444 79.1 4.3 
   Butter 112 272 81 202 2516.2 3.5 
   Cheese 388 570 430 694 113.7 10.0 
   Dry/condensed milk products 2,158 2,555 1,404 2,404 11.2 1.7 
   Fluid milk 37 42 44 60 257.5 0.3 
   Ice cream  60 62 64 83 48.4 0.3 
Sources: Commission estimates for 2007 employment data based on USDA price and production data taken from 
USDA, AMS, Dairy Market Statistics, 2008; non-employment 2007 data taken from USDOC, Census, Annual 
Survey of Manufactures 2008 (accessed February 25, 2011); 2007 ice cream pricing data taken from Gould, 
“Understanding Dairy Markets” (accessed April 8, 2011); 2008 and 2009 data taken from USDOC, Census, Annual 
Survey of Manufactures 2009 (accessed February 25, 2011); data on U.S. imports and exports taken from USITC 
DataWeb/USDOC; Commission estimates for projection and liberalization. 
 
Note: Model sectors are determined by U.S. input-output classifications and may differ from summary data. 
Projected changes are based on quantity trends. Effects of liberalization represent deviations from the projected 
changes. See app. E for details and table E.6 for sector definitions.  
 
   aNot available. 
   bEmployment data for butter manufacturing is combined with fluid milk and cream in USDOC, Census, Annual 
Survey of Manufactures (accessed February 25, 2011). 
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TABLE 2.5  Dairy import restraint overview, representative products and sources, 2010 
Item, with selected sources 
AVE tariff rate (%)  Imports (1,000 kg)  TRQ 
In-quotaa Over-quotab, c  In-quotaa Over-quotab, c  
Fill rate 
(%) 
Allocation 
(1,000 kg) 
Subject to TRQd                 
Butter         
   From the EU 2.0 17.8  77.2 55.0  80.3 96.2 
   From New Zealand 4.9 8.8  38.6 127.5  25.6 150.6 
   From all other countries 1.0 20.9  3,168.1 86.9  47.1 6,730.2 
Skim milk powder 0.6 16.4  107.0 36.4  2.0 5,261.0 
Whole milk powder 4.5 13.3  1,234.1 120.2  37.2 3,321.3 
Cheddar cheese       
   From FTA beneficiaries 0.2 4.5  897.6 483.1  33.6 2,670.0 
   From the EU 11.4 15.9  1,203.3 775.2  91.6 1,313.0 
   From New Zealand 10.9 —  168.3 0.0  2.1 8,200.0 
   From all other countries 1.1 17.0  3,594.9e 183.0  1,498.6e 239.9 
Swiss cheese       
   From the EU 6.2 21.6  10,804.5 17.1  47.2 22,900.0 
   From Norway 6.1 —  6,497.6 0.0  94.4 6,883.0 
   From Switzerland 6.2 14.3  2,030.3 1.0  55.9 3,630.0 
   From all other countries 5.4 22.3  58,901.4 6.2  57.6 102,172.8 
         
Not subject to TRQf Total AVE tariff rate (%) Total imports (1,000 kg)    
Milk protein concentrates 0.1  58,481.2    
Casein and caseinates 0.0  63,466.0    
Sheep’s milk cheeses 0.1  24,015.7    
Milk albumin 0.0   7,166.2    
 
   aCommission estimate. Imports for specific countries may have entered under the "all other country" and 
FTA TRQs.  
   bOver-quota imports may enter under separate tariff lines.  
   cExcluding over-quota shipments from FTA partners that enter duty free. 
   dIncluded in the following U.S. Additional Notes in HTS chap. 4: Butter (note 6); skim milk powder 
(note 7); whole milk powder (note 8); cheddar cheese (note 18); swiss cheese (note 25). 
   eImport quantities from Australia, Canada, Egypt, India, Ireland, Jamaica, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom subject to licensing requirements under the “any country” TRQ for cheddar cheese (note 18) far 
exceeded the allocated TRQ volume. Therefore, the fill rate is greater than 100 percent. 
   fIncluded in the following HTS codes: Milk protein concentrates (0404.90.10 and 3501.10.10); casein and 
caseinates (3501.10.50 and 3501.90.60); cheeses made from sheep milk (0406.90.56, 0406.90.57, and 
0406.90.59); milk albumin (3502.20). 
 
Dairy products that are subject to TRQs encompass about two-thirds of the 392 HTS 10-
digit tariff classifications in the dairy sector. Most of the 27 TRQs have country-specific 
in-quota volume allocations. U.S. imports of dairy products subject to these TRQs are 
primarily cheese, ice cream, butter, yogurt, and milk powder. In-quota tariff rates on 
these products are generally below 10 percent ad valorem equivalent (AVE), while over-
quota AVE rates can exceed 20 percent. For some products, such as butter from New 
Zealand or cheddar cheese from the EU, over-quota imports are common because the 
over-quota AVE is only slightly higher than the in-quota rate. For other products, over-
quota imports occur because certain U.S. FTAs allow duty-free over-quota imports from 
beneficiary countries (particularly Mexico and Australia). 
 
TRQ fill rates—the ratio between actual imports under the quota and the allotted quota 
level—reflect the restrictiveness of restraints: the higher the fill rate, the more restrictive 
the restraint. In 2009, fill rates for butter, butter substitutes, and whole milk powder 
typically met or exceeded 90 percent, including allocations for large global producers 
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such as New Zealand and the EU. In the cheese categories, 2009 TRQs were effectively 
filled (over 85 percent) for products such as Italian-style and cheddar (although other 
types of cheese had lower fill rates).29  
 
In general, however, fill rates for U.S. dairy TRQs were significantly lower in 2010 than 
in 2009, reflecting global market forces such as rising demand in emerging markets.30 
Global dairy exporters such as New Zealand, Australia, and to a certain extent the EU 
have begun to export their production surpluses to expanding markets in Asia and the 
Middle East rather than to the United States. As dairy prices offered by rapidly 
developing economies converge with U.S. prices, the United States is no longer always 
the destination market of choice. Instead, major dairy exporting countries (including the 
United States) are responding to market signals by shifting sales to regions of the world 
with traditionally low consumption of dairy products. These trends are expected to 
continue through the medium term (and likely longer) and are reflected in the sector-
specific forecasts for dairy products in the simulation. 
 
Projected Industry Trends, 2005–15 
The projection for the dairy industry anticipates a continuation of recent favorable 
trends.31 U.S. production across all dairy sectors expands by about 20 percent over the 
period 2005 to 2015, partly in response to rising global demand. Exports are expected to 
increase by 79 percent over the 10-year period, while imports are anticipated to decline 
by about a third. Overall employment is expected to rise slowly, by less than 1 percent 
per year, while rising productivity accommodates growth in output. 
 
Effects of Liberalization Relative to Projected Trends 
Liberalization of U.S. import restraints on dairy products is anticipated to increase U.S. 
welfare by $223 million in 2015, much less than the increase of $732 million by 2013 
that was estimated in the previous report. Liberalization is modeled by removing all 
TRQs and duties on butter, cheese, ice cream, fluid milk, and dry, condensed, and 
evaporated dairy products. Table 2.4 and figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the summary results of 
this liberalization. Results for specific dairy sectors, as well as for sectors that provide 
inputs to dairy production, are presented in appendix table E.5. Among dairy products, 
the greatest effect is observed in condensed and evaporated dairy products, the sector 
with the greatest overall trade restraints (see table 1.2).32 Rising world prices for dairy 
products have lessened the restrictiveness of dairy TRQs, moderating trade restraints in 
the industry substantially since the last study. This in turn has lessened the estimated 
benefits of dairy liberalization. 
  
                                                          
29 Even in cases where broad quota categories remain unfilled, TRQs can restrain imports if country-
specific quantitative limits are filled and importers are forced to shift to other suppliers. 
30 See box 1.1 for a more detailed discussion of declines in imports subject to dairy TRQs. 
31 To produce the 2005–15 projection, observed quantities of U.S. dairy imports, exports, and output in 
the 2005–10 period were combined with dairy supply and use projections from the Food and Agricultural 
Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) for 2010–15. FAPRI, U.S. Baseline Briefing Book, 2011. See app. E for 
additional details. 
32 These restraints include both tariffs and TRQ effects, as measured by the effect that each has on the 
price of imports. 
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FIGURE 2.4  Percent change in imports of dairy, baseline projection and liberalization, 2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
FIGURE 2.5  Percent change in output of dairy, baseline projection and liberalization, 2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
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Ending import restraints is expected to bring down the landed, duty-paid price of imports, 
especially for condensed and evaporated dairy products, butter, and cheese (appendix 
table E.5). These price declines lead to increases in imports, led by condensed and 
evaporated dairy products, cheese, and dry dairy products (up 76 percent, 65 percent, and 
58 percent, respectively). As a result of increased imports, domestic production would 
decrease, led by condensed and evaporated dairy products (−5 percent), dry dairy 
products (−2 percent), and butter (−2 percent) (appendix table E.5); employment would 
decline by roughly similar proportions. Despite the decline in U.S. production, the drop 
in domestic prices relative to world prices for most dairy commodities would lead to 
increased exports. This is especially true for cheese, where exports would increase by 10 
percent, and for condensed dairy products, where exports would increase by 6 percent 
(table E.5). 
 
Tobacco and Tobacco Products 
Flue-cured and burley tobaccos, the two principal tobacco types produced in the United 
States, are primarily used in the manufacture of cigarettes.33 U.S. tobacco has long been 
regarded as among the highest-quality tobaccos produced in the world, but other 
suppliers such as Brazil now produce comparable tobacco at lower costs, which has led to 
a decrease in U.S. exports and an increase in U.S. tobacco imports in recent years. 
Imports account for a very small share of consumption, however, and most cigarettes 
consumed in the United States are domestically produced.  
 
The value of U.S. production of flue-cured and burley tobacco totaled $1.3 billion in 
2010, essentially unchanged from 2007 (table 2.6); however, production volumes 
declined by 12 percent to 713 million pounds during 2007–10.34 By value, U.S. 
production of cigarettes declined by 26 percent. The fall in output during the period 
reflects declining domestic demand for cigarettes and a drop in demand for U.S. tobacco 
and cigarette exports owing to strong competition from foreign producers—particularly 
Brazil, the leading global supplier. U.S. exports of unmanufactured tobacco fell 
moderately (by 9 percent) during 2007–10, while exports of cigarettes fell at a much 
higher rate (64 percent), from over $1 billion to $371 million. U.S. exports to Japan, the 
leading market, fell by over 60 percent by volume during the period, as cigarettes from 
Germany and the Netherlands displaced U.S. exports. Declining U.S. demand for 
cigarettes led to lower U.S. imports of tobacco. U.S. imports of unmanufactured tobacco 
fell moderately by value, but dropped by 33 percent by volume during 2007–10.35 U.S. 
cigarette imports, which make up only a small share of total U.S. cigarette consumption, 
declined by 19 percent. 
 
 
                                                          
33 Flue-cured and burley tobacco varieties differ in how they are cured (dried)––flue cured tobacco is 
dried with heat, while burley tobacco is air dried. Most tobacco leaf is cured on the farm, after which it is 
processed at a factory into “unmanufactured tobacco,” an intermediate product. To produce unmanufactured 
tobacco, the factory de-stems the cured leaf, re-dries it, and cuts it into strips for use by cigarette 
manufacturers. Most tobacco traded internationally is unmanufactured tobacco. 
34 USDA, NASS, Database (accessed February 22, 2011).  
35 According to import quantities in USITC DataWeb/USDOC. 
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TABLE 2.6  Tobacco: Summary data and simulation results 
Item 
Summary data Projected 
change, 
2005–15 (%) 
Effect of 
liberalization 
(%) 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Employment Employees   
Unmanufactured tobaccoa 2,600 2,400 1,900 (b) –10.6 –3.4 
Cigarettes 16,600 15,700 12,300 (b) –2.7 –0.1 
Shipments Millions of $   
Unmanufactured tobaccoc 1,329 1,488 1,511 1,254 –2.9 –3.2 
Cigarettes 34,075 30,544 23,537 (b) –4.9 0.1 
Imports    
Unmanufactured tobaccod  398 423 429 393 –25.3 72.8 
Cigarettes 170 165 156 137 –57.6 7.3 
Exports    
Unmanufactured tobaccod  1,016 1,078 977 926 7.4 4.8 
Cigarettes 1,012 705 414 371 –77.2 1.6 
Sources: USDA, NASS; USDOC, Census, Annual Survey of Manufactures, 2007–09; USITC 
DataWeb/USDOC; Commission estimates for projection and liberalization. 
 
Note: Model sectors are determined by U.S. input-output classifications and may differ from summary data. 
Projected changes are based on quantity trends. Effects of liberalization represent deviations from the 
projected changes. See app. E for details and table E.6 for sector definitions. 
 
   aStemming and redrying sector, excluding tobacco farmers. 
   bNot available. 
   cFarm value, primarily flue-cured and burley tobacco. 
   dStemmed and redried flue-cured and burley tobacco. 
 
Nature of Trade Restraints 
Cigarettes are subject to a 7.6 percent AVE tariff. A TRQ established in 1995 is applied 
to imports of unmanufactured tobacco36 and manufactured tobacco used in the production 
of cigarettes destined for the U.S. market.37 The total TRQ quantity for the 2010 quota 
year38 was 150,700 metric tons (mt), which was divided into nine separate country or 
trading group allotments and a small residual allocation for all other countries (table 2.7). 
Brazil accounted over one-half (53 percent) of the total TRQ in 2010, while Malawi and 
Zimbabwe, other suppliers of high-quality tobacco, accounted for the next largest 
shares.39 
 
 
                                                          
36 Generally, more than 90 percent of the value of tobacco imported under the TRQ is classified in HTS 
subheading 2401.20.85, threshed or similarly processed tobacco. Other categories of tobacco and tobacco 
products subject to the TRQ are included in HTS subheadings 2401.10.63, 2401.20.33, 2401.30.33, 
2401.30.35, 2401.30.37, 2403.10.60, 2403.91.45, and 2403.99.60. 
37 The tobacco TRQ was established by Presidential proclamation in 1995 to replace a WTO-
inconsistent domestic content rule. The earlier rule was put in place in 1993 after U.S. imports of 
unmanufactured leaf tobacco rose dramatically (more than 150 percent) during the 1990–92 period. For 
additional information in the establishment of the tobacco TRQ, see USITC, Import Restraints, Third Update, 
2002, 88–89. 
38 The TRQ quota year runs from September 13 to September 12 of the following year. Quota year 
2010 lasted from September 13, 2009, to September 12, 2010. 
39 High-quality “flavor” tobacco is tobacco that imparts the aroma and taste characteristics to cigarettes, 
in contrast to filler-type tobacco. Brazil, Argentina, and Zimbabwe are the leading foreign suppliers of high-
quality flue-cured tobacco; Brazil and Malawi are the leading suppliers of high-quality burley tobacco. 
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TABLE 2.7  Tobacco: TRQ fill rates,a imports, and allocations 
 TRQ fill rates (%) Imports Allocation 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2010 
     Thousands of kg 
Brazil 100 99 87 73 58,306 80,200 
Malawi 79 19 85 70 8,438 12,000 
Zimbabwe (+) 1 (+) 0 0 12,000 
Argentina 100 100 100 64 6,836 10,750 
EU 49 78 86 49 4,872 10,000 
Guatemalab 31 40 33 56 5,641 10,000 
Thailand 100 100 84 8 544 7,000 
Philippines 36 90 85 100 2,993 3,000 
Chileb 0 0 1 0 0 2,750 
Other countries 87 100 100 100 3,017 3,000 
Source: DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Quota Enforcement and Administration Branch. 
 
Note: The symbol (+) indicates a small positive value of less than 0.5 percent. 
 
   aFill rates, allocations and imports are for the TRQ year, ending on September 12 of the stated year.  
   bTable reflects TRQ allocation and fill rates. It does not include additional access under FTAs. 
 
In-quota imports for unmanufactured tobacco—the bulk of the tobacco that is subject to 
the TRQ—are subject to a calculated duty of 10 percent AVE.40 All over-quota imports 
are subject to a 350 percent ad valorem duty. A duty drawback program exists for all 
imports (in-quota and over-quota) that are reexported either as unmanufactured tobacco 
or in cigarettes. Countries with PTAs with the United States are either not subject to 
quantitative restrictions set forth in the TRQ or are given additional access under 
preferential rates.41  
 
As noted, weak domestic demand for cigarettes led to a substantial fall in tobacco imports 
during quota year 2010. Tobacco TRQ imports declined by 34 percent by volume from 
the previous quota year. The TRQ was restrictive only for the Philippines and the “other 
countries” group, both of which registered fill rates of 100 percent in 2010.42 However, 
these countries together accounted for just 4 percent of the total tobacco TRQ. Brazil, the 
dominant U.S. supplier of flue-cured and burley tobacco, registered a fill rate of just 73 
percent, down from previous years (table 2.7). Imports from Argentina also declined, 
after filling its quota the three preceding quota years.  
 
Projected Industry Trends, 2005–15 
The baseline simulation projects a modest contraction in U.S. production of tobacco and 
most tobacco products by 2015, though production of cigars and of chewing and smoking 
tobacco is expected to expand somewhat. Imports of unmanufactured tobacco and 
                                                          
40 Tariffs on tobacco subject to the TRQ ranged from free to 40.9 cents per kg in 2010, with most in-
quota tobacco (HTS subheading 2401.20.85) entering the United States subject to a duty of 37.5 cents per kg. 
41 Canada, Mexico, and Israel are not subject to the quantitative restrictions set forth in the TRQ, 
pursuant to FTAs with those countries. Under other U.S. bilateral FTAs, certain countries have been provided 
additional access under preferential rates; however, most of these countries are not traditional tobacco 
sources. Chile, which already has a TRQ allotment, was granted additional access under the FTA, but Chile is 
not an important U.S. tobacco supplier and routinely has one of the lowest fill rates of countries that were 
provided TRQ access in 1995. For CAFTA-DR partners, in-quota duties are free, while over-quota duties are 
210 percent ad valorem. The majority of U.S. imports from CAFTA-DR are cigars and cigar tobacco, which 
are not subject to the TRQ. 
42 The “other countries” allotment generally fills soon after the beginning of the quota year, as these 
suppliers compete among themselves for the relatively small allocation. However, the relatively low-quality 
filler-type tobacco that these countries currently produce is not directly competitive with tobacco from the 
foreign suppliers that have country-specific allocations. 
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cigarettes are anticipated to decline substantially, reflecting the continuing decline in U.S. 
smoking rates. Imports of cigars and chewing and smoking tobacco, however, are 
expected to rise substantially, reflecting the overall expansion in demand for these 
tobacco products. Cigarette exports are expected to contract by three-quarters, while cigar 
and chewing and smoking tobacco exports decline by 6 to 8 percent. Employment in 
these sectors follows production trends, with employment in unmanufactured tobacco 
declining by about 11 percent and in cigarette manufacturing by 3 percent.  
 
Effects of Liberalization Relative to Projected Trends 
Removing all TRQs and tariffs on these products is estimated to increase U.S. welfare by 
$63 million, compared to $99 million by 2013 in the previous report. The effects of 
liberalizing U.S. imports of tobacco and tobacco products were modeled by removing the 
TRQ on unmanufactured tobacco and by eliminating the tariffs on imports of cigarettes. 
Table 2.6, figures 2.6 and 2.7, and appendix table E.5 show the sectoral effects of the 
trade liberalization for tobacco products relative to the 2015 baseline.  
 
Because TRQs are anticipated to be less restrictive in the current analysis, elimination of 
tobacco TRQs and tariffs would reduce the landed, duty-paid price of tobacco to a lesser 
extent than in the previous study. The landed, duty-paid price of unmanufactured tobacco 
would decline by about 22 percent, while that of imported cigarettes would fall by about 
4 percent (appendix table E.5). The import prices of other tobacco products would 
decline by lesser amounts.  
 
In the USAGE model, unmanufactured tobacco of any origin represents 18 to 25 percent 
of the value of intermediate inputs into the cigarette, cigar, and other tobacco products 
sectors, though imported tobacco comprises only 2 percent of the tobacco needed to 
produce U.S. cigarettes and 3 percent of that needed for cigars and other tobacco 
products. Liberalization of tariffs on tobacco would substantially increase imports and 
significantly contribute to a decline in the price of domestically produced downstream 
products, leading to rises in exports between 1 and 2 percent. Liberalization of restraints 
on imports of tobacco products themselves would lead to only modest increases in 
imports of cigarettes (7 percent) and of chewing and smoking tobacco and snuff (2 
percent). The estimated increase in tobacco imports causes tobacco shipments and 
associated employment to decline by about 3 percent, while output and employment in 
the tobacco farming sector would decline by about 2 percent. Output and employment 
would rise in all tobacco products sectors, except for cigarettes, for which employment 
would fall slightly (appendix table E.5). 
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FIGURE 2.6  Percent change in imports of tobacco, baseline projection and liberalization, 2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
FIGURE 2.7  Percent change in output of tobacco, baseline projection and liberalization, 2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
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Sugar and Sugar-Containing Products 
The United States ranks fifth in the world in sugar consumption, accounting for 5 percent 
of global consumption, or 11.2 million short tons, raw value (strv) in marketing year 
(MY) 2010.43 U.S. sugar consumption has increased at an annual average rate of about 2 
percent since 2005, mainly reflecting population growth. However, U.S. per capita sugar 
consumption, which totaled 66 pounds in calendar year (CY) 2010, has been in a long-
term decline, having peaked at 102 pounds in 1972.44 The decline mainly reflects a shift 
to lower-cost alternatives, principally high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS), by primary users, 
such as soft-drink manufacturers. More recently, consumer concerns about obesity have 
also played a role in the decline. In CY2010, refined sugar accounted for about 50 
percent of the total U.S. consumption of caloric sweeteners, down from 86 percent in 
1967, the year before consumption of HFCS was first recorded. This share has remained 
relatively stable in recent years, as the shift to HFCS has matured. However, the share of 
the U.S. caloric sweetener market share held by refined sugar has rebounded slightly 
since 2005, as consumer preferences shifted demand away from HFCS back to sugar in 
certain products such as soft drinks, as well as in food formulations.45 
 
Sugar is produced in the United States both from sugarcane and sugar beets. The 
sugarcane sector comprises two distinct segments: sugarcane milling and raw cane sugar 
refining. First, sugarcane is milled to produce raw cane sugar.46 Raw cane sugar is then 
further refined at raw cane sugar refineries. Refined beet sugar, by contrast, is produced 
from sugar beets in a continuous process. Refined beet sugar and refined cane sugar are 
virtually identical and are interchangeable. Refined sugar is used directly by consumers 
and as an input in the manufacture of a multitude of food items. Many of these food items 
are included in the sugar-containing products (SCP) sector.47 While the primary focus of 
this section is the sugar sector, there is a secondary discussion of SCPs because of the 
quantity of sugar contained within these products.48 
 
U.S. producers supplied approximately 73 percent of U.S. sugar consumption in 
MY2010.49 The value of U.S. raw cane sugar production totaled $2.3 billion in MY2010 
(table 2.8). The value of U.S. refined sugar production totaled $7.5 billion in the same 
year, with refined beet sugar accounting for 58 percent of the total. These values were 
substantially above those recorded in previous years, as sugar prices increased  
 
 
                                                          
43 Data are on a marketing year basis, generally October of the previous year through September of the 
stated year. USDA, FAS, Production Supply and Distribution Online (accessed February 22, 2011). 
44 USDA, ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Yearbook Tables (accessed June 1, 2011). 
45 USDA, ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Yearbook Tables (accessed May 23, 2011); Kelso, “Sugar’s 
Comeback Slowly Reaching into QSR,” June 28, 2010. 
46 Sugarcane and sugar beet production (NAICS categories 111930 and 111991, respectively) are not 
explicitly included in the sugar sector, as the import restraint is applied to the manufactured product. In 
addition, the United States does not trade in sugarcane and sugar beets. However, the import restraints 
affecting the sugar sector have an indirect effect on the production of sugarcane and sugar beets, as they are 
the primary inputs for sugar production. The Commission’s CGE model accounts for adjustments among 
sectors and implicitly addresses the impact of sugar import liberalization on the sugarcane and sugar beet 
sector, which is discussed in this report. 
47 NAICS categories for SCPs include chocolate and confectionery manufacturing from cacao beans 
(31132); confectionery manufacturing from purchased chocolate (31133); nonchocolate confectionery 
manufacturing (31134); bread and bakery product manufacturing (31181); cookie, cracker, and pasta 
manufacturing (31182); and flavoring syrup and concentrate manufacturing (31193). 
48 These SCPs are not covered by TRQs. 
49 USDA, ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Yearbook Tables (accessed February 22, 2010). Share is for 
domestic food and beverage use, raw sugar basis. 
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TABLE 2.8  Sugar: Summary data and simulation results 
Item 
Summary data Projected 
change, 
2005–15 (%) 
Effect of 
liberalization 
(%) 2007 2008 2009 2010  
Employmenta Employees  
Total sugar crop farming 7,340 5,565 5,219 5,378b 4.5 –2.8 
   Sugarcane farming  5,606 3,976 3,675 4,076b 17.0 –7.7 
   Sugar beet farming 1,734 1,589 1,544 1,302b 1.9 –1.7 
Total sugar processing 12,686 12,317 12,859 11,493b –4.9 –1.6 
   Raw cane sugar 4,084 3,643 3,543 3,049b 3.6 –7.9 
   Refined cane sugar 2,682 2,622 3,305 2,746b –1.9 2.4 
   Refined beet sugar 5,920 6,052 6,011 5,698b –9.0 –1.8 
       
Shipmentsc Millions of $  
Sugarcane 881 830 992 969  8.3 –7.6 
Sugar beets 1,337 1,293 1,501 1,610  –2.9 –1.7 
Raw cane sugar 1,435 1,459 1,465 2,322  10.0 –7.7 
Total refined sugar 4,062 4,549 5,022 7,489  3.1 0.7 
   Refined cane sugar 1,653 1,915 2,226 3,188  6.8 2.9 
   Refined beet sugar 2,409 2,635 2,796 4,301  –0.8 –1.7 
       
Importsd    
Total sugar 434 951 1,243 1,850  25.6 31.8 
   Raw cane sugar 105 622 706 1,268  4.3 36.4 
   Refined sugar 329 329 537 582  221.4 18.2 
       
Exportsc    
Total sugare 21 148 87 156  21.7 8.7 
Source: USDA, ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Yearbook Tables (accessed various dates); USDA, NASS, 
Agricultural Prices, January 31, 2011; USDA, NASS, Crop Production 2009 and 2010 Summaries, January 
2010 and January 2011; USDOC, Census, Annual Survey of Manufactures (accessed February 25, 2011); 
and USDOL, BLS, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (accessed February 24, 2011); 
Commission estimates for projection and liberalization. 
 
Note: Model sectors are determined by U.S. input-output classifications and may differ from summary data. 
Projected changes are based on quantity trends. Effects of liberalization represent deviations from the 
projected changes. See app. E for details and table E.6 for sector definitions.  
 
   aReported on a calendar year basis. 
   bEmployment data for 2010 are estimated based on available data for the first six months of 2010 and 
likely are understated owing to seasonality. 
   cReported on a marketing year basis. Raw cane sugar is valued at the U.S. domestic price for raw sugar. 
Refined beet sugar is valued at the U.S. domestic wholesale price for refined beet sugar. 
   dReported on a marketing year basis. Refined sugar imports include refined cane and refined beet sugar. 
   eIncludes exports of cane and beet sugar, including refined sugar exports under the sugar reexport 
program, which accounted for 29 percent of the total value of U.S. sugar exports in 2010. 
 
dramatically in MY2010. In terms of quantity, however, U.S. sugar production decreased 
slightly, from 8.2 million strv in MY2008 to 8.0 million strv in MY2010.50 Annual 
variations in refined sugar production result largely from weather conditions that affect 
both sugar beet and sugarcane production, often to a varying degree. The sugar 
processing sector employed about 11,500 workers in CY2010.51 Such employment has 
rebounded somewhat from a long-term decline resulting from industry consolidation.  
                                                          
50 USDA, ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Yearbook Table (accessed February 23, 2011). 
51 Data for 2010 represent the first six months and may be understated owing to seasonality. 
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Employment in upstream sectors—sugarcane and sugar beet farming—totaled 5,378 
workers in CY2010. Though it was relatively steady during CY2008–10, it was down 
significantly from CY2007.52 
 
The United States is a net importer of sugar, mostly raw cane sugar, and typically exports 
a minor amount.53 The total value of sugar imports increased substantially from MY2008 
to MY2010 as a result of both rising demand and rising domestic and world prices. 
Imports supplied 27 percent of the U.S. sugar market in MY2010 in terms of quantity 
(raw basis), up from about 22 percent in MY2008. Mexico was the leading supplier of 
U.S. sugar imports in 2010, accounting for 24 percent of the total quantity (raw basis) of 
such imports in MY2010.54 U.S. imports from Mexico have entered free of duty under 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) since January 1, 2008.  
 
The United States also trades a significant amount of sugar in SCPs that are not subject to 
sugar TRQs. The net imported sugar content of such trade increased from 36,680 metric 
tons, raw value (mtrv) in 1995 to 616,255 mtrv in 2006 before declining to 389,903 mtrv 
in 2010.55 The bulk of SCP imports consist of sugar confectionery and cocoa and cocoa 
preparations. The principal suppliers are Canada and Mexico, which together accounted 
for 71 percent of the total value of such imports during 2006–10.56 There has been a long-
term shift in production capacity of U.S. confectionery and baking companies to these 
countries, contributing to this trade. However, net U.S. imports of sugar in SCPs have 
been declining in recent years, likely the result of increased market access for U.S. SCP 
exports under NAFTA and other FTAs.  
 
Nature of Trade Restraints 
Trade barriers in the U.S. sugar sector are related to domestic policies that manage 
supplies to maintain market prices for raw cane and refined sugar.57 If domestic prices 
fall below legislatively determined thresholds (“loan rates”), producers may forfeit their 
supplies to the Commodity Credit Corporation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture at 
the loan rates.58 To keep U.S. domestic prices sufficiently above the loan rates, the 
United States administers a system of TRQs for imports of raw cane and refined sugar, 
blended sugar syrups, and certain SCPs for World Trade Organization (WTO) member 
countries in accordance with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, and for other countries 
                                                          
52 Between 1999 and 2009, total employment in the sugar sector (including both farming and 
processing) fell by 27 percent, from 24,881 to 18,078 workers, according to official government statistics. 
USDOL, BLS, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (accessed June 28, 2011).  
53 Some U.S. sugar exports (29 percent in 2010) fall under the refined sugar reexport program, which 
allows cane sugar refiners and manufacturers using refined sugar as an input to import raw cane sugar at or 
slightly above world prices. However, the equivalent quantity of imported sugar is reexported within a given 
time period. The refined sugar reexport program is designed to ensure the competitiveness of U.S. sugarcane 
product exports on the world market while offering U.S. cane sugar refiners access to the raw material they 
need to maintain utilization of their refineries’s capacity. 
54 USDA, ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Yearbook Tables (accessed various dates). 
55 USDA, ERS, Sugar and Sweeteners Outlook, December 14, 2010, 9. Data converted from short tons. 
In 2010, the sugar content of U.S. imports of all SCPs equaled about 35 percent of total U.S. imports of raw 
and refined sugar, while the sugar content of U.S. exports of all SCPs equaled about 349 percent of total U.S. 
exports of refined sugar. 
56 Calculated by USITC staff based on official statistics of the USDOC. 
57 The principal domestic policy elements include minimum prices (loan rates), a guaranteed 85-percent 
market share for U.S. producers, and a feedstock flexibility program to divert surplus sugar to ethanol 
production. A summary of major changes that occurred to the U.S. sugar program under the 2008 farm bill is 
available at USDA, ERS, “2008 Farm Bill Side-by-Side” (accessed February 16, 2011). 
58 Threshold prices are known as loan rates because when sugar prices drop below the threshold, U.S. 
sugar producers may take non-recourse loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation, using their sugar as 
collateral. 
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under U.S. FTAs.59 WTO TRQs are based on minimum commitments and may be 
increased under certain circumstances, while sugar TRQs under FTAs are increased 
annually according to staging schedules set by each FTA.60  
 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture TRQs 
The United States maintains separate TRQs for raw cane sugar, refined sugar, certain 
SCPs, and blended sugar syrups, and an absolute quota for cocoa powder containing 
sugar under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.61 Imports within the quota are dutiable 
at relatively low in-quota tariff rates, while over-quota imports are subject to much higher 
duties. The majority of in-quota imports benefit from duty-free treatment under various 
FTAs or PTAs, mainly the GSP. Over-quota imports are also subject to automatic 
safeguards, which add extra duties to the over-quota tariff depending on the price level of 
imports or, if announced by the Secretary of Agriculture, on the quantity of imports.62 
 
The raw cane sugar TRQ is allocated on a country-specific basis among designated 
sugar-exporting nations in proportion to their average market share of U.S. imports. Four 
suppliers were allocated about half of the total TRQ quantity and each of these suppliers 
filled their entire allotted amount in 2010 (table 2.9). Under Uruguay Round 
commitments, the United States is required to allocate at least 1.1 million mtrv annually. 
The raw sugar TRQ must be set at this minimum level at the beginning of each marketing 
year (October 1) and must not be increased before April 1 of the following year, except in 
emergencies.63 The raw cane sugar TRQ was increased twice during MY2010, when the 
total raw cane sugar TRQ for MY2010 rose to 1.6 million mtrv.64  
 
The refined sugar TRQ is administered with lower allocations than the raw cane sugar 
TRQ, but with fewer regulatory restrictions as well. For example, while the required 
minimum level of the global refined sugar TRQ is 22,000 mtrv annually, it is not 
restricted to this minimum on October 1. The refined sugar TRQ typically is set at a 
substantially higher level than the minimum. Moreover, the refined sugar TRQ is 
administered on a first-come, first-served basis, except for reserved annual allocations for 
Mexico and Canada.65 A certain amount of the refined sugar TRQ—69,695 mtrv in 
MY2010—is reserved for specialty sugars.66  
                                                          
59 Sugar quotas were first established under the Jones-Costigan Act in 1934 largely in response to 
global competitive conditions and government support in other countries. The current TRQ structure was 
established on October 1, 1990, as a result of a GATT complaint by Australia. Suarez, “Origin of the U.S. 
Sugar Import Tariff-Rate Quota Shares,” September 1997, 14; Proclamation No. 6179, C.F.R. 3 (1990 
Compilation). 
60 Preferential treatment under the raw cane sugar and refined sugar TRQs were not provided in the 
FTA with Australia. In addition, in-quota imports of sugar benefit from duty-free treatment under the GSP, 
the Andean Trade Preference Act, and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. 
61 The WTO TRQs for raw cane sugar, refined sugar, certain SCPs, and blended sugar syrups are all 
provided for in the additional U.S. notes 5, 7, 8, and 9 to chap. 17 of the HTS and pertinent subheadings. The 
WTO TRQ for cocoa powder containing sugar is provided for in additional U.S. note 1 of chap. 18 of the 
HTS. 15 C.F.R. (2011). 
62 The safeguards do not apply to imports from countries with U.S. FTAs. U.S. note 1 to chap. 99, 
subch. IV of the HTS. 
63 Emergencies include war, flood, hurricane, or other natural disaster, or other similar event as 
determined by the Secretary of Agriculture. 7 U.S.C. 1359kk. The current farm bill became effective 
beginning October 1, 2008. 
64 USDA, FAS, “USDA Announces Increase in Fiscal Year 2010 Raw Sugar Tariff-Rate Quota,” 2010; 
75 Fed. Reg. 38764 (July 6, 2010). Additional U.S. note 5 (a) (ii) of chap. 17 of the HTS and section 359(k) 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, provides the authority for the Secretary of 
Agriculture to increase the TRQ. 
65 Because of WTO commitments, Mexico still receives a refined sugar allocation (2,954 mt) despite its 
duty-free status under NAFTA. The Canadian allocation is 10,300 mt. 
66 Specialty sugars are defined in 15 CFR 2011.202(i). 
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TABLE 2.9  Sugar: TRQ fill rates, 2007–10 
  TRQ fill rates (%)   Imports Allocation 
TRQa 2007  2008 2009 2010   2010 2010 
      Thousand mtrv 
Raw sugar 80.8  85.5 82.2 94.1  1,478,234 1,570,787 
    Australia 100.0  99.9 100.0 100.0  142,428 142,428 
    Brazil 100.0  100.0 98.4 100.0  248,822 248,822 
    Dominican Republic 100.0  100.0 95.5 100.0  253,830 253,830 
    Philippines 89.7  97.0 99.1 100.0  177,367 177,367 
    Other 70.1  71.4 65.9 87.6  655,787 748,340 
Refined sugar  99.2b 99.7  90.9 96.7  87,085 90,039 
Mexicoc  34.0  (d) (d) (d)   732,164 (d) 
Other FTA sugare  100.0  99.2 96.7 95.6  107,183 112,157 
    CAFTA-DR  100.0  99.2 98.4 97.3  107,163 110,103 
    Peruf  (d) (d) 0 0  0 2,000 
    Other  (d) 43.9 33.3 37.0  20 54 
Source: USDA, FAS, Sugar Monthly Import and Re-Export Data Report, 2008–11; USDA, FAS, “Sugar 
under Tariff Rate Quotas,” 2007; USDA, ERS, Sugar and Sweetener Yearbook Tables (accessed various 
dates); U.S. Customs, Customs Quota Branch, “Historical Tariff-Rate Quota/Fill Rate Levels.” 
 
   aOn an MY basis, unless otherwise indicated. 
   bUSITC estimate. 
   cImports unconstrained by TRQs since January 1, 2008. Fill rate for 2007 includes NAFTA and specialty 
sugar allocations. 
   dNot applicable. 
   eOn a CY basis. 
   fIncludes the 2,000 mtrv Peru specialty sugar TRQ in 2009 and 2010. Regular FTA TRQ allocation is 
zero, because Peru did not have a sugar trade surplus. The FTA with Peru entered into force on February 
1, 2009. 
 
FTA TRQs 
The United States provides TRQs for sugar and SCPs under various FTAs. FTAs include 
additional market access for imported raw cane sugar, refined sugar, and SCPs, and the 
allocations increase annually for the quantities specified in each FTA. As noted above, 
imports from Mexico under NAFTA now enter duty free. Other than Mexico, CAFTA-
DR countries have received the largest additional allocations among U.S. FTA partners. 
The CAFTA-DR countries received initial additional regional allocations totaling 
109,000 mt. After a 15-year linear staging period, the additional regional allocations will 
total 153,140 mt.67 These quantities could overstate the allocations actually received, 
however, because partner countries must be net exporters of sugar in order to receive 
additional TRQs. For example, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Chile, and Morocco are 
not currently net exporters, and therefore received no TRQ allocations in 2010.68 
 
Projected Industry Trends, 2005–15 
The baseline simulation projects modest growth in output of 10 percent or less in the U.S. 
sugar industry from 2005 to 2015. Total imports of sugar are expected to grow by about 
25 percent over the same period, with most of that growth coming in the form of refined 
sugar. Employment in all sugar crops is anticipated to rise by about 5 percent. The world 
price of sugar has risen markedly since 2005, while domestic sugar prices have also risen, 
though to a lesser extent. The baseline projection incorporates this expectation. As a 
                                                          
67 In future years, access will increase by 2,640 mt annually, in perpetuity. 
68 74 Fed. Reg. 66718–66720 (December 16, 2009). Costa Rica did not receive its CAFTA-DR sugar 
quota until CY2011.  
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result, sugar TRQs and other domestic sugar policies raise import prices by only 12.2 
percent in the projection, compared to 47.5 percent in the previous study. 
 
Effects of Liberalization Relative to Projected Trends 
Removal of the restrictions on imports of sugar would result in an estimated increase in 
U.S. welfare of $49 million in 2015, compared to an increase of $514 million in 2013 in 
the previous report. The smaller welfare gain is driven by the downward revision in the 
degree to which TRQs and other domestic sugar policies are expected to raise the 
baseline price of imported sugar in 2015. Table 2.8, figures 2.8 and 2.9, and appendix 
table E.5 show the effects of liberalizing U.S. sugar import restrictions. 
 
Liberalization consists of removing TRQs and eliminating the remaining within-quota 
tariffs. Under liberalization, the landed, duty-paid import price of raw cane sugar would 
decline by about 14 percent (appendix table E.5). As prices decline, demand for imported 
sugar is expected to expand by 36 percent for raw cane sugar and by lesser amounts for 
refined sugar. The increased competition from imports depresses domestic production of 
raw cane sugar by 8 percent and of refined beet sugar by 2 percent. Production of the 
feedstock crops, sugarcane and beets, similarly decline (appendix table E.5). Employment 
in sugar crops would decline by 2.8 percent as a result of liberalization, while 
employment in sugar processing would fall by somewhat less, 1.6 percent, owing to the 
rise in refining of imported raw sugar. Domestic production of refined cane sugar would 
rise by almost 3 percent because imported raw cane sugar is used as an input into 
domestic sugar refineries. Household prices of refined sugar would decline by 1 percent. 
Because of the reduced cost of sugar, production of SCPs would increase slightly 
(appendix table E.5). 
 
Of the $49 million in welfare gain from liberalization of sugar restraints, $36 million is 
accounted for by increased household consumption of sugar and SCPs. The net effect of 
private consumption of all other goods and services contributes another $4 million to 
welfare, and the remaining $9 million is due to the rise in government expenditures.69 
 
 
                                                          
69 In the model, the government receives a fixed portion of any income gains from liberalization, so 
both real private consumption and real government consumption expand. As with all welfare estimates in this 
report, the reported welfare gains are net of any declines in the liberalized sectors. 
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FIGURE 2.8  Percent change in imports of sugar, baseline projection and liberalization, 2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
FIGURE 2.9  Percent change in output of sugar, baseline projection and liberalization, 2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
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Canned Tuna70 
The United States is the world’s third-largest canned tuna producer,71 with shipments 
valued at an estimated $889 million in 2010 (table 2.10). It also represents the world’s 
leading market for canned tuna, accounting for about 28 percent of global consumption.72 
The U.S. canned tuna industry, which includes production facilities in the continental 
United States, American Samoa, and Puerto Rico, has become increasingly concentrated 
over time, such that three major brands—Bumble Bee, StarKist, and Chicken of the 
Sea—accounted for about 80 percent of the market in 2010. Industry concentration has 
occurred largely in response to competitive stresses linked to significantly higher U.S. 
wage rates in fish processing compared with foreign competitors, such as Vietnam and 
Ecuador. As a result, U.S. production has fallen from about 300,000 mt in 2000 to about 
200,000 mt in 2008.73 Similarly, industry employment fell to about 10,000 workers in 
2010, representing a significant loss of jobs compared with 30 years ago. As employment 
has declined, U.S. companies have become increasingly mechanized in order to achieve 
efficiency through scale economies.74 
 
The United States is the world’s largest canned tuna importer,75 with imports of $660 
million in 2010. Like domestically produced canned tuna, these imports are highly 
concentrated among a few major suppliers. In 2010, Thailand accounted for 58 percent of 
U.S. tuna imports, while the top five suppliers (Thailand, Ecuador, the Philippines, 
Vietnam, and Indonesia) together accounted for 95 percent. Imports made up 45 percent 
of estimated U.S. consumption in 2010, and exports accounted for 1 percent of domestic 
production. 
 
The canned tuna sector comprises two principal products: tuna packed in oil and tuna 
packed in water. Production costs for tuna in oil and tuna in water are nearly identical; 
canneries can switch production from one product to the other at little cost. The two 
products generally have identical wholesale and retail prices (for any given brand and size 
of can or pouch). Tuna packed in water is by far the more popular product, accounting for 
about 85 percent of U.S. production and approximately 96 percent of total U.S imports. 
 
Nature of Trade Restraints 
Restrictions on tuna packed in oil are much higher than on tuna in water. Imports of 
canned tuna packed in oil are subject to a relatively high tariff of 35 percent, but are not 
subject to TRQs. U.S. imports of canned tuna packed in water are subject to a TRQ, but 
both the in-quota rate of 6 percent and the over-quota duty rate of 12.5 percent are below 
the 35 percent rate for tuna packed in oil.76 The TRQ for any given calendar year is equal 
to 4.8 percent of apparent U.S. consumption (as reported annually by the USDOC) of  
 
                                                          
70 Throughout this section, the term “canned tuna” refers to both canned and pouched tuna. In the U.S. 
HTS, both tuna in cans and tuna in pouches are referred to as “tuna in airtight containers.” 
71 Makoto et al., “Recent Developments in the Tuna Industry,” 2010, 93, 98.  
72 Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, written submission to the USITC, January 12, 2011, 2. 
73 Makoto et al., “Recent Developments in the Tuna Industry,” 2010, figure 67, 108.  
74 Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, written submission to the USITC, January 12, 2011, 5. 
75 Makoto et al., “Recent Developments in the Tuna Industry,” 2010, 93, 98.  
76 Quotas on canned tuna imports were first introduced in 1956. This was in response to sharply 
increasing imports of canned tuna (nearly all from Japan) beginning in the early 1950s. For example, between 
1951 and 1956, imports of canned tuna increased from 13 million pounds to 44 million pounds, or 
equivalently from 6 percent of domestic consumption to 16 percent. U.S. Tariff Commission, Tuna Fish, 
1958; USITC, Competitive Conditions in the U.S. Tuna Industry, 1982. 
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TABLE 2.10  Canned tuna: Summary data and simulation results 
Item 
Summary Data Projected change,   
2005–15 (%) 
Effect of    
liberalization    
(%) 2007  2008  2009  2010  
Employment Employees   
Total canned tuna 10,050 a 10,050 a 10,000 a 10,000 a 68.1 –6.6 
       
Shipments Millions of $   
Total canned tuna 702 845 757 869 a 15.3 –8.2 
   Tuna in oil 105 a 127 a 114 a 113 a 15.4 –8.9 
   Tuna in water 597 a 718 a 643 a 756 a 15.2 –8.1 
       
Imports    
Total canned tuna 524  662  613  660  –2.0 19.9 
   Tuna in oil 17 a 25 a 28 a 28 a 14.0 52.1 
   Tuna in water 507 a 637 a 585 a 632 a –2.7 18.5 
       
Exports    
Total canned tuna 4  6  8  9  –66.3 12.9 
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, Fisheries of 
the United States; USITC DataWeb/USDOC; Commission estimates for projection and liberalization. 
 
Note: Model sectors are determined by U.S. input-output classifications and may differ from summary data. 
Projected changes are based on quantity trends. Effects of liberalization represent deviations from the 
projected changes. See app. E for details and table E.6 for sector definitions.  
 
   aCommission estimate. 
 
canned tuna during the immediately preceding year.77 There is substantial demand for 
canned tuna in the United States, however, and as the over-quota tariff is not prohibitive, 
in 2009 over-quota imports amounted to 149,324 mt, representing 89 percent of total 
canned tuna imports.78 
 
The TRQ is administered on a global first-come first-served basis. Because the low in-
quota tariff rate is about one-half the over-quota rate, importers attempt to qualify for as 
large a share of the TRQ as possible by storing thousands of cases of canned tuna in 
customs-bonded warehouses in late December, waiting to withdraw those cases as soon as 
the calendar year begins.79 As a result, the TRQ fills very rapidly. However, according to 
industry sources, this system is costly for importers because it raises storage costs and 
leads to uncertainty over whether an individual importer’s product will face the in- or 
over-quota rate. 
 
Projected Industry Trends, 2005–15  
The baseline simulation projects modest growth in canned tuna production to 2015, with 
an annual growth rate of about 1 percent. Overall imports are expected to decline slightly 
over the same period; the industry produces almost exclusively for domestic 
consumption, with exports expected to remain low. 
 
 
                                                          
77 For example, for calendar year 2010, the TRQ on canned tuna was 16,618,716 kilograms. 75 Fed. 
Reg. 22418 (April 28, 2010).  
78 USDOC et al., Fisheries of the United States 2009, September 2010, 53. 
79 Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, written submission to the USITC, January 12, 2011, 3. 
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Effects of Liberalization Relative to Projected Trends 
The canned tuna TRQs were not explicitly specified in the modeling framework because 
in-quota levels are small compared to the total volume of U.S. imports and consumption, 
while over-quota imports are large. Instead, liberalization of U.S. canned tuna imports 
was modeled by removing the ad valorem tariff equivalents for both tuna packed in oil 
and tuna packed in water. In the 2015 projected baseline, the anticipated tariff equivalent 
rates are 16.3 percent for tuna packed in oil and 10.2 percent for tuna packed in water. 
Removing these tariff equivalents is estimated to increase U.S. welfare by $16 million. 
The removal of import restraints would affect tuna packed in oil more than tuna packed in 
water.  The imported price of tuna packed in oil would decline by 16 percent (table E.5), 
and imports would rise by 52 percent; for tuna packed in water, the import price would 
fall by 9 percent and imports would rise by 19 percent (table 2.10, figures 2.10 and 2.11). 
Employment would fall by 7 percent in the canned fish industry, which also produces 
other canned fish and seafood. The estimated effects on related sectors are small, with a 
small negative effect on prepared fish (appendix table E.5). 
 
Textiles and Apparel 
The United States remains the world’s largest importer of textiles and apparel,80 
accounting for about 25 percent of global imports by value in 2010. The U.S. recession 
between 2007 and 2009 exacerbated the contraction in the U.S. textile and apparel sector 
that has been underway since the late 1980s. Output of textiles and apparel fell 35.3 
percent during 2007–09 to $62.7 billion before rebounding modestly by 5.9 percent to 
$66.4 billion in 2010 (table 2.11). Output of apparel was especially hard hit, falling 47.9 
percent, with scant (1.3 percent) recovery in 2010. Employment in the textiles and 
apparel sector also declined dramatically, falling 27 percent in 2007–10, for a loss of 
146,500 jobs. U.S. imports and exports fell by 16 and 18 percent, respectively, between 
2007 and 2009, but began to rebound in 2010. As textile and apparel manufacturing 
companies have increasingly outsourced production to low-cost overseas producers,81 the 
number of U.S. textile and apparel plants has declined, with a corresponding decrease in 
the number of textile and apparel workers. In 2009, there were 3,463 textile mills, down 
from 3,828 in 2007; 7,810 textile product mills, down from 8,130 in 2007; and 8,339 
apparel firms, down from 9,492 in 2007.82 
 
Despite this sharp contraction, industry representatives project that the rate of decline in 
the U.S. textile and apparel industry will slow through 2015 compared with 2005–10.83 In 
part, this is because domestic products no longer compete directly with imports. The 
limited remaining domestic production of textile and apparel articles is primarily for U.S. 
government defense contracts under the Berry Amendment;84 for high-end and niche 
 
 
                                                          
80 Textiles and textile articles include yarn, thread, fabric, household furnishings (carpets, rugs, home 
linens, canvas products, rope, twine, and tire cord), and other miscellaneous made-up articles. Apparel 
articles include knit, knit-to-shape, and woven garments.  
81 Panteva, “Textile Mills in the U.S.,” 2010, 5. 
82 USDOL, BLS, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (accessed March 14, 2011). Textile mills 
are included in NAICS 313; firms that produce textile mill products are in NAICS 314; and apparel firms are 
included in NAICS 315. 
83 Panteva, “Textile Mills in the U.S.,” 2010, 3; Reichard, “Textiles 2011,” 2011, 26. 
84 The Berry Amendment requires that clothing or textile articles procured by the U.S. Department of 
Defense (USDOD) be produced in the United States, including the fibers, yarn, and fabric used to construct 
such articles (10 U.S.C. 2533a). For further information on the Berry Amendment, see USDOD, “Berry 
Amendment FAQ” (accessed June 13, 2011). 
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FIGURE 2.10  Percent change in imports of canned tuna, baseline projection and liberalization, 2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
FIGURE 2.11  Percent change in output of canned tuna, baseline projection and liberalization, 2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
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TABLE 2.11  Textiles and apparel: Summary data and simulation results 
Item 
Summary Data Projected 
change, 
2005–15 (%) 
Effect of 
liberalization 
(%) 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Employment Thousands of employees   
All textiles and apparel 542 497 418 396 –51.8 –8.9 
   Textile millsa 170 151 124 119 –61.7 –9.2 
   Textile productsb 158 147 126 119 –39.5 –4.4 
   Apparelc 215 199 168 158 –56.2 –15.8 
       
Shipments Millions of $   
All textiles and apparel 96,888 91,501 62,675 66,401 –39.7 –9.8 
   Yarn, thread, and fabric 36,587 33,554 25,380 28,289 –49.3 –8.6 
   Textile products 30,487 26,780 21,774 22,382 –25.8 –4.8 
   Apparel 29,814 31,167 15,521 15,730 –32.0 –15.8 
       
Imports       
All textiles and apparel 101,830 98,107 85,337 97,760 9.6 2.0 
   Yarn, thread, and fabric 7,456 6,943 5,287 6,524 –23.5 –1.6 
   Textile products 15,412 14,985 13,229 15,824 15.2 1.4 
   Apparel 78,962 76,179 66,821 75,412 13.3 2.2 
       
Exports       
All textiles and apparel 13,994 13,880 11,509 13,471 –23.9 –51.7 
   Yarn, thread, and fabric 8,242 8,209 6,431 7,822 –27.9 –30.3 
   Textile products 2,628 2,600 2,267 2,583 –16.3 –46.0 
   Apparel 3,124 3,071 2,811 3,066 –19.5 –88.6 
Sources: USITC DataWeb/USDOC; USDOC, Census, Annual Survey of Manufactures (accessed March 22, 2011); 
USDOL, BLS, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (accessed March 22, 2011); Commission estimates for 
projection and liberalization. 
 
Note: Model sectors are determined by U.S. input-output classifications and may differ from summary data. Projected 
changes are based on quantity trends. Effects of liberalization represent deviations from the projected changes. See 
app. E for details and table E.6 for sector definitions.  
 
   aTextile mills primarily produce yarn, thread, and fabric. 
   bTextile products include carpets, rugs, home linens, canvas products, rope, twine, tire cord, and other 
miscellaneous made-up textile articles. 
   cApparel includes knit, knit-to-shape, and woven garments and hosiery. 
 
markets willing to pay a premium price for higher quality, a more advanced product, and 
faster turnaround; and for medical and industrial protection purposes requiring 
specialized materials such as nonwoven, flame-resistant fabrics—products that low-cost 
countries are unable to manufacture because they lack the requisite advanced 
technologies.85 
 
In 2010, 85.6 percent of the total value of all apparel sold in the United States was 
imported, up from 74.7 percent in 2007. Since the elimination of global textile and  
 
  
                                                          
85 Panteva, “Textile Mills in the U.S.,” 2010, 4, 8.  
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apparel import quotas in 2005,86 global textile and apparel production has become 
concentrated among a small group of lower-cost Asian suppliers, particularly China. 
 
Between 2007 and 2010, U.S. imports of textiles and apparel from China increased 16.0 
percent to $40.5 billion, while imports from Vietnam rose 37.0 percent to $6.1 billion and 
imports from Bangladesh grew by 27.5 percent to $4.1 billion. Although China is the 
leading supplier, its growth in the U.S. market has slowed in recent years because rising 
material and labor costs have boosted the price of Chinese-produced apparel, making it 
less competitive with other low-cost suppliers.87 
 
Nature of Trade Restraints 
There are no remaining quantitative restrictions on textile and apparel imports. However, 
U.S. tariffs on textiles and apparel remain high: the trade-weighted average ad valorem 
tariff on all U.S. imports of textiles and apparel was 11.1 percent in 2010. In general, 
tariffs on textiles and apparel increase with each stage of manufacturing—that is, the duty 
rates are usually higher on apparel than on yarn or fabric.88 In 2010, the trade-weighted 
average tariff on apparel was 12.6 percent, compared with 6.2 percent for textile products 
and 5.1 percent for textile mill articles (mainly yarns and fabrics).89 In addition, tariffs on 
many heavily traded apparel articles are much higher than the overall average cited 
above, particularly for articles produced with man-made fibers. For example, the 2010 
NTR duty rates on certain women’s and girls’ woven man-made fiber pants and blouses 
were 28.6 percent and 26.9 percent respectively, and those on men’s swimwear of man-
made fibers were 27.8 percent.90 U.S. apparel industry representatives claim that such 
tariffs have a disproportionate impact on low-income consumers.91 
 
FTAs, Preference Programs, and Rules of Origin 
Certain U.S. imports of textiles and apparel are eligible for duty-free treatment under 
FTAs and PTAs. The value of U.S. textile and apparel imports that entered duty-free 
under FTAs or preference programs in 2010 was $20.4 billion, or 20.1 percent of total 
imports of such goods, with over half (56 percent) of such imports originating from 
CAFTA-DR countries and NAFTA partners. In general, for apparel to qualify for duty-
free entry under the ROO requirements in U.S. FTAs or preference programs, it must be 
made from U.S. or regional inputs (yarns and fabrics); the specific percentages and other 
requirements vary by program.92 According to industry representatives, compliance and 
paperwork associated with the ROO raise costs and may discourage companies from 
taking full advantage of the trade benefits offered under these programs and 
                                                          
86 Quotas were originally imposed on textile and apparel imports to prevent market disruption as part of 
the 1974 Multifiber Arrangement (MFA), an agreement reached among most of the major textile exporting 
and importing countries. In 1995, the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing replaced the MFA and 
established a 10-year phase-out of textile and apparel quotas that ended on January 1, 2005. For additional 
information, see USITC, Import Restraints, Fifth and Sixth Updates, 2007 and 2009; and USITC, U.S. 
Imports of Textiles and Apparel under the Multifiber Arrangement, 1991. 
87 Bruemmer, “Chinese Apparel Manufacturers Strive to Maintain Global Competitiveness,” 2011. 
88 This is often referred to as tariff escalation. 
89 These average tariffs were calculated using NAICS nomenclature. Under NAICS, textile mill articles 
include intermediate inputs (e.g., yarn and fabric), and textile products consist of made-up textile articles 
such as carpets and rugs as well as towels, bedding, and other house furnishings. See table E.6 for additional 
information on the NAICS categories related to textiles and apparel. 
90 Nearly all U.S. trading partners have permanent NTR status. 
91 American Apparel and Footwear Association, written submission to the USITC, February 7, 2011, 2. 
92 USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010, 63, 119 (testimony of Julia Hughes, president, on 
behalf of United States Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel [USA-ITA]). 
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agreements.93 Nonetheless, these ROO generate a large share of the export demand for 
U.S. textile and apparel inputs. 
 
Projected Industry Trends, 2005–15  
The baseline simulation projects a 40 percent decline in U.S. output of textiles and 
apparel between 2005 and 2015. Domestic employment is projected to decline by an even 
steeper 52 percent. Exports are also expected to contract in almost all sectors, with an 
average decline of 24 percent. The projected change in imports varies across the three 
product categories. Imports of apparel are projected to rise modestly between 2005 and 
2015.94 Imports of textile products also rise in the projection, while those of intermediate 
textile products fall substantially, reflecting declining demand for both domestic and 
imported inputs by U.S. manufacturers of downstream products. Overall household 
demand for apparel is estimated to rise by 25 percent over the 10-year period. 
 
Effects of Liberalization Relative to Projected Trends  
The removal of these trade restraints in this sector would increase overall U.S. welfare in 
2015 by $514 million, compared to $2,254 million in the previous report. Liberalization 
consists of removing all tariffs and ROO requirements on the subject goods. The removal 
of ROO reduces demand for U.S. exports of items that currently benefit from such 
requirements. The size of the reduction in each sector depends on the amount of textile 
and apparel inputs that the United States exports to preferential trading partners that is 
subsequently exported back to the United States in finished apparel.95  
 
Welfare gains from removing tariffs would total $909 million, but the contraction in 
demand for U.S. exports by countries whose trade preferences would be eliminated 
would reduce welfare by $395 million. The overall increase in welfare is substantially 
lower than estimated in the last update of this report, and is principally due to the 
elimination of quantitative restrictions on certain imports from China and Vietnam that 
occurred in 2008.96  
 
The effect of liberalization in each sector depends on the relative importance of tariff 
removal and ROO elimination. Sectors experiencing the largest tariff liberalizations 
generally have the largest increases in imports, while sectors most affected by ROO have 
the largest declines in exports. Output declines are driven by both tariffs and ROO 
liberalization. In the seven sectors where ROO-based preferences are a relatively minor 
factor or not a factor at all, the estimated changes from the policy liberalization are small,  
 
 
                                                          
93 USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010, 118 (testimony of Julia Hughes, president, on behalf 
of USA-ITA); USA-ITA, written submission to the USITC, February 7, 2011. 
94 The projected rise in imports of apparel excluding hosiery represents an annual growth rate of 1 
percent and is consistent with a 3 percent annual growth rate from 2010 to 2015, following the observed 3.4 
percent import decline in quantity between 2005 and 2010. The broad apparel sector reported in table 2.11 
also includes women’s hosiery and hosiery n.e.c., imports of which have expanded substantially. See chap. 1 
and app. E for details on construction of the projection. 
95 A more complete discussion of the approach used can be found in Fox et al., “Textile and Apparel 
Barriers and Rules of Origin,” 2008.  
96 For a discussion of the quantitative restraints on Chinese and Vietnamese imports, see USITC, 
Import Restraints, Fifth Update, 2007, 67–70. For their expiration in 2008, see USITC, Import Restraints, 
Sixth Update, 2009, 41–44. 
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relative to the projected changes based on industry trends.97 However, liberalization 
would sharply reduce exports in the 15 sectors in which domestic production is 
encouraged by U.S. preference programs and FTAs, since foreign demand would decline 
for those goods.98 Although all 15 of these sectors show large estimated declines in 
exports, the effect of liberalization on production varies and depends primarily on the 
export orientation of the sector (figures 2.12–2.13 and appendix table E.5). The estimated 
decline in employment for these sectors generally mirrors the decline in output. 
 
Other Sectors with Significant Import Restraints 
Despite the low average U.S. tariff rate, the sectors discussed in this section remain 
subject to relatively high tariffs (table 1.2).99 The largest such sector is the glass and glass 
products sector, in terms of both U.S. production value and employment in 2009; by 
these measures, the smallest sector is costume jewelry (table 2.12). 
 
Projected Industry Trends, 2005–15 
Although there is a great deal of variation, shipments for most of the sectors treated here 
were projected to grow at rates higher than the growth in U.S. GDP from 2005 to 2015, 
with footwear and leather products growing the most rapidly at 57 percent, and costume 
jewelry the least rapidly at 13 percent. The average projected growth in shipments for 
these sectors is 25 percent, compared to projected GDP of 20.8 percent. 
 
Export growth rates for many members of this group vary widely from the projected 
national average growth in exports of 59 percent; the group’s growth rates are projected 
to vary from 19 percent (writing instruments) to 92 percent (footwear and leather 
products). The projected change in imports varies from a decline of 19 percent for 
pesticides to a 37 percent increase for writing instruments, compared to a projected 
average growth rate of 24 percent in overall U.S. imports. 
 
Effects of Liberalization Relative to Projected Trends  
The effect of liberalizing imports in these sectors is modeled by removing tariffs, one 
sector (or group) at a time. Simulation results show that eliminating tariffs in these 
sectors would decrease the price of imported goods, increase imports, and generally 
reduce production and employment in the domestic industry, leading to a net welfare gain 
in almost all sectors (table 2.12, figures 2.14–2.17, and appendix table E.5). 
 
The sectors experiencing the largest welfare effects were in the footwear and leather 
products group; the welfare gain attributable to tariff elimination for this group was $215  
 
                                                          
97 These sectors are nonwoven fabric, carpets and rugs, coated fabric, textiles goods, curtains, canvas 
products, and embroideries. Exports in these sectors are anticipated to decline by less than 10 percent in the 
case of removal of ROO requirements only. 
98 These 15 sectors include broadwoven fabric, narrow fabric, knit fabric, yarn, thread, tire cord, 
cordage, house furnishings, textile bags, pleating, automotive and apparel trimmings, fabricated textile 
products, women’s hosiery, hosiery n.e.c., and apparel.  
99 As noted in chap. 1, two other sectors (motorcycles, bicycles, and parts; and watches, clocks, and 
parts) were also identified as having significant restraints based on their 2010 tariff rates. Liberalization of 
these sectors was estimated to have a small effect on U.S. welfare (less than $17 million combined). 
However, the model does not adequately distinguish between the parts and the finished goods in these 
sectors. Because tariff changes on intermediate goods can have very different implications from tariff 
changes on final goods, this report does not give detailed results for these two sectors.  
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FIGURE 2.12  Percent change in imports of textiles and apparel, baseline projection and liberalization, 
2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
Note: n.e.c. means “not elsewhere classified.” 
 
FIGURE 2.13  Percent change in output of textiles and apparel, baseline projection and liberalization,  
2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
Note: n.e.c. means “not elsewhere classified.” 
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TABLE 2.12  Sectors with significant tariffs: Summary data and simulation results 
Item 
Summary data 
2009  
Projected change, 
2005–15 (%) 
Effect of 
liberalization (%) 
Employment Employees    
Ball and roller bearings 21,004   13.3 –3.8 
Costume jewelry 817a  –9.7 –2.3 
Footwear and leather products 24,622    29.0 –1.7 
Glass and glass products 80,784   11.5 –0.1 
Hand tools 36,387a  5.5 –0.2 
Writing instruments 2,373a  9.2 –1.7 
Pesticides and agricultural chemicals 9,422   8.3 (+) 
China tableware 5,711   6.3 –4.0 
Ceramic tile 4,123   5.5 –4.4 
Tires 50,849   10.6 –0.4 
     
Shipments Millions of $    
Ball and roller bearings 5,296   31.4 –3.8 
Costume jewelry 207a  12.9 –2.3 
Footwear and leather products 3,084   56.9 –1.7 
Glass and glass products 18,612   26.5 –0.1 
Hand tools 7,076a  23.3 –0.2 
Writing instruments 552a  32.3 –1.6 
Pesticides and agricultural chemicals 10,935   15.6 –0.1 
China tableware 539   28.0 –4.0 
Ceramic tile 827   23.5 –4.4 
Tires 14,573   22.2 –0.4 
     
Imports     
Ball and roller bearings 1,596   17.6 10.5 
Costume jewelry 1,576   12.4 5.1 
Footwear and leather products 24,261   22.1 3.9 
Glass and glass products 4,211   12.6 5.7 
Hand tools 2,074   8.7 2.0 
Writing instruments 787   37.3 4.2 
Pesticides and agricultural chemicals 743   –19.0 5.2 
China tableware 1,498   0.9 4.1 
Ceramic tile 964   22.4 2.4 
Tires 8,108   1.2 1.6 
     
Exports     
Ball and roller bearings 1,371   87.1 0.7 
Costume jewelry 167   59.6 1.0 
Footwear and leather products 1,153   91.5 0.3 
Glass and glass products 3,715   77.4 3.4 
Hand tools 1,226   64.2 0.1 
Writing instruments 99   19.4 1.4 
Pesticides and agricultural chemicals 2,205   66.4 0.9 
China tableware 455   54.4 0.4 
Ceramic tile 39   72.9 0.5 
Tires 3,619   52.7 0.1 
Source: USITC DataWeb/USDOC data; USDOC, Census, Annual Survey of Manufactures 2009 (accessed 
February 25, 2011); Commission estimates for projection and liberalization. 
 
Notes: Model sectors are determined by U.S. input-output classifications and may differ from summary 
data. Projected changes are based on quantity trends. Effects of liberalization represent deviations from 
the projected changes. See app. E for details and table E.6 for sector definitions. The (+) denotes a small 
positive value of less than 0.05 percent. 
 
   aCommission estimate. 
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FIGURE 2.14  Percent change in imports of high-tariff sectors, baseline projection and liberalization, 2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
FIGURE 2.15  Percent change in output of high-tariff sectors, baseline projection and liberalization, 2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
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FIGURE 2.16  Percent change in imports of footwear and leather products, baseline projection and 
liberalization, 2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
Note: n.e.c. means “not elsewhere classified.” 
 
FIGURE 2.17  Percent change in output of footwear and leather products, baseline projection and 
liberalization, 2005–15 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
Note: n.e.c. means “not elsewhere classified.” 
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million. Although eliminating tariffs has a minimal effect on leather goods not elsewhere 
classified (n.e.c.), eliminating tariffs on all other footwear and leather products reduces 
import prices by 8 to 11 percent; the greatest output declines for products in this group 
are in luggage, which declines by 6 percent from the projected 2015 baseline, and 
personal leather goods n.e.c., which declines by about 5 percent. Employment for these 
two sectors declines by similar amounts, while average output across the footwear and 
leather products group declines by about 2 percent and average imports rise by 4 percent. 
 
For most other sectors the price of imports decline, output and employment in the 
domestic industry fall, and there is a net welfare gain. For pesticides and glass and glass 
products, however, the declines in output and employment outweigh the benefits of 
reduced import prices to produce a small net welfare loss of $3 million and $1 million, 
respectively. 
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Services Import Restraints 
The United States is the leading global consumer of services supplied by foreign firms, 
which are attracted by both the large size and relative openness of the U.S. services 
market. Although the United States is largely open to the imports of services from other 
countries,100 U.S. services import restrictions do impact certain industries. Such 
restrictions, which typically stem from federal and state regulations, chiefly affect the 
services delivered by the domestic subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations 
rather than cross-border services flows.  
 
Although this section presents information on notable U.S. barriers to services trade—
drawn heavily from reports published by the WTO and the EU101 (table 2.13)—no 
attempt has been made to quantify or model the barriers’ impact. Over the past decade, 
several international bodies, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the World Bank, as well as the Commission, have initiated 
programs to quantify the effects of services barriers in specific industries, but to date 
have reported relatively few results of the analyses for the United States. As analytical 
approaches to measuring the restrictiveness of specific services barriers mature, future 
updates of this report may present quantitative assessments of those barriers. 
 
Current Conditions  
Service industries represent a very large share of both production and employment in the 
United States.  In 2009, for example, the U.S services market totaled $11.6 trillion, or 
about 82 percent of total U.S. gross domestic product; the number of employees working 
in the U.S. services sector in that year totaled approximately 103 million, or 84 percent of 
all employees in the United States.102 
 
The United States is the world’s single largest cross-border importer and exporter of 
services, accounting for 14 percent of global services exports and 11 percent of imports 
in 2009, the most recent year for which such data are available. The United States also 
recorded the world’s largest services trade surplus.103 In 2010, U.S. exports of private 
sector services totaled approximately $527 billion, whereas U.S. imports totaled $359 
billion, resulting in a services trade surplus of $168 billion (table 2.14). In 2009, the most 
recent year for which industry-level data are available, business, professional, and 
technical services represented 24 percent of both U.S. imports and exports of services, the 
single largest share in both categories. 
  
                                                          
100 The United States is the sixth most open country for services trade out of 147 countries ranked 
according to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Commitments Restrictiveness Index. 
WTO, World Trade Indicators 2009/10 database (accessed March 16, 2011). 
101 WTO, Trade Policy Review, 2010; European Commission, United States Barriers to Trade and 
Investment Report for 2008, 2009. 
102 USDOC, BEA, “Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Industry Data,” accessed July 20, 2011. These 
values and shares include both government and private services-producing industries. Employment is based 
on full-time equivalent employees. 2009 is the latest year for which services employment data are available. 
103 WTO, International Trade Statistics 2010, 2010, 15. There are slight discrepancies between BEA 
and WTO trade data, the latter of which is sourced from the International Monetary Fund; the discrepancies 
stem largely from the use of different classification systems. For example, in 2009, the WTO recorded U.S. 
imports of services as $331 billion, whereas BEA recorded imports as $335 billion. In that same year, the 
WTO reported U.S. services exports of $474 billion, whereas the BEA reported $484 billion. 
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TABLE 2.13 Significant restrictions on U.S. services imports by sector 
Broad sector 
Establishment 
restrictions 
Foreign-equity 
restrictions 
State-level 
regulations 
Air transport ☒ ☒ ☐ 
Marine transport ☒ ☒ ☐ 
Communication services ☐ ☒ ☐ 
Insurance services ☐ ☐ ☒ 
Legal services ☐ ☐ ☒ 
Sources: American Bar Association; European Commission; National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners; National Conference of Bar Examiners; United States Code; Code of Federal Regulations; 
and the WTO. 
 
TABLE 2.14  Trade in U.S. private service industries, 2007–10 (billions of dollars) 
Item 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Exports     
Total export trade 469.9 517.9 483.9 526.6 
Business, professional, and technical 103.8 115.2 116.6 (a) 
Travel 96.9 110.0 93.9 103.1 
Royalties & license fees 84.6 93.9 89.8 95.8 
Financial services 61.0 60.8 55.4 (a) 
Other transportationb 40.3 43.7 35.4 39.8 
All other 83.3 94.3 92.7 287.9c 
Imports     
Total import trade 335.1 365.5 334.9 358.6 
Business, professional, and technical 70.4 82.5 82.0 (a) 
Travel 76.3 79.7 73.2 74.6 
Insurance services 47.5 56.1 55.2 (a) 
Other transportationb 53.5 53.7 41.6 49.0 
Passenger fares 28.4 32.6 26.0 28.1 
All other 58.9 60.8 56.9 206.9c 
Trade balance 134.8 152.5 149.0 168.0 
Sources: USDOC, BEA, U.S. International Services database, “Table 1,” 1986–2009; USDOC et al., U.S. 
International Trade in Goods and Services, January 2011, “Exhibits 3 and 4,” March 10, 2011. 
 
Note: Details are provided for the five service industries with the largest imports or exports in 2009. 
Individual entries may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
 
   aNot available.  
   bIncludes freight and port services. 
   cTrade data not available by industry in 2010 are included in the “all other” aggregation. 
 
In addition to cross-border flows, international trade in services also occurs when U.S. 
and foreign companies sell services through foreign affiliates abroad. Services supplied 
abroad by U.S.-owned foreign affiliates were valued at $1.1 trillion in 2008, whereas 
services supplied by foreign-owned affiliates in the United States totaled $727.4 billion 
(table 2.15). 104 Wholesale trade represented the largest share of U.S. affiliate trade in 
2008, accounting for 21 percent of U.S. affiliates’ sales abroad and 23 percent of the sales 
of foreign affiliates in the United States (table 2.15). 
 
 
                                                          
104 U.S.-owned foreign affiliates are subsidiary companies owned by a U.S.-parent company and 
located abroad. Conversely, foreign-owned U.S. affiliates are owned by foreign parent companies and located 
in the United States. 
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TABLE 2.15  Sales and purchases by multinational corporations (MNCs) in U.S. private service industries, 
2006–08 (billions of dollars) 
Item 2006 2007 2008 
Sales by U.S. MNCs abroada    
Total sales 889.8 1,019.2  1,136.9 
Wholesale trade 179.2 214.2 234.8 
Financial services 145.9 160.2 175.9 
Insurance services 47.6 55.3 65.3 
Retail trade 53.4 58.6 63.3 
Real estate and rental and leasing 31.9 42.8 48.5 
All other 431.8 488.1 549.0 
Sales by foreign MNCs in the United States    
Total purchases 648.3 683.8 727.4 
Wholesale trade 151.4 156.8 163.9 
Financial services 82.5 90.6 96.7 
Professional, scientific, and technical services 56.2 63.0 70.3 
Transportation and warehousing 42.9 42.9 48.5 
Insurance services 42.1 44.4 47.7 
All other 273.2 286.2 300.3 
Sources: USDOC, BEA, U.S. International Services database, “Tables 9 and 10,” 1986–2009.  
 
Note: Details are provided for the five service industries with the largest imports or exports in 2009. 
Individual entries may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
 
   aTo safeguard proprietary information, the USDOC suppressed data on professional, scientific, and 
technical sales abroad in 2007 and 2008; this category is therefore not included in the top five (based on 
2009 data). These sales, however, were $114 billion in 2006 (third largest for 2006, excluding the “all other” 
aggregation). 
 
Nature of Trade Restraints 
Most U.S. government restrictions on services imports take the form of regulations that 
limit or prohibit foreign companies from operating and/or establishing subsidiaries in the 
United States. U.S. cabotage105 laws, for example, act as a barrier to foreign companies 
seeking to provide freight shipping services within the United States. Under the Merchant 
Marine Act, also referred to as the Jones Act, cabotage in the United States may be 
provided only by ships that are registered, built, and maintained in the United States and 
owned by a U.S. citizen or corporation.106 Similarly, U.S. air cabotage regulations 
prohibit the transportation of persons, property, or mail for compensation between points 
within the United States in a foreign civil aircraft.107 
 
In the United States, federal regulations that restrict equity ownership positions by 
foreign persons or companies, or impose nationality requirements, may also act as a 
barrier to foreign services suppliers. In air transport services, for example, foreign 
persons or companies are not allowed to control U.S. airlines, with U.S. legislation 
limiting foreign ownership to 25 percent of voting shares and stipulating that the 
president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and other managing officers 
must be U.S. citizens. Airplanes serving domestic routes within the United States are also 
required to be crewed by U.S. citizens or resident aliens.108 Similarly, 75 percent of the 
                                                          
105 Cabotage is defined as the transport of passengers and goods between two points within the country. 
106 46 U.S.C.: Shipping. In 2002, the USITC modeled the impact of completely liberalizing the 
coastwise Jones Act fleet, with welfare effects estimated at $656 million. By contrast, liberalizing only the 
Jones Act’s domestic-build requirement produced welfare effects of $261 million. USITC, Import Restraints, 
Third Update, 2002, 115–29. 
107 19 C.F.R. 122.165 “Air Cabotage” (2011). 
108 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15); 49 U.S.C. § 41102(a). 
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crew operating Jones Act-compliant ships must be U.S. citizens. 109 In communication 
services, federal law restricts foreign investors to a direct ownership position of 20 
percent in a broadcast, common carrier, or aeronautical radio station licensee, while 
indirect ownership is limited to 25 percent.110 The United States’ commitments under the 
WTO’s Agreement on Basic Telecommunication Services also exclude foreign 
ownership in companies that offer direct-to-home, direct broadcast, and digital audio 
services to the U.S. market.111 
 
Variations in state-level regulations and/or professional accreditation standards may pose 
impediments to foreign service providers. The property and casualty insurance industry, 
for example, is regulated by insurance regulators in 50 states, the District of Columbia, 
and five U.S. territories.112 Such state-by-state regulations apply to both domestic 
companies and international affiliates. These regulations chiefly affect the services 
delivered by domestic subsidiaries rather than cross-border services flows. Like many 
companies, countries, and organizations around the world, the EU considers the U.S. 
state-by-state insurance regulatory framework to be an impediment to EU insurance 
companies, largely because companies entering the U.S. market face the 56 different 
insurance jurisdictions discussed above, each with its own licensing, solvency, and 
operating requirements.113 
 
In legal services, each U.S. state has sovereignty over its court system, and therefore has 
the authority to establish the standards and qualifications necessary to practice law. The 
most notable example of this authority is the state-level bar exam, which lawyers must 
pass before offering legal services in a given state. Foreign lawyers wishing to operate in 
the United States also face foreign legal consultant (FLC) rules in 31 states (or 
jurisdictions), with such rules varying considerably from state to state.114 In some states, 
for example, FLCs may only offer legal advice on home-country law, while in other 
states they may also give advice on third-country and international law. In some states, 
too, FLCs are allowed to operate only under the supervision of a local, state-qualified 
lawyer.115 
 
This section does not attempt to quantify restrictions to trade in services, largely because 
such restrictions take the form of nontariff barriers applied “behind the border”—i.e., 
potentially anywhere within the national territory. They are therefore conceptually more 
difficult to quantify than barriers affecting trade in goods, which are applied by customs 
officials at border entry points. Nonetheless, researchers have begun to model trade in 
services, as well as broader “behind the border” issues, in CGE models, with such efforts 
showing potential for deriving large gains from liberalizing services restraints and other 
nontariff measures.116 Such research has largely focused on overall gains from improved 
services efficiency, however, and so is not directly comparable to the modeling of 
specific restraints in this report. 
                                                          
109 46 U.S.C.: Shipping. 
110 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(3); 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4). 
111 WTO, “ Schedule of Specific Commitments,” 1997. 
112 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, “About the NAIC” (accessed March 16, 2011).  
113 European Commission, United States Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2008, 2009, 87; 
Cooke and Skipper, “An Evaluation of U.S. Insurance Regulation,” 2008.  
114 NCBE, ABA, Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements 2010, 2010, 35–36; Terry, 
“Summary of State Action on ABA MJP Recommendations 8 & 9,” October 2010, 1–2. 
115 Silver and DeBruin, “Comparative Analysis of United States Rules Licensing Legal Consultants,” 2006. 
116 USITC, Import Restraints, Sixth Update, 2009, 101–5. The results reported by various studies are 
highly variable, largely because services restraints and other nontariff measures are difficult to specify. For 
more information, see Brown et al., “Multilateral, Regional and Bilateral Trade Policy Options,” 2003; 
Hoekman, “Liberalizing Trade in Services,” 2006; Robinson et al., “Capturing the Implications of Services 
Trade Liberalization,” 2002. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Global Supply Chains 
Development of Global Supply Chains 
From automobiles, electronics, and plastics, to software development or clothing, many 
goods and services today are provided via global supply chains (box 3.1). Instead of 
carrying out everything from research and development (R&D) to delivery and retail 
within a single country, many industries are dividing this process into stages or tasks (or 
“fragments”) that are then undertaken in many countries. The Apple iPod is a prominent 
example of a good produced via a global supply chain. Apple is headquartered in the 
United States and most of its R&D, marketing, top management, and corporate functions 
are located in the United States. The iPod’s hard drive, however, was designed in Japan 
by Toshiba and built in factories in China and the Philippines. The controller chip was 
designed by the U.S. firm Portal Player, but is produced by firms in either Taiwan or the 
United States. Other parts are manufactured in Japan, Thailand, Taiwan, Korea, and 
Singapore. Finally, the iPod is assembled by Taiwanese manufacturing firms in China.1 
 
Global supply chains have spread widely across both industries and countries. The global 
restructuring of production has led to faster growth in trade, new patterns of trade, and 
new benefits from trade. It may also have introduced new risks, including exposure to 
foreign shocks2 and negative effects for workers in certain industries and occupations. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the key elements of global supply chains, the 
major economic forces behind the emergence of these chains, and their significance for 
global trade and development. This is followed by an in-depth look at the evolution of 
U.S. participation in supply chains, and the policies, institutions, and characteristics that 
have affected that participation. The chapter then examines some of the effects of global 
supply chains on U.S. companies, consumers, and workers. The final section explores 
U.S. supply chains in three sectors (apparel, motor vehicles, and televisions) in which 
U.S. trade and production have been substantially integrated into global supply chains. 
The case studies also include U.S. logistics providers, which provide a service essential to 
the efficient operation of global supply chains. 
 
Key Elements of Global Supply Chains 
Structure 
The activities involved in a supply chain can be grouped into sequential or “vertical” 
stages. Figure 3.1 illustrates a simple supply chain, broken into broad stages from 
upstream R&D and design, through manufacturing, to downstream marketing, retail 
sales, delivery, and customer service. Each stage includes a large number of tasks. While 
many firms can carry out most stages or tasks internally, they often purchase raw 
materials and some service inputs from domestic or international suppliers. In a global 
 
 
                                                          
1 The example refers to the fifth-generation iPod. Linden et al., “Who Profits from Innovation in Global 
Value Chains?” 2010; Linden et al., “Innovation and Job Creation in a Global Economy,” 2011; Linden et al., 
“Who Captures Value in a Global Innovation System?” 2007. 
2 Including economic and political shocks as well as natural disasters. 
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BOX 3.1 Global supply chain fundamentals 
 
A supply chain is a production network between multiple firms that supply interlinked economic activities 
toward the provision of a final good or service. Because the firms contribute economic value through these 
activities, the chains are often referred to as value chains. In general, supply chains encompass all 
activities necessary to bring a product from conception to consumption. To the extent that they involve 
suppliers located in different countries, the chains are global supply chains. For purposes of this 
discussion, a regional supply chain—e.g., one involving two or three NAFTA countries—is considered 
“global” based on this definition. 
 
Outsourcing refers to service or manufacturing activities that are contracted out to unrelated firms located 
either in the home country or abroad. Offshoring originally referred to service or manufacturing activities 
within the supply chain that are carried out by affiliates located in foreign countries. However, offshoring is 
now commonly used more broadly to refer to activities done abroad through both foreign affiliates and 
independent contracts. The provision of service or manufacturing activities by a domestic firm to a firm 
abroad is known as inshoring. 
 
FIGURE 3.1 Illustration of a simple supply chain 
 
Source: Commission compilation. 
 
supply chain, many tasks are “offshored,”3 either through the firm’s own subsidiaries 
abroad or through independent contracts.4 For example, a domestic firm might provide 
the R&D and design of a product, and produce the initial intermediate inputs using local 
raw materials, as in figure 3.1. Then these intermediate inputs would be exported to a 
second country, where a firm would use them to produce a semifinished product. That 
                                                          
3 Feenstra, “Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Global Production in the Global Economy,” 
1998; Jones and Kierzkowski, “A Framework for Fragmentation,” 2001; Deardorff, “International Provision 
of Trade in Services, Trade, and Fragmentation,” 2001; Deardorff, “Fragmentation Across Cones,” 2001; 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, “Trading Tasks,” 2008. 
4 Amiti and Wei, “Fear of Service Outsourcing,” 2005; Spencer, “International Outsourcing and 
Incomplete Contracts,” 2005.  
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firm would then export the semifinished good to a third country, where the final good is 
assembled and packaged. The third country would then export the good back to the 
domestic firm, which would oversee the marketing, retailing, and delivery of the product 
domestically and abroad. Supply chains like these require extensive organizational 
oversight. They also typically involve heavy reliance on telecommunications to ensure 
that different stages of the product are made to specification and on logistics to 
coordinate the movement of material across many firms and countries. As the case 
studies later in this chapter illustrate, global supply chains can involve complex 
interconnections between different tasks, as well as between domestic and foreign firms 
carrying out those tasks. This complexity is managed by lead firms in the chain that 
oversee production and make other key decisions (box 3.2). 
 
Offshored tasks in a global chain can be done by independent foreign firms, by foreign 
affiliates, or both. Evidence from China, for example, indicates that most global supply 
chain manufacturing in China is done through foreign multinational subsidiaries or joint 
ventures.5 The choice of affiliate versus independent firm is determined in part by the 
nature and maturity of the product, as well as the status of the intellectual property rights 
in the offshore site. If the product is new and embodies extensive R&D or intellectual 
property, firms may be less likely to offshore any tasks.6 If they do offshore tasks, they 
may be more likely to use affiliates. This is due, in part, to the risk that intermediate 
goods may not be made to exact specifications if contracted to independent firms. It can 
also reflect concern about enforcement of contracts or property rights abroad.7 Once a 
product is more standardized, firms are more likely both to offshore tasks and to do so 
using independent contractors. 
 
Trade 
Global supply chains have produced important changes in the nature and volume of 
global trade. Modern complex supply chains generate more trade than traditional supply 
networks in which only raw materials or final goods might be sent across international 
borders. In the earlier example of a supply chain in which the stages in figure 3.1 were 
carried out in three countries, the product was exported three times before being sold in 
final form at home or abroad. Global chains can also generate new patterns of 
specialization, as firms in a particular country often specialize in a particular stage or 
task.8 In electronics, for example, intermediate and semifinished goods are often 
produced in Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, while final assembly activities 
are often contracted to Chinese firms.9 Finally, global chains can change the nature of a 
nation’s trade. As countries become more vertically specialized, their imports and exports 
are increasingly composed of intermediate goods and services that are moving to the next 
stage in the chain.  
 
 
                                                          
5 Dean et al., “Decomposing China-Japan-U.S. Trade,” 2009; Feenstra and Hanson, “Ownership and 
Control in Outsourcing to China,” 2005. 
6 Antras, “Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle,” 2005. For an examination of the potential 
increase in affiliate sales if intellectual property rights protection in China is improved, see USITC, “China: 
Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and Indigenous Innovation Polices on the U.S. Economy,” 2011.  
7 For example, American Tower, a provider of wireless network infrastructure and services, requires an 
extensive review of intellectual property rights protection before it will consider partnering with a firm in any 
foreign country. See Taiclet, “Keynote Address,” April 5, 2011. 
8 Hummels et al., “The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization in World Trade,” 2001. 
9 Dean et al., “Decomposing China-Japan-U.S. Trade,” 2009. 
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Major Economic Forces Driving the Development of Chains 
Technological Change 
A key force behind the widespread development of global supply chains has been 
technological change. Over time, technological change has allowed more production 
processes to be fragmented—split into stages or tasks—and those stages or tasks to be 
carried out in new, often distant locations. For example, in the 1970s some apparel 
production for the U.S. market was offshored in nearby countries in the Caribbean region. 
But advances in telecommunications and in transport have allowed the industry to source 
from distant Asian suppliers and still meet the time-sensitive demands of the industry.10 
Since the introduction of just-in-time technologies in the 1980s, the automobile industry 
has been significantly restructured, enabling it to rely on complex global and regional 
networks with tiers of suppliers of parts and components. In the mid-1990s, the increased 
speed of communications via the Internet allowed the Indian software industry to become 
a key player in global chains. Swiss Airlines, American Airlines, and Singapore Airlines 
began contracting with Indian firms for flight scheduling, and Reebok and Nordstrom had 
their inventory software developed and supported by the Indian firm Infosys.11 
 
International Cost Differences 
International cost differences have been another driving force behind the spread of global 
chains. Some tasks require higher skills or more complex equipment than other tasks, and 
a global chain allows a firm to reduce costs by locating activities in different countries 
based on their respective comparative advantages. Semiconductor production, for 
                                                          
10 David Hummels notes that faster delivery, including higher ship speeds and a shift to air transport, is 
“the most obvious quality improvement” in international transport. Hummels, “Have International Transport 
Costs Declined?” 1999, 21–22. 
11 Lateef, “Linking Up with the Global Economy,” 1997. 
BOX 3.2  Leadership of global chains 
 
Supply chains are typically initiated and overseen by a limited number of lead firms. In a producer-
driven chain, the lead firms are usually involved in R&D and design (the upstream end of the chain). 
These chains are most often found in high-tech goods that embody specialized design, complex 
production processes, and extensive R&D, such as electronics, semiconductors, computers, software 
development, and pharmaceuticals. In these types of chains, the production process itself is often 
fragmented, and the fragments are carried out in different countries. In one producer-driven chain, for 
example, U.S.-based lead firms design electronic products and component specifications. The 
components are produced in Asia and exported to Mexico, where affiliates of U.S. manufacturers use 
them to produce the electronic products. The finished products are then exported to the United States, 
where the U.S. lead firms carry out marketing and sales.a  
 
Buyer-driven chains generally are led by firms involved in retail (the downstream end of the chain). 
These chains are more often associated with standardized, lower-tech goods such as apparel, which 
require less sophisticated capital equipment and fewer skilled workers. In these chains, the production 
process itself may not be fragmented, but may instead be done completely offshore. The apparel case 
study later in this chapter illustrates three types of buyer-driven supply chains, where the U.S. lead firms 
are branded marketers, large retailers, or branded manufacturers. These lead firms are involved (in 
varying degrees) in marketing and service activities, but contract out actual apparel production to foreign 
firms.b  
 
 
   aSturgeon and Kawakami, “Global Value Chains in the Electronics Industry,” 2010. 
   bGereffi, “International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commodity Chain,” 1999; Gereffi 
and Frederick, “The Global Apparel Value Chain, Trade, and the Crisis,” 2010. 
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example, can be broken into three stages: design, front-end fabrication, and back-end 
production. The majority of semiconductor producers, which carry out the design stage, 
are located in the United States, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and the European Union (EU), 
where higher-skilled labor is relatively abundant and, thus, relatively less expensive. 
Front-end production, the stage requiring the most intensive use of capital and 
technology, also takes place in the EU, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States. Back-end 
testing, assembly, and production, which are relatively less skill-intensive, have generally 
been located in countries such as China, where lower-skilled labor is relatively more 
abundant and, thus, relatively less expensive.12 The result is a more efficient, lower-cost 
production process. 
 
Lower Trade and Transport Costs 
Two other important drivers in the development of global chains are the extensive global 
trade liberalization (e.g., reduction in tariff and nontariff barriers) and falling 
transportation costs that have occurred in the past quarter-century.13 Because goods and 
services produced by global supply chains typically cross borders multiple times, they 
pass through multiple customs regimes and are affected by multiple tariffs and nontariff 
barriers. Thus, the benefits of trade liberalization can also be multiplied for goods and 
services produced in global supply chains. The Uruguay Round negotiations, a major 
multilateral trade liberalization completed in 1994,14 resulted in average tariff reductions 
of 38 percent among industrialized nations, as well as liberalized trade in textiles and 
apparel and reductions to barriers in services trade. Created at the same time, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and its dispute settlement mechanism have contributed to a 
more open and orderly trading system.15  
 
Bilateral and unilateral trade liberalization has also contributed to the formation of global 
supply chains, as have programs that encourage duty-free trade in parts and components. 
For example, the United States established programs as early as the 1950s to allow duty-
free imports of U.S.-origin components contained in imported articles. This treatment has 
encouraged the use of U.S. components in foreign assembly operations and reduced the 
tariff costs associated with these supply chains. Other countries or regional blocs, such as 
the EU, have similar provisions.16 
 
Similarly, falling transportation costs in the past three decades have significantly lowered 
the cost of shipping semifinished inputs between countries. These developments have 
reduced the obstacles to locating stages of production in different countries.  
 
Improved International Logistics 
Logistics, the coordinated movement of goods and services, has become essential to the 
smooth flow of goods and services in many internationally fragmented supply chains. In 
fact, as discussed in the case study at the end of this chapter, the rise of low-cost, 
efficient, and globally integrated logistics firms is one factor that has spurred the creation 
of global chains. The development of logistics firms that offer multiple logistics services 
                                                          
12 Yinug, “Challenges to Foreign Investment in High-Tech Semiconductor Production in China,” 2009. 
13 In some exceptional cases, trade restrictions may themselves have led to the break up of single-
country production systems and the formation of global supply chains. For example, the voluntary export 
restraints under which Japanese automakers found themselves in the 1980s may have led them to invest in 
auto production in the United States and to form auto parts supply chains between the United States and 
Japan.  
14 Jackson, The World Trading System, 1997, 74. 
15 Additional accomplishments are noted in USITC, Import Restraints, Sixth Update, 2009, 83–87. 
16 USITC, Production Sharing, 1989, chap. 9 and app. A.  
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(such as warehousing, distribution, tracking, and customs brokerage) has enabled lead 
firms to manage larger and more complex chains. Technological advances, particularly 
via the Internet, have helped improve network communications and reduced logistics 
costs. Lowering the cost of logistics services can increase the number of suppliers and the 
complexity of the relationships that a lead firm can profitably incorporate in a supply 
chain.17 
 
Improved Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Contract Enforcement 
Finally, improvements in intellectual property rights protection and contract enforcement 
in some countries may have facilitated the creation of global chains. From a lead firm’s 
point of view, the prospect of overseeing contracts with independent firms, or setting up 
subsidiaries abroad to carry out offshored tasks, often implies additional risk. As noted 
earlier, this risk can both reduce the number of activities a firm offshores and determine 
whether or not the firm carries out those tasks via foreign investment or independent 
firms.18 To the extent that countries have improved laws and regulations regarding 
intellectual property and contracts, their business environment will be more conducive to 
their participation in global chains.19  
 
Growth of Global Supply Chains in World Trade 
As global supply chains proliferate and expand, it is likely that they account for a 
growing share of world trade. However, because detailed trade data for such chains are 
not typically available, their share of world trade is difficult to measure. Researchers have 
turned instead to a variety of other methods to try to identify such trade (box 3.3). 
Evidence gathered from all these methods suggests that global supply chains are growing 
in importance in global trade. 
 
Trade in Parts and Components 
Because supply chains involve extensive trade in intermediate and semifinished goods, 
some broad evidence of their importance can be found by measuring trade in parts and 
components. World trade in parts and components grew by about 9 percent per year from 
1990 to 2000, outstripping total world trade growth of 6.5 percent per year.20 There is 
also evidence of a strong network of Asian suppliers in parts and components. Estimates 
for 1984–96 showed that Asian global exports of parts and components grew by more 
than 500 percent, compared to Asian total export growth of 300 percent.21 A similar 
analysis found that the share of East Asia in global exports of parts and components grew 
from 29.3 percent in 1992 to 39.2 percent in 2003.22 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 Jones et al., “What Does Evidence Tell Us about Fragmentation and Outsourcing?” 2005. 
18 Antras, “Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle,” 2005; Feenstra and Hanson, “Ownership and 
Control in Outsourcing to China,” 2005. 
19 In the plastics industry, for example, Gloucester Engineering has extended its chain to include 
Malaysia, in part because of Malaysia’s improved property rights protection. See Johnson, “Doing Business 
in Malaysia,” April 5, 2011. 
20 Jones et al., “What Does Evidence Tell Us about Fragmentation and Outsourcing?” 2005. 
21 Ng and Yeats, “Major Trade Trends in East Asia,” 2003. 
22 Athukorala, “The Rise of China and East Asian Export Performance,” 2009; Athukorala and 
Yamashita, “Production Fragmentation and Trade Integration,” 2006. These authors also found evidence that 
the share of components in intra-regional trade was far higher than its share in extra-regional trade. 
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Processing Trade 
Numerous countries have set up programs to encourage processing trade, which allow 
duty-free imports of components used in products made solely for export. Using data on 
these programs provides a more direct measure of global supply chain trade, since all of 
the trade in the components and products affected by the programs moves through a 
supply chain. China and Mexico are the two largest users of export processing regimes in 
the developing world, and together account for about 80–85 percent of such exports 
worldwide.23  Chinese trade grew by more than 800 percent between 1995 and 2008—
and about half of this growth is attributable to Chinese processing trade.24 Mexico is also 
heavily reliant on processing trade; processing imports represented over 50 percent of 
total Mexican imports in 2006.25 
 
                                                          
23 Koopman et al., “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due,” 2010, 17. 
24 Dean et al., “Measuring Vertical Specialization,” 2011. 
25 De La Cruz et al., “Estimating Foreign Value-added in Mexico’s Manufacturing Exports,” 2010. 
BOX 3.3 Measuring trade and value in global supply chains 
 
Several methods have been used to measure the extent of global supply chain activity in world trade. 
Some methods rely only on trade data. One method uses detailed trade data to identify trade in parts 
and components. Another uses special customs data reported by some countries to measure 
processing trade, which includes imported goods used as inputs into products made solely for export 
(processing imports) and exports embodying processing imports (processing exports). China and Mexico 
account for a large portion of global processing trade, and both report such data.a 
 
Other methods also incorporate input-output tables to measure the foreign content in domestic 
production or exports. Measures of foreign content in intermediate use (also known as offshoring 
intensity) examine the share of all intermediate inputs that come from abroad for use by domestic 
companies. Such inputs can include intermediate goods (e.g., hard drives) or intermediate services (e.g., 
accounting or information technology services) that firms use to produce goods for domestic use or 
exports. Measures of foreign content in exports (also known as vertical specialization) rely on 
estimates of the value of imported inputs used directly and indirectly in an exported good or service. If 
foreign content is high, this would suggest the country is extensively involved in global chains. If firms in 
the country lie far downstream in the chain, most of the value of the product will have been contributed 
by foreign countries at earlier stages in the chain. Thus, high foreign content might suggest that the 
country is specialized toward the downstream end of a global supply chain (e.g., in assembly, marketing, 
or sales). 
 
A recent, more extensive approach uses global input-output data to track the sources and destination of 
value contributed by workers and companies in each country. Such databases capture value that flows 
directly between countries or through intermediate countries in the chain. This approach is based on 
value added, which is the difference between the cost of intermediate inputs a firm receives and the 
price paid by the next firm (or consumer) in the chain. This value includes workers’ wages and company 
profits, and is tracked in input-output tables along with the value of intermediate inputs. The examination 
of U.S. participation later in the chapter measures value added in imports, value added in exports, and 
value added in absorption. Absorption is similar to demand and encompasses both intermediate inputs 
used by manufacturers and final goods and services used by consumers. 
 
The copious data used in methods relying on input-output tables creates a tradeoff between timeliness 
and accuracy. Measures of foreign content generally employ data from a single country or a limited set of 
countries and are available on an annual basis up to 2008, but the more comprehensive value-added 
measures using worldwide data provide a snapshot of only a single year (currently only 2004 is 
available). 
 
 
   aChina reports processing trade using data on special customs regimes. Mexico reports export 
processing data for IMMEX, formerly the Maquiladora and PITEX programs. See USITC, Production 
Sharing, 1999. 
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Foreign Content in Exports 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, firms in supply chains often import a semifinished 
product from the firm at the previous stage in the chain, add value, and then send that 
product to the country at the next stage in the chain. Measuring the share of imported 
inputs (foreign content) in the value of a country’s exports might broadly indicate the 
extent of that country’s participation in global chains and whether its firms are 
specialized upstream or downstream in the chain. Early evidence for countries belonging 
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) showed that 
the foreign content of their exports was only about 16 percent in 1970, but grew to about 
20 percent by 1990.26 More recently, evidence for China indicated that in 2002, foreign 
content accounted for as much as 46 percent of China’s total exports and 74 percent of its 
processing exports. For some products, like computers, the estimated foreign content in 
Chinese exports was as much as 95 percent.27  
 
Evidence from recent studies measuring sources of value added in traded goods and 
services suggests that foreign content accounts for about one-quarter of global exports.28 
This share varies substantially by region, however. Emerging East Asian economies are 
the most integrated into global supply chains, with foreign content shares commonly 
exceeding 40 percent of export value. Major advanced economies (the United States, 
Japan, and the EU) have much lower foreign content shares of about 12 percent.29 
 
Significance of Global Supply Chains for World Trade and 
Economic Development  
Magnified Effect of Tariff Cuts 
Since the 1960s, the growth in global manufactured exports has been dramatic. Recent 
evidence suggests that global supply chains can explain a significant part of this 
growth.30 As noted earlier, every time an intermediate good in a global chain crosses a 
border, it may incur a tariff. Thus, a reduction in tariffs is likely to cause a magnified cost 
reduction for a good produced in a global chain and a magnified increase in trade. In 
addition, new global chains may become cost-effective only when reductions in tariffs 
are sufficiently large.31 If so, the extensive trade liberalization in the developing world, 
from the mid-1980s onward, may have stimulated new global chains by making it more 
profitable to offshore tasks to these countries.32 The development of these new global 
chains would further magnify trade, compared to trade solely in final goods.  
 
Changes in the Pattern of Trade 
The ability to split the production process into tasks that can be done in different 
locations implies at least three important changes in the pattern of global trade. First, it 
means a change in the nature of specialization. Traditionally, a country’s production and 
                                                          
26 Hummels et al., “The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization in World Trade,” 2001, 83.  
27 Dean et al., “Measuring Vertical Specialization,” 2011; Koopman et al., “How Much of Chinese 
Exports Is Really Made in China?” 2008.  
28 Values reported here are from Koopman et al., “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due,” 2010. See also 
Johnson and Noguera, “Accounting for Intermediates,” 2010; Daudin et al., “Who Produces for Whom in the 
World Economy?” 2009. 
29 Koopman et al., “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due,” 2010.  
30 Yi, “Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth of World Trade?” 2003. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Dean et al., “Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries since 1985,” 1994. 
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exports were concentrated in goods or services in which the country had a comparative 
advantage. Now specialization is more finely defined, with countries specializing in 
stages or tasks within products, based on comparative advantage. Second, this new 
pattern of specialization has generated a change in the nature of trade flows. The 
expansion of global supply chains is likely to increases the trade between industrial and 
developing countries, since the location of tasks depends upon differences in comparative 
advantage.33 Third, the international fragmentation of production means the pattern of 
trade will be more sequential and more dominated by trade in intermediate goods.  
 
Trade patterns in the semiconductor industry illustrate these three effects. In the past, the 
United States would have exported products like semiconductors to China. Now, the 
United States performs the R&D, design, and front-end fabrication of a semiconductor, 
and exports it to a Southeast Asian country that performs the back-end testing, assembly, 
and packaging of that semiconductor. The Southeast Asian country then exports the 
packaged semiconductor to China, where it is incorporated into various electronic 
products and then exported to customers globally.34 
 
Changes in the Benefits of Trade 
Economy-wide benefits 
Freer trade tends to bring benefits to a country as a whole. These national gains occur 
through two channels: producers increase profits as they specialize more in goods in 
which the country has a comparative advantage; consumers are able to buy goods at 
lower prices. Both of these gains increase a country’s global purchasing power. The 
possibility of participating in global supply chains strengthens these national gains, 
because it means a good can be produced more efficiently than if the entire process had to 
take place in a single location. It also means that trade liberalization yields larger 
increases in national purchasing power, due to its magnified impact on trade in global 
chains.35 
 
Global supply chains may bring additional gains for developing countries, through 
opportunities to participate in one or more stages in the production of technology- or 
skill-intensive products, instead of having to achieve mastery over the entire production 
process first.36 Firms initially performing the least-skilled tasks may learn through 
interaction with other firms in the chain and be able to move to higher-value activities. 
Indian software firms in the 1990s, for example, were largely in the middle to lower end 
of the software development chain, engaged in contract programming, coding, and 
testing.37 Yet now, partly because of the learning process just described, Indian firms 
engage in business and technology consulting, systems integration, product engineering, 
custom software development, and other more skill-intensive activities.38  
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Arndt and Kierzkowski, Fragmentation, 2001. 
34 Evidence on this kind of change in trade patterns for China can be found in Dean et al., “Measuring 
Vertical Specialization,” 2011, and Dean and Lovely, “Trade Growth, Production Fragmentation and China’s 
Environment,” 2010. 
35 Yi, “Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth of World Trade?” 2003. 
36 Arndt and Kierzkowski, “Fragmentation,” 2001. 
37 Lateef, “Linking Up with the Global Economy,” 1997. 
38 See Commander et al., “The Consequences of Globalisation,” 2008; Infosys, “What We Do,” 
http://www.infosys.com/about/what-we-do/Pages/index.aspx. 
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Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may see additional gains from global chains. 
Many SMEs are not able to obtain financing for exporting directly or to surmount other 
informational obstacles to participation in global markets.39 However, these SMEs might 
be able to enter the global market indirectly, by contracting as a supplier in a global 
chain.40 This is true for SMEs in both developing and industrial countries, but particularly 
so in developing countries, where business obstacles are larger.  
 
Distributional benefits 
Evaluating the effect of global supply chains on the benefits of trade, as well as on the 
distribution of those benefits within an economy, is not simple. Freer trade typically 
generates winners and losers within a country. This occurs because productive resources 
move away from industries in which the country does not have a comparative advantage 
and into industries in which it does. In a country where capital and high-skilled labor are 
relatively abundant, for example, this typically means a shift of resources out of less skill-
intensive industries and into those that are more capital- and skill-intensive. In this 
example, earnings of higher-skilled workers and capital owners tend to rise, while those 
of lower-skilled workers tend to fall throughout the economy. 
 
In the presence of global supply chains, an industry would now have the opportunity and 
incentive to split off the most low-skilled, labor-intensive activities within the chain to 
locations offshore, specialize in the remaining activities, and continue producing the final 
good. One effect of this would be to create winners and losers, as described above. 
However, the global chain could reduce the adjustment costs of shifting resources across 
industries and soften the impacts on the “losers” from freer trade.41 If a firm is already 
offshoring some of its less skill-intensive tasks, and the costs of offshoring fall, then the 
cost saving on the already offshored tasks has the same effect as an increase in 
productivity for the firm’s less-skilled workers. This provides an incentive to expand 
output. Thus, employment and/or wage losses might be mitigated, or even reversed.42  
 
A number of studies have examined the effect of offshoring on relative wages or 
employment. The evidence on these issues is mixed. The evidence for the United States is 
discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
 
New Concerns: Exposure to International Shocks 
While global chains introduce new benefits, there is also a potential negative side to 
greater international integration: global chains can increase exposure to global shocks. As 
international trade relationships deepen, domestic economies can become more sensitive 
to both positive and negative economic developments overseas. As a result, trade flows 
and economic growth may become more synchronized across countries. When a country 
grows rapidly, it trades more, thus aiding growth in other countries connected with it 
directly or indirectly through its supply chain. By the same token, if a country undergoes 
a recession, or experiences internal strife or natural disasters, other countries in the 
supply chain will feel the effects, even if they do not trade directly with the affected 
country. For example, a decline in U.S. demand for electronics imports from China 
 
  
                                                          
39 OECD, Enhancing the Role of SMEs in Global Value Chains, 2008. 
40 USITC, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 2010. 
41 Arndt and Kierzkowski, Fragmentation, 2001; Jones and Kierzkowski, “A Framework for 
Fragmentation,” 2001; Deardorff, “International Provision of Trade in Services,” 2001. 
42 Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, “Trading Tasks,” 2008. 
3-11 
would reduce Chinese demand for electronics parts and components from Asian 
suppliers. Asian suppliers’ exports would fall even if they had no direct exports to the 
United States.43 
 
Extensive integration into global supply chains may also make trade flows more volatile. 
This observation, while not universally accepted, accords with trade patterns in the recent 
global recession. The volume of global trade declined by 25 percent from October 2008 
to May 2009, while global industrial production declined by only 13 percent in that 
period.44 This contraction of trade was unusually large by recent historical standards.45 In 
part, the large trade decline in global chains was due to the composition of products 
produced by those chains: in recessions, demand for consumer electronics, automobiles, 
consumer appliances, and even clothing can contract sharply, leading to lower trade. But 
some economists have argued that global supply chains themselves have increased trade 
volatility, implying that large positive or negative swings may be a new and permanent 
feature of the global trade environment.46 
 
The increased interrelationships caused by global chains may also lead to speedier 
transmission of supply shocks as well as demand shocks. For example, the earthquake 
and tsunami that hit Japan in March 2011 have disrupted some global supply chains. In 
the case of the motor vehicle industry, for example, the single-sourcing of certain paint 
pigments from a Japanese plant affected by the earthquake and tsunami has limited the 
availability of some vehicle colors for automakers such as Chrysler and Ford.47 On the 
other hand, Japanese firms may be better able to limit the negative effects of the disaster 
on the Japanese economy because of their increased ability to import supplies—an ability 
facilitated by global supply chains.48  
 
Evolving U.S. Position in Global Supply Chains 
U.S. manufacturers have substantially increased their participation in global supply 
chains during the last few decades, although this growth has differed by industry. U.S. 
companies engage more intensively in global supply chains to source inputs for domestic 
consumption than to obtain materials for exports. The United States exchanges the most 
value in global chains with Canada, Mexico, the EU, Japan, and China, in the electronics, 
chemicals, motor vehicles, and apparel industries. In addition, U.S. foreign investment 
has contributed to the development of global supply chains in China, Mexico, and 
elsewhere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 Bems et al., “The Collapse of Global Trade,” 2009.  
44 Baldwin and Taglioni, “The Great Trade Collapse and Trade Imbalances,” 2009, 48. See also 
Baldwin, The Great Trade Collapse, 2009. 
45 Levchenko et al., “The Collapse of International Trade,” 2009. See also Bems et al., “The Collapse 
of Global Trade,” 2009. 
46 No consensus has emerged on this topic. Brad Jensen noted that it is not yet known whether supply 
chains contributed to the trade decline “in a nefarious way.” USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010, 
77–78 (testimony of J. Bradford Jensen, associate professor, Georgetown University). See also Altomonte 
and Ottaviano, “Resilient to the Crisis?” 2009; O’Rourke, “Collapsing Trade in a Barbie World,” 2009. 
47 Just-auto.com, “Japan Quake,” March 28, 2011. 
48 Escaith et al., “Japan’s Earthquake and Tsunami,” 2011. 
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U.S. Participation in Global Supply Chains Has Increased Since the 
1980s 
Manufacturing 
Though it is not a new phenomenon,49 U.S. manufacturers have become much more 
involved in global supply chains in recent decades. Estimates of a country’s participation 
in global supply chains often examine the use of imported intermediate inputs in 
domestic production. A common approach measures a domestic industry’s purchases of 
imported inputs relative to its total purchases of inputs.50 This measure (foreign content 
in inputs used by domestic manufacturers) indicates that U.S. manufacturers’ use of 
global supply chains grew about fourfold between 1980 and 2006 (figure 3.2).51 Most of 
this increase has occurred since 1990, a period during which increased computer use and 
improved telecommunications facilitated global integration of operations. This was also a 
period of accelerated cross-border integration of manufacturing in North America under 
NAFTA. Industries with the largest shares of imported inputs in 2006 were apparel and 
leather products (25.7 percent); motor vehicles and parts (25.6 percent); and computers 
and electronics (20.8 percent).52  
 
A related indicator of U.S. involvement in global supply chains is the amount of imported 
intermediate inputs embodied in U.S. exports (foreign content in exports).53 An example 
of such an input would be a Mexican auto part used in a car assembled in the United 
States and exported to Canada. Imported inputs accounted for only 8.5 percent of the total 
value of U.S. merchandise exports in 1977.54 This measure trended slowly upward and 
peaked at 15.9 percent in 2008.55 Annual estimates available since 1998 show that 
foreign content in exports tends to decline during global trade downturns, as in 2001 and 
2009, and then return to its generally upward trajectory.56 
 
A comparison of the two measures shows that foreign content in inputs used by domestic 
U.S. manufacturers rose faster than foreign content in U.S. exports since the 1980s, and is  
                                                          
49 The United States has been involved in global supply chains since at least the 1800s, when it was a 
major exporter of cotton to Britain, which produced textiles and exported cotton fabrics and finished 
garments to the world. Robertson, History of the American Economy, 1973, 116–117, 252. Other examples 
include the sewing of brassieres and baseball gloves in the Philippines before 1950 using U.S.-origin fabric 
and leather. Motor vehicles is another sector in which the U.S. has long been involved in regional and global 
supply chains. The Canada-U.S. Automotive Products Agreement of 1965 fostered North American 
integration in the sector by removing tariffs on motor vehicles and parts traded between the two countries. 
See the motor vehicle case study at the end of the chapter for recent developments.  
50 The first use of this measure was in Feenstra, “U.S. Imports, 1972–1994,” 1996. 
51 Feenstra and Jensen, “Evaluating Estimates of Materials Offshoring,” 2009.  
52 Milberg, written submission to the USITC, December 20, 2010, figure 2a. For some products, 
however, a substantial share of import value consists of U.S. value returning home after processing abroad. 
The estimates in the following sections based on value-added flows are thus better estimates of foreign 
content in U.S. inputs and exports, although these estimates are available only for one year (2004). 
53 This indicator is commonly called vertical specialization. Hummels et al., “The Nature and Growth 
of Vertical Specialization in World Trade,” 2001, 77. Global use of imported intermediate inputs has risen 
since the 1980s, indicating increasing use of global supply chains. This measure has not increased markedly 
for the United States in this period, however, so the discussion in this section focuses on foreign content in 
U.S. trade. See Chen et al., “Vertical Specialization and Three Facts about U.S. International Trade,” 2005, 
41; Miroudot et al., “Trade in Intermediate Goods and Services,” 2009, 51. 
54 Chen et al., “Vertical Specialization and Three Facts about U.S. International Trade,” 2005, 42; 
Bridgman, “The Rise of Vertical Specialization Trade,” 2010, 20. 
55 Commission estimates for 1998 to 2009 using annual BEA input-output tables. 
56 This decline reflects the overall drop in trade in global supply chains during recessions. See section 
on “new concerns” above for discussion of potential causes. 
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FIGURE 3.2  Measures of U.S. participation in global supply chains, 1977–2009 
Sources: Feenstra and Jenson, “Evaluating Estimates of Materials,” 2009; Chen et al., “Vertical 
Specialization,” 2005; Amiti and Wei, “Fear of Service Outsourcing,” 2005; Milberg, written submission to the 
USITC, December 20, 2010; and Commission estimates. 
 
now substantially higher. Hence, the United States has increased its use of imported 
intermediate inputs, but these imports have largely been consumed at home and not been 
used as extensively by U.S. exporters. In contrast, the most active countries in global 
supply chains, such as Mexico and emerging Asian economies, incorporate a much 
higher share (often greater than 40 percent) of foreign inputs into their exports.57 
 
Services 
U.S. services trade (both imports and exports) in global supply chains has increased over 
time and is likely to continue to grow rapidly in the future. However, services are less 
integrated than goods into global supply chains; for example, U.S. companies currently 
use substantially fewer imported services inputs than imported goods inputs. One reason 
for this disparity is that as a practical matter, some services can only be provided locally 
or through direct personal contact. Similarly, although services accounted for 82 percent 
of U.S. GDP in 2010, they only accounted for 17 percent of U.S. imports and 30 percent 
of U.S. exports in the same year.  
 
The value of imported services (such as communications, information technology [IT], 
accounting, and financial services) used by U.S. industry is reportedly quite limited, 
although studies have not examined the most recent data. One study showed that U.S. 
manufacturers’ purchases of imported services increased as a share of their total 
                                                          
57 Koopman et al., “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due,” 2010, 36–37. In fact, as noted earlier for 
Chinese processing trade, exports from these countries may include more foreign inputs than the goods and 
services they consume domestically. 
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purchases of inputs between 1992 and 2000 (figure 3.2), though from a very small base.58 
Thus, the value of imported services, such as accounting services  provided by a company 
in India, made up considerably less than 0.5 percent of the total value of all inputs to 
manufacturing (including domestic services inputs and manufactured inputs such as the 
auto parts mentioned above). Other work showed that this measure (use of imported 
services as a share of total inputs) continued to increase between 1998 and 2006, but that 
imported services still accounted for less than 0.5 percent of total input purchases in 
2006.59 Another study examined the shares of imported services used by both 
manufacturers and services providers. Of the two groups, U.S. manufacturers buy more 
inputs of services from providers overseas than do U.S. service providers. Even in 
detailed industry categories, services offshoring rarely represents more than 2 percent of 
total purchases of inputs.60  
 
Evidence from specific firms in professional services industries supports these findings. 
A study of 200 U.S. firms in architecture, engineering, computer systems design, and 
business support services found little services offshoring: less than 20 percent of all U.S. 
multinational companies (MNCs) imported services from 1999 to 2003.61 Moreover, 
there was little consistent growth in services offshoring for these MNCs during that 
period. 
 
Although U.S. firms have not substantially increased their offshoring of services, some 
researchers have focused on identifying which services could potentially be offshored. 
Services that do not require face-to-face contact have the potential to move overseas.62 
Services that are traded domestically across different parts of the United States also 
provide some insight into which services could be offshored. By this measure, studies 
have found that a significant portion of the overall services sector could be traded abroad. 
Professional services are viewed as especially tradable: about 70 percent of workers in 
the sector are deemed to perform a tradable activity.63  
 
The United States also contributes substantial exports of services in global supply chains. 
As noted in chapter 2, the United States is a net exporter of services and has a 
comparative advantage in many services sectors.64 U.S. workers in many tradable 
services sectors have more education and higher skill levels than in the lower-paying 
nontradable service sectors.65 These facts imply that the United States may gain good 
jobs in tradable services as services exports grow and become more integrated into global 
supply chains, although some services are at risk of being offshored to low-wage labor-
abundant countries like India and China.66 
                                                          
58 Amiti and Wei, “Services Offshoring and Productivity,” 2006, 8. Amiti and Wei examined imports 
of the top five services used by U.S. manufacturers as a share of their total input use. The five services were 
communications, financial services, insurance, business services, and computers and information services. 
59 Milberg, written submission to the USITC, December 20, 2010, figure 1; Milberg and Winkler, 
“Financialisation and the Dynamics of Offshoring in the USA,” 2010, 281. Milberg and Winkler looked at a 
broader measure of services use than Amiti and Wei. They examined imports of all types of services used as 
inputs by both manufacturers and services firms. 
60 National Academy of Public Administration Panel, Offshoring: How Big Is It, 2006, chap. 3. 
61 Including imports from affiliated and unaffiliated sources. Ibid., chap. 6. 
62 Blinder, “Offshoring,” 2006, 113–28.  
63 Jensen and Kletzer, “Tradable Services,” 2005, 10, 30.  
64 For example, in 2009, the United States recorded large trade surpluses in financial services, travel 
services, and education services. USITC, Recent Trends in U.S. Services Trade, 2011, xiv–xv. See the section 
on the effects of these surpluses on the U.S. economy below. 
65 Jensen and Kletzer, “Tradable Services,” 2005, 12. 
66 Jensen and Kletzer, “‘Fear’ and Offshoring,” 2008, 1. Jensen and Kletzer estimate that 15–20 million 
jobs are at risk, with about half in the manufacturing sector. Liu and Trefler, “Much Ado about Nothing,” 
2008, 31–33, estimate that the effects of inshoring (the opposite of offshoring) are likely to be larger than 
offshoring, although both effects were small. 
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While statistics suggest that growth has been slow, offshoring of services is relatively 
new and has substantial growth potential. Global supply chains are likely to provide more 
services as companies seek to reduce costs by splitting apart such functions as human 
resources management, customer support, accounting and finance, and procurement and 
outsourcing those functions that can be done more efficiently or less expensively by 
others.67 Also, R&D and knowledge-intensive services are increasingly being offshored. 
Many leading services providers are large global firms with headquarters in the United 
States (table 3.1). These firms have large worldwide workforces. For example, of 
Accenture’s total employees, more were in India than anywhere else in 2007, and 60,000 
of IBM’s almost 400,000 total employees were in India in 2006. These firms employ 
their global workforce to supply a wide variety of services, including IT and business 
consulting, to U.S. firms and to other firms throughout the world.68 
 
Information on Value Added Shows That the United States 
Participates in Supply Chains with a Variety of Countries69 
When a good or service is produced in several different countries, official government 
trade statistics, which are based on the total value of the traded good, can inaccurately 
represent each country’s contribution. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the 
Apple iPod is composed of value created in many different countries, only a small share 
of which is produced in China, the exporter of the final good. The value contributed by 
each source country, both directly and through intermediate countries, reflects how 
deeply it is integrated into U.S. supply chains (refer to box 3.3 for details and 
definitions).70 This section examines the contributors of value to U.S. imports, 
absorption, and exports. 
 
Value Added in U.S. Imports 
Although U.S. imports from China and Mexico are considerable, these countries 
contribute less value added to U.S. imports than Europe,71 Canada, and Japan, the three 
largest contributors to value added (table 3.2). Remarkably, U.S. value added that returns 
home after receiving further processing elsewhere ranks fourth at 8.3 percent. Among all 
countries, the United States has the highest share of its own value-added exports returned 
home in its imports.72 This high share reflects both the large size of the U.S. market and 
its tight integration with Canada and Mexico. 
 
 
 
                                                          
67 Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, “The Offshore Services Value Chain,” 2010, 11–12. This view is also 
supported by the data on intermediate services trade, which now accounts for a substantial share of total 
services trade. The ratio of intermediate services trade to total services trade (54 percent) was higher than the 
comparable ratio for goods trade (52 percent) for the United States in 2005 (Miroudot et al., “Trade in 
Intermediate Goods and Services,” 2009, 48).  
68 Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, “The Offshore Services Value Chain,” 2010, 10, 12. 
69 Value added is the value of output less the value of all intermediate inputs and therefore represents 
the contribution of labor and capital to the final product. See box 3.3. 
70 This section is based on the database detailed in Koopman et al. “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due,” 
2010. It is perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to trace value added in trade, but the data to meet its 
stringent requirements are currently only available for 2004. 
71 Europe refers to the entire EU (EU-27) plus the countries in the European Free Trade Association. 
The combined GDP of this region is very large and contributes to its prominence in tables in this section. 
72 The world average is 4.0 percent. Other economies with high shares include the EU (7.2 percent) and 
Japan (3.4 percent). Koopman et al., “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due,” 2010, 36. 
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TABLE 3.1  Top 10 offshore services providers, 2008 
Name 
Home 
country Employees 
Services sales  
(millions of $) Main activities 
IBM U.S. 398,455 58,892 Consulting, IT services 
Accenture U.S. 177,000 23,171 Consulting, IT services 
HP Enterprise Services US 
(formerly EDS) U.S. 139,500 22,100 
IT, applications and business 
consulting 
Computer Sciences Corp. U.S. 92,000 16,740 
Software management, customer 
relations management 
Capgemini France 89,453 12,740 Consulting, IT services 
Automatic Data Processing U.S. 45,000 8,867 
Human resources, payroll, tax, 
and benefits 
Affiliated Computer Services U.S. 76,000 6,523 
IT services, customer relations, 
human resources, e-government 
Logica UK 39,525 6,320 Business consulting, IT services 
Tata Consultancy Services India 111,407 5,824 
Consulting, IT, engineering 
services 
Infosys Technologies India 105,453 4,533 
IT, engineering, consulting, 
knowledge, and legal services 
Source: Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, "The Offshore Services Value Chain," 2010, 9. 
 
TABLE 3.2  U.S. imports and value-added shares in U.S. imports, 2004, by source 
 Region Total imports   
Share of 
general 
imports 
Share of value-
added imports 
Share of value added passing 
through a third country before 
entering the United States 
 Millions of $  Percent 
Europe 393,301  24.7 26.1 17.6 
Canada 242,170  15.2 11.0 3.2 
Japan 138,417  8.7 10.4 26.0 
United States —  0.0 8.3 100.0 
China 176,879  11.1 7.7 14.8 
Mexico 154,571  9.7 4.9 4.0 
Rest of Americasa 76,183  4.8 4.7 13.2 
Developing East Asia 79,250  5.0 4.5 32.4 
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong 73,066  4.6 4.3 36.7 
Korea 51,707  3.3 3.3 31.8 
Brazil 23,662  1.5 1.6 20.3 
Australia and New Zealand 15,717  1.0 1.3 33.6 
Russia 12,003  0.8 1.3 46.4 
India 17,486  1.1 1.1 22.0 
South Asia 9,557  0.6 0.5 10.2 
Rest of world 120,320  7.6 8.5 23.5 
   Total 1,590,124   100.0 100.0 25.8b 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
   aIncluding South American, Central American, and Caribbean countries other than Mexico and Brazil. 
   bU.S. average, weighted by U.S. imports from all sources. 
 
The value-added approach more accurately portrays the origin of the value in U.S. 
imports than officially reported import data can. For example, Japan has an 8.7 percent 
share of total U.S. imports, but accounts for 10.4 percent of the value added in U.S. 
imports (hereafter “U.S. value-added imports”). Japan’s higher share of value-added 
imports indicates that a substantial share of its exports (26 percent) first journey to other 
countries and undergo additional processing before being exported to the United States. 
Specifically, Japan produces a large volume of high-value components that are shipped to 
other Asian countries, particularly China, where they are assembled into consumer goods 
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and then exported.73 In contrast, China’s share of U.S. value-added imports (7.7 percent) 
is less than its share of total U.S. imports (11.1 percent). China is the final assembler in a 
number of supply chains in which Japan and other countries in East Asia supply parts. 
Similarly, exports from many smaller East Asian countries pass through third countries, 
such as China, before entering the United States. Canada and Mexico also have lower 
shares of U.S. value-added imports than their total U.S. imports. U.S. imports from 
Canada and Mexico contain many U.S.-produced components, which contribute to the 
large share of U.S. exported value that returns home.  
 
Various countries and regions contribute value to U.S. imports in different sectors 
(table 3.3). Europe is the largest source of value added for many sectors, particularly 
business services. U.S. returned value added is most significant in motor vehicles and 
parts (19.1 percent); much of this represents value added returned home from other 
NAFTA countries, as the United States is heavily involved in auto supply chains in this 
region.74 Europe and Japan also contribute significant amounts of value added to U.S. 
imports of motor vehicles and parts. U.S. returned value added is also fairly high for 
apparel (11.0 percent), since  some rules of origin provide for duty-free imports of 
apparel made from U.S. yarns and fabrics (as discussed in the case study on apparel). 
East Asia,75 which has abundant low-cost labor and is well integrated into supply chains 
with China, contributed the most value added to U.S. imports of apparel (27.8 percent).76 
 
TABLE 3.3  Country or regional sources of value added in U.S. imports, selected sectors, 2004, percent 
Sector 
U.S 
returned China Japan 
East 
Asia Canada Mexico 
Latin 
America Europe Others Total 
Total 8.3 7.7 10.4 12.0 11.0 4.9 6.3 26.1 13.2 100.0 
           
Selected Sectors           
Apparel 11.0 11.2 2.4 27.8 2.4 2.0 10.4 11.4 21.4 100.0 
Chemicals, rubber and 
plastics 6.3 5.0 9.7 8.7 12.0 2.5 3.6 42.8 9.4 100.0 
Motor vehicles and parts 19.1 2.5 23.0 7.2 16.0 3.8 1.9 23.1 3.4 100.0 
Electronic equipment 8.6 14.4 19.0 29.6 2.4 9.3 1.3 11.4 3.9 100.0 
Machinery and equipment 11.3 10.1 17.2 9.7 6.9 4.7 2.9 32.1 5.1 100.0 
Business services 1.5 1.3 6.2 12.7 8.8 0.2 2.7 55.5 11.3 100.0 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
Value Added in U.S. Absorption 
The value-added shares of U.S. absorption (i.e., use of intermediate inputs plus 
consumption of final products, or equivalently total domestic expenditures on goods and 
services) provide another view of the sectors and regions where global value chains are 
important to the U.S. economy. Absorption can distinguish the relative U.S. and foreign 
value-added shares in products consumed in the United States. Overall, the United States 
itself generates a large share (89 percent) of the value of final and intermediate goods that 
it uses (table 3.4). This share is on a par with those of Japan (90 percent) and the EU-15  
 
 
                                                          
73 Dean et al., “Decomposing China-Japan-U.S. Trade,” 2009. Japan is also a leading supplier of 
components to Mexico’s export processing industry, particularly for television and vehicle assembly. 
74 See the case study on autos and parts later in this chapter. 
75 East Asia includes Brunei, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Burma (Myanmar), the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam. 
76 Major changes have occurred in global supply chains involving textiles and apparel since 2004, and 
China’s prominence in U.S. imports has increased. See the case study on apparel later in this chapter.  
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TABLE 3.4  Country or regional sources of value added in U.S. absorption, selected sectors, 2004, percent 
Sector U.S. China Japan 
East 
Asia Canada Mexico 
Latin 
America Europe Others Total 
Total 89.0 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.3 0.6 0.7 3.2 1.4 100.0 
           
Selected sectors           
Apparel 54.3 4.1 0.6 18.3 2.1 1.8 5.7 2.9 8.6 100.0 
Chemicals, rubber and 
plastics 69.1 3.1 4.2 4.2 3.4 0.8 1.4 11.9 1.5 100.0 
Motor vehicles and parts 57.3 1.5 11.3 3.4 10.1 4.6 0.6 10.6 0.5 100.0 
Electronic equipment 33.3 9.3 12.7 23.3 1.8 10.9 0.8 7.0 0.8 100.0 
Machinery and equipment 76.1 2.7 4.5 3.1 2.2 1.6 0.7 8.4 0.6 100.0 
Business services 88.5 0.3 1.4 1.1 1.4 0.0 0.5 5.9 0.8 100.0 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
(88 percent), and is higher than those of most developing countries.77 The many goods 
and services produced and consumed in the United States and the large portion of U.S. 
value returned in imports contribute to the high share. 
 
Although overall U.S. value in absorption is high, the domestic value share is typically 
lower for sectors actively involved in global supply chains. There is substantial foreign 
content in electronic equipment, apparel, and motor vehicles. For apparel, consistent with 
value added in imports, China and East Asia contribute more value to U.S. absorption 
than Mexico and Latin America (largely from Central America).78 As noted in the case 
study, Japan, Canada, and Europe are major participants in supply chains for motor 
vehicles and parts, and together account for almost one-third of the value added in U.S. 
absorption in the sector. Japan, East Asia, Mexico, and Europe participate in the supply 
chain for electronic equipment, which is one of the largest in terms of the number of 
countries contributing significant value added.79 Electronics has the highest share of 
foreign content: fully two-thirds of the value of all electronics products used by U.S. 
industry and consumers originates abroad. Hence, foreign value in some U.S. industries 
may be substantially higher than estimates in previous studies based on gross input use or 
gross trade.80 
 
In business services, a category that includes consulting and computer support, the United 
States provides a large portion (88.5 percent) of its absorbed value added, while Europe 
contributes 5.9 percent. Despite the high profile of India’s consulting and computer 
services and the prominence of some large suppliers (table 3.2), India supplied only 0.1 
percent of the value added in U.S. absorption of business services in 2004. 
 
 
                                                          
77 EU-15 refers to the first 15 countries to join the EU. Domestic value-added shares for Japan, the 
EU-15, and other countries come from Koopman et al., “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due,” 2010, 36. 
78 Given changes discussed in the apparel case study later in this chapter, China’s contribution has 
likely grown since 2004. 
79 See the case study on televisions for an example of an electronic product in which Mexico is a major 
contributor. 
80 The Commission’s estimate of foreign value in electronics is considerably higher than some previous 
estimates. For example, Professor William Milberg estimates that the share of foreign inputs in the 
electronics industry’s use of intermediate inputs is about 20 percent. (Milberg, written submission to the 
USITC, December 20, 2010, 11.) Based on the Commission’s data, the foreign value-added share in U.S. 
gross absorption of electronic equipment is 16 percent, which is similar to Milberg’s estimate. These low 
values are based on gross input use, however. This report has argued that measures based solely on value 
added (such as the estimates in table 3.4) provide the most informative view on foreign content. 
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Value Added in U.S. Exports 
Value added in U.S. exports measures how much different countries contribute to the 
value of exported goods and services. The United States contributed a high share 
(87.1 percent) of total value added to its exports in 2004 (table 3.5). The domestic content 
of exports remains high even in sectors such as electronics, where various countries 
contribute value added. This is in sharp contrast to emerging markets such as China, 
Malaysia, and Mexico that have substantial foreign value in their exports. The United 
States does have slightly higher foreign value in its exports than the other major 
developed economies (Japan and the EU).81  
 
Europe contributes the largest foreign share of value in total U.S. exports (3.3 percent) 
with significant shares in many sectors, namely, electronic equipment; motor vehicles 
and parts; and chemicals, rubber, and plastic products.82 The United States participates in 
various value chains with its NAFTA partners, Canada and Mexico. Canada contributes 
the largest single-country share of foreign value added in U.S. exports (1.7 percent) and 
is a key supplier of foreign value added in motor vehicles and parts and chemical, rubber, 
and plastic products.83 Mexico’s overall share (0.9 percent) is small but its contribution is 
important in sectors such as electronics and motor vehicles. The U.S. share of value 
added in its own exports is highest for business services (95.6 percent) and lowest for 
electronic equipment (76.9 percent), where many other countries contribute value added. 
 
Value-added calculations provide a more revealing look at the contributors to U.S. 
imports and exports than can be seen in officially reported gross trade statistics. Hence, 
these trade statistics can also provide new insight into bilateral trade deficits. Box 3.4 
compares bilateral deficit measures in gross terms to those measured using the value-
added decomposition in this chapter. 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.5  Country or regional sources of value added in U.S. exports, selected sectors, 2004, percent 
Sector U.S. China Japan 
East 
Asia Canada Mexico 
Latin 
America Europe Others Total 
Total 87.1 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.7 0.9 1.1 3.3 2.1 100.0 
           
Selected sectors           
Apparel 88.5 0.7 0.8 1.5 1.3 0.6 0.7 3.3 2.5 100.0 
Chemicals, rubber and 
plastics 85.5 0.5 1.0 1.1 2.2 0.7 1.5 4.4 3.0 100.0 
Motor vehicles and parts 81.5 1.3 3.0 1.9 3.0 1.3 1.3 4.7 2.0 100.0 
Electronic equipment 76.9 2.7 3.7 5.1 1.6 2.2 1.0 4.7 2.0 100.0 
Machinery and equipment 89.4 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.8 2.8 1.4 100.0 
Business services 95.6 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.4 0.6 100.0 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
  
                                                          
81 Koopman et al., “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due,” 2010, 35. 
82 This region was the largest destination for U.S. exports, accounting for just over 27 percent of total 
U.S. exports.  
83 The United States exported over $145 billion of chemical, rubber, and plastics products in 2004, 
about 14 percent of the global total. 
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  BOX 3.4 The U.S. value-added trade deficit
 
The U.S. trade balance, or the difference between U.S. exports and imports, is a frequently discussed 
trade issue. The United States has had large trade deficits in recent years (e.g., $500 billion in 2010), 
and it has also had substantial bilateral deficits with major trading partners. 
 
This chapter shows repeatedly that many countries may add value to a particular good or service in a 
global supply chain, and that attributing the entire export value to the last exporting country can provide 
a misleading picture of the sources of value in U.S. trade. While the overall U.S. trade balance is not 
affected by any of the calculations in this chapter, examinations of bilateral trade balances on a value-
added basis yield different conclusions about the extent to which specific foreign countries contribute to 
the U.S. deficit.a  
 
The contribution of China to the U.S. trade deficit differs substantially depending on which of the two 
measures is used. As discussed in this chapter, China is the final assembler in a large number of global 
supply chains, and it uses components from many other countries to produce its exports. The figure 
below shows that the U.S.-China trade deficit on a value-added basis is considerably smaller (by about 
40 percent in 2004) than on the commonly reported basis of official gross trade.b By contrast, Japan 
exports parts and components to countries throughout Asia; many of these components are eventually 
assembled into final products and exported to the United States. Thus the U.S.-Japan trade balance on 
a value-added basis is larger than the comparable gross trade deficit. The U.S. value-added trade 
deficits with other major trading partners (Canada, Mexico, and the EU-15) differ by smaller amounts 
from their corresponding gross trade deficits. 
 
U.S. Bilateral Trade Deficits with Major Trading Partners, 2004 (billions of dollars) 
 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
 
   aUSITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010, 12 (testimony of Kenneth Kraemer, professor, 
University of California, Irvine);  Johnson and Noguera, “Accounting for Intermediates,” 2010, 33. 
   bUsing a slightly different method, a recent study found that this discrepancy was about 53 percent in 
2005 and 42 percent in 2008. WTO, IDE-JETRO, Trade Patterns and Global Value Chains in East Asia, 
2011, 104. 
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Investment Abroad Has Increased U.S. Participation in Global 
Supply Chains 
U.S. investment abroad has contributed to the development of global supply chains.84 For 
example, U.S. firms are key investors in Mexico’s processing industry, which exports 
goods containing large shares of U.S. value added.85 U.S. firms and other foreign firms 
also contributed to the growth of China’s processing industry, which participates in 
supply chains with the United States and East Asia.86 As previously noted, U.S. 
production is well integrated with that of Canada, a major recipient of U.S. foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in 2009. 87 About a third of U.S. manufacturing imports from Canada 
originate from U.S. firms operating in Canada, and many Canadian exports to the United 
States are intermediate products that contain a sizable component of U.S. value added 
and that are returning for further processing in the United States. Most U.S. FDI in 2009 
was directed to Europe, a key U.S. supplier in global chains. U.S. investments abroad 
were primarily in the finance industry, the insurance industry, and a variety of 
manufacturing industries, including chemicals and machinery. 
 
Investments by foreign firms in the United States similarly contribute to the growth of 
global supply chains. European countries, followed by Japan and Canada, were the 
primary sources of FDI into the United States in 2009.88 Foreign multinationals investing 
in the United States commonly extend global supply chains from the parent firm to their 
affiliates. For example, Japanese automakers that manufacture cars in U.S. plants import 
some auto parts from Japan.89 Such “vertical” FDI is particularly important for supply 
chains. 
 
Policies and Institutions Have Affected U.S. Participation in Global 
Chains 
U.S. government policies have neither directly promoted nor opposed the development of 
global supply chains. However, many policies and institutions, especially those 
concerning trade and foreign business conditions, indirectly affect the prevalence of 
supply chains. This section briefly surveys these factors. 
 
Facilitating Factors 
Private entrepreneurs seeking innovative ways to access markets and to lower costs have 
been the principal force behind global supply chains, which have developed despite 
differences in culture, administration, geography, and level of development among 
participants in the value chain.90 These entrepreneurs are attracted by institutions that 
                                                          
84 Gereffi, “Shifting Governance Structures in Global Commodity Chains,” 2001, 1616. Along with 
increased use of the Internet, investment by multinational firms was a primary driver of the growth of global 
supply chains in the last part of the 20th century.  
85 The Mexican processing sector includes the IMMEX program (formerly the Maquiladora and PITEX 
programs), and is similar in nature to the Chinese processing regime discussed earlier in the chapter. In 2006, 
the United States supplied 51 percent of the value of Mexican processing imports, a high share but one that 
has declined from 81 percent in 2000 as Mexico has integrated into supply chains with other countries. See 
De La Cruz et al., “Estimating Foreign Value-added in Mexico’s Manufacturing Exports,” 2010, 4–6. 
86 Fung et al., U.S. Direct Investment in China, 2004, 5. 
87 Ibarra-Caton, “Direct Investment Positions for 2009,” 2010, 32–33. 
88 Ibid., 34–35. 
89 Blonigen, “In Search of Substitution between Foreign Production and Exports,” 2001, 94. 
Economists commonly find a complementary relation between FDI and imports from the parent’s country. In 
this case, Blonigen found a substitution relationship: fewer Japanese cars were imported. 
90 Ghemawat, Redefining Global Strategy, 2007. 
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support business growth by providing for secure property rights and contract 
enforcement. Some governments have sought to improve their investment climate, which 
indirectly contributes to the formation of global value chains. For example, the USDOC 
SelectUSA program91 encourages foreign firms to invest in new U.S. businesses and 
contributes to the formation of supply chains between the United States and the country 
of the investing parent firm.92 The business climate in foreign countries is an important 
determinant of where U.S. firms choose to invest.93 
 
As noted, the effects of tariff and other trade restraints are magnified in the case of goods 
passing through multiple borders in global supply chains.94 U.S. supply chain 
development has thus benefited from trade liberalization abroad and from lower U.S. 
import restraints. For example, average U.S. tariffs have fallen considerably, from 3.4 
percent in 1989 to 1.3 percent in 2010.95 Similarly, the barriers that U.S. exporters face 
abroad fell during the period; the average tariff on U.S. exports is now about 3.0 percent, 
although some high tariffs remain.96 Still, despite shrinking trade barriers, multiple 
border crossings raised the cost of exporting U.S. final goods by 46 percent (from 1.3 to 
1.9 percentage points) in 2004, the most recent year for which data are available.97 
 
U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) and preferential trade programs also contributed to the 
creation of global supply chains.98 NAFTA phased out a number of tariffs and other trade 
restrictions, and promoted the integrated production of many commodities in Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States. Since NAFTA entered into force in 1994, U.S.-Mexico 
trade in goods has more than tripled, and as much as 85 percent of Mexico’s exports 
result from global supply chains.99 The United States and Canada have a large, highly 
integrated trading relationship that includes value chains in auto parts and other products. 
Likewise, the Caribbean Basin Trade and Partnership Act and the Central America-
Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) have led to increased U.S. 
integration with Caribbean and Central American countries. Although highly efficient 
apparel supply chains in East Asia (particularly China) have supplanted apparel chains in 
this region to a large extent, collectively the CAFTA-DR countries were the second 
largest supplier of textiles and apparel to the United States in 2010 after China.100 
 
Impeding Factors 
Policies that limit trade tend to restrict the use of global supply chains, and many 
impediments to trade remain.101 For example, customs procedures—both burdensome 
                                                          
91 SelectUSA incorporated the “Invest in America” program in June 2011.  
92 There is some evidence that such programs can increase investment; see Harding and Javorcik, 
“Developing Economies and International Investors” 2007, 21–22. 
93 The United States has over 40 bilateral investment treaties, mostly with smaller countries, that seek 
to protect U.S. investment abroad. USDOS, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Related Agreements, March 3, 
2008.  
94 Yi, “Can Multistage Production Explain the Home Bias in Trade?” 2010, 365; Ma and Assche, “The 
Role of Trade Costs in Global Production Networks,” 2010. 
95 USITC, Import Restraints, Sixth Update, 2009, 1; this report, chap. 2. 
96 USITC, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 2010, 6-15. 
97 Koopman et al., “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due,” 2010, table 7.  
98 ROO in these agreements, as well as earlier trade programs such as U.S. production sharing tariff 
provisions, have facilitated supply chains with U.S. trading partners. 
99 De La Cruz et al., “Estimating Foreign Value-added in Mexico’s Manufacturing Exports,” 2011, 18, 24. 
100 Despite lower tariffs offered by CAFTA-DR, inefficient port operations in Central America make it 
difficult for these countries to take advantage of this agreement. Londoño-Kent et al., “A Tale of Two Ports,” 
2003, 20.  
101 See chap. 2 of this study for an analysis of significant U.S. restraints. 
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rules and inefficient port operations—often hinder the flow of goods.102 Efficient 
operation of global supply chains requires adequate infrastructure at ports and airports, as 
well as speed and accuracy in the customs and security clearance process.103 Extra time in 
transit, whether due to delays in customs clearance or transportation, raises trade costs 
and decreases the likelihood that trade will take place at all.104  
 
Regulations that restrict foreign business practices also make it more difficult for global 
supply chains to flourish. These include policies that limit foreign investment, regulate 
the form that a foreign-owned establishment can take, restrict the hiring of personnel, and 
impose opaque and duplicative licensing requirements.105 However, these restrictions do 
not necessarily make the operations of global supply chains impossible. In some cases, 
when faced with onerous regulations that may stifle foreign investment, foreign firms 
may still be able to contract local firms to complete tasks in a global supply chain; these 
firms may be more adept at dealing with (or exempt from) the local barriers.106 
 
Effects of Global Supply Chains on the U.S. Economy 
Key Effects 
The expansion of global supply chains has had multifaceted and complex effects on the 
U.S. economy, which are challenging to quantify in terms of production, prices, and jobs. 
One reason it is difficult to measure these economic effects is that supply chains have 
rearranged the pattern of U.S. trade, increasingly concentrating the production and export 
of skill-intensive goods and services in the United States while relocating other, less skill-
intensive activities to other countries. Global supply chains have induced many leading 
U.S. companies to change their business models, refocusing on coordinating the assets 
and expertise of their business partners, and placing less emphasis on owning all key 
technological and managerial assets. Advances in supply chain management by U.S. 
retailers have made it easier and cheaper to import an increasing variety of goods into the 
United States, with significant benefits to consumers. The effect of global supply chains 
on U.S. wages and employment varies for workers in different industries and 
occupations, and may also depend on the extent to which U.S. multinationals concentrate 
their activities in high-income or low-income countries.  
 
The strength of the evidence linking global supply chains to the effects on companies, 
consumers, and workers varies, depending on the type of linkage being examined. Many 
of the observations in this section rely at least partly on indirect evidence and inference. 
There are several ways in which better measurement can aid further quantitative 
investigations on this topic; these possibilities are discussed at the end of this chapter.  
 
 
                                                          
102 International logistics firms encounter their most significant impediment at the border clearance 
process. USITC, Logistic Services,” 2005, 3-2. 
103 USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010, 39–43 (testimony of Michael Mullen, Express 
Association of America). 
104 Studies on the importance of time in trade include Hummels, “Calculating Tariff Equivalents for Time 
in Trade,” 2007 and Djankov et al., “Trading on Time,” 2006. Londoño-Kent provided information of border 
crossing frictions at the U.S.-Mexican border; see USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010, 31–38. 
105 USITC, Logistic Services, 2005, 3-2. 
106 A U.S. industry source noted that Haitian firms can perform such tasks as Haitian customs clearance 
more efficiently than U.S. firms and added that for this reason, it is more efficient to contract for services 
there than to invest directly. USITC, Textiles and Apparel, 2008, 1–12. 
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Effects on the Pattern of U.S. Production and Trade 
U.S. Multinational Firms, Now Acting as Coordinators of Networks 
As already mentioned, the advent of global supply chains has required major U.S. 
companies to revise their business models to become network facilitators, with successful 
firms acting as coordinators of capabilities among multiple strategic allies.107 As firms 
expand their global supply chains, their ability to grow and remain profitable depends on 
managing their relationships with an ever-larger network of suppliers and customers.108 It 
is less and less likely that a firm managing a global supply chain will own all of the assets 
needed to succeed in a single vertically integrated operation. Thus, the focus of 
multinational firms’ strategy is increasingly on alliances. These alliances range in their 
degree of formality from turnkey operations to joint ventures. When a high degree of 
coordination is required, such alliances may result in mergers or acquisitions.109  
 
The increasing reliance on strategic networks means that successful U.S. multinationals 
must operate very differently than they did in earlier decades, when there was a greater 
tendency for firms to control all phases of their operations directly. Today, personal 
computer companies such as Apple, Dell, and Hewlett-Packard (HP) specialize in 
consumer-oriented aspects of computer design, while Taiwan-based manufacturers are 
increasingly responsible for designing a computer’s physical architecture, finding 
suppliers for subcomponents, and making sure the pieces fit.110 Similarly, as discussed 
below in the apparel case study, U.S. retailers of apparel like Wal-Mart and Limited 
Brands are linked indirectly to a wide variety of textiles and apparel suppliers worldwide, 
often relying on specialized middlemen such as the Hong Kong-based Li & Fung.  
 
The effect of these changes has been to enhance the leadership of U.S. multinationals in 
some industries, but not universally. Companies such as HP that successfully transitioned 
to a role as coordinator of networks thrive and remain global lead firms, while those that 
failed to do so have declined. For example, U.S. television producers did not adapt to 
technological changes as readily as other electronics firms, thus ceding their role as 
network coordinators to Japanese and Korean firms (see the television case study later in 
this chapter). 
 
Relocation of Tasks 
As discussed above, the development of supply chains enables different parts of the 
production process to be carried out in various locations, allowing countries to specialize 
in tasks rather than in goods.111 In general, as already noted, this industrial restructuring 
has led firms in the United States to increasingly specialize in mid- to high-skilled tasks; 
however, the stages of production that relocate, and the speed of this relocation, have 
varied by industry. The following sections discuss how this trend has affected U.S. 
manufacturing, services, and R&D activity. 
 
 
 
                                                          
107 For the concept of multinationals as manufacturing impresarios, see North, Localizing Global 
Production, 1997. 
108 Dunning and Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 2008, 260–94. 
109 Contractor and Lorange, “The Growth of Alliances in the Knowledge-Based Economy,” 2002. 
110 Dedrick and Kraemer, “Offshoring and Outsourcing in the PC Industry,” 2009. 
111 Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, “Trading Tasks,” 2008. 
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Relocation of tasks: Effects on U.S. manufacturing 
U.S. companies have moved their manufacturing operations abroad to capitalize on 
differences in comparative advantage. Companies in developing countries have focused 
on particular labor-intensive tasks, such as final assembly of computers and 
telecommunications equipment, while the United States and other high-income countries 
have retained certain technology-intensive parts of the supply chain. 
 
The speed of this reorganization has differed by industry. In electronics, productive tasks 
have been offshored relatively rapidly to low-wage locations such as China. The most 
dramatic shift has been in the production and assembly of computers. Production of 
computer peripherals, photographic equipment, and telecommunications equipment such 
as cell phones has also relocated to lower-income countries. However, the United States 
and other high-income countries have retained a large share of the production and export 
of such technology-intensive products as doped wafers112 and machinery used in 
manufacturing semiconductors. Figure 3.3 shows the average income in countries 
exporting electronics products relative to incomes in the United States.113 For example, 
the average per capita income of producers of semiconductors and integrated circuits is 
less than 40 percent of U.S. income. This indicates that producers of these goods earn 
wages below those prevailing in, say, Taiwan (which has roughly half the per capita 
income of the United States), but above those of China, Malaysia, or the Philippines 
(which have per capita incomes less than one-fifth of the U.S. level). The decline in 
relative wages between 1997 and 2006 has been particularly rapid in computers and 
computer peripherals, reflecting the rapid offshoring of production from high-income 
countries in these products. 
 
The offshoring of activity in most other industries has not been as extensive, nor the 
changes as rapid, as in the electronics industry. Chemicals provides an example of an 
industry with more modest movements in supply chains (figure 3.4). A comparison of 
electronics and chemicals offshoring also shows that globalization does not affect the 
same stage of production in every industry. The United States retains substantial 
production of upstream inputs and machinery in the electronics sector, which require 
much more technology and skill to produce than more finished goods in the sector such 
as computers. In chemicals, high-income countries retain most of the production of final 
goods such as cosmetics and personal care items, which are the most technologically 
complex products in the sector. Meanwhile, upstream inputs are composed mostly of raw 
materials and basic organic compounds, and sourcing of these inputs has moved rapidly 
to low-income countries. 
 
Relocation of tasks: Effects on U.S. services 
Globalization has caused relocation of services activities as well as goods production. 
The reorganization of supply chains for services has led to both offshoring (foreign 
provision of services used to produce goods and services in the United States, resulting in  
 
 
 
                                                          
112 Wafers are thin crystals of highly pure semiconductor material, usually silicon. They are doped by 
the deliberate introduction of impurities such as boron or antimony. The technology of this process is 
relatively more difficult than later stages of the assembly and testing of semiconductors.  
113 The analysis in this section is based on Deason and Ferrantino, “Determinants of Diffusion and 
Downstreaming,” 2009. This study looked at patterns of international trade in technology-intensive products 
for 15 countries making up the bulk of world trade in such products for the period 1997–2006. 
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FIGURE 3.3  Some electronics and related products have moved rapidly to low-income countries; others 
have not 
 
 
Source: Deason and Ferrantino, “Determinants of Diffusion and Downstreaming,” 2009. 
 
FIGURE 3.4 Exports involving later stages of chemical processing are associated with higher income levels 
  
 
Source: Deason and Ferrantino, “Determinants of Diffusion and Downstreaming,” 2009. 
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U.S. services imports) and inshoring (U.S. provision of services to foreign producers, 
resulting in U.S. services exports). Firms in the United States specialize in many kinds of 
skilled labor-intensive services. Important components of the U.S. trade surplus in 
services include royalties and license fees; financial services; other business, 
professional, and technical services; and travel services. Firms around the world thus tend 
to source some of the skilled services they need in the United States. While some service 
activities, such as call centers, software design, and payroll processing, can be relocated 
to developing countries,114 these remain the exception rather than the rule.115 
Consequently, for the United States, inshoring of services is a much larger phenomenon 
than offshoring. In 2009 the United States exported $484 billion of services and imported 
$335 billion, for a surplus of $149 billion. The 2009 surplus is more than double its 2003 
level of $67 billion. During the same period, U.S. exports of business, professional, and 
technical services have grown by 85 percent, more rapidly than the 66 percent growth in 
U.S. exports of other services.116  
 
Relocation of tasks: Effects on U.S. R&D 
U.S. multinationals still perform most of their R&D activities at home; in 2007, for 
example, 85 percent of their R&D investment remained in the United States. Both 
economies of scale in R&D and the need to coordinate R&D with central headquarters 
management provide continuing incentives for firms to focus their R&D at home. 
However, it is becoming more common for U.S. firms to locate R&D outside the United 
States.117 Although only 15 percent of U.S. multinationals’ R&D investment went to their 
affiliates abroad in 2007, that share is up from 12 percent in 2001. Moreover, while most 
of the R&D carried out by U.S. affiliates occurs in other developed countries,118 there 
have been a number of recent instances of U.S. firms increasing their R&D investment 
and employment in emerging markets, including Pfizer and Microsoft in China, Ford in 
Brazil, and Boeing in India.119 
 
Multinationals’ R&D in developing countries consists in large measure of adapting U.S. 
technologies. When multinationals use their foreign affiliates primarily for production 
and sales, as is common, it makes sense for their R&D in those countries to focus 
primarily on adapting technologies, processes, and strategies already developed in the 
United States to different local conditions.120 The development of new technologies or 
management methods would require the affiliate to engage in a higher level of 
independent action than a typical affiliate focused on production and sales.121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
114 The United States is also a net importer of insurance services and computer and data processing 
services. See Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, “The Offshore Services Value Chain,” 2010, for more examples 
of services that have been offshored to developing countries. 
115 This characterization is based on both recent case studies and U.S. trade data.  
116 BEA data and Commission calculations. 
117 Gilman, “The New Geography of Global Innovation,” 2010, 7. 
118 In 2008, 70 percent of the $37.0 billion of R&D performed by majority-owned U.S. affiliates abroad 
was located in Australia, Canada, the EU, and Japan. (BEA data and Commission calculations.) 
119 Gilman, “The New Geography of Global Innovation,” 2010, 8, gives additional examples. 
120 Dunning and Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 370–1. See also USITC, 
hearing transcript, December 16, 2010, 131–2 (testimony of Kenneth Kraemer, professor, University of 
California, Irvine). 
121 Cantwell and Mudambi, “MNE Competence-Creating Subsidiary Mandates,” 2005, 1109–28. 
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Effects on Consumers 
Retailers are major users of advanced supply chain management techniques, and the 
efficiencies gained from the use of such techniques impact consumers directly. For 
example, the United States’ largest retailer, Wal-Mart, has pioneered a variety of 
techniques to track products, manage warehouse inventories, and guarantee that orders 
from suppliers are quickly and accurately filled.122 These practices are increasingly being 
adopted by other retailers around the country, and integrated with strategies for overseas 
sourcing. U.S. consumers have benefited both from the lower prices in today’s better-
managed superstores and from an increasingly wide variety of imported and domestic 
goods.123 Better supply chain management also contributed to lowering the retail prices 
of apparel, electronics, hardware, recreational goods, and other items that are frequently 
imported. 
 
In addition to lowering costs, the availability of a wider range of imported goods in the 
U.S. market has also benefited consumers in terms of increased product variety. The 
number of imported product varieties in the United States increased by a factor of four 
from 1972 to 2001.124 The benefit to consumers of this increase in variety is estimated to 
be equivalent to a 1.2 percentage point annual drop in import prices, or 2.6 percent of 
GDP over the entire time period. While there are multiple factors affecting the supply of 
new imported varieties into the United States, including economic development in other 
countries, improvements in supply chain efficiency have also played a role. It has been 
estimated that trade facilitation measures in developing countries, which would enhance 
these countries’ integration into supply chains by cutting red tape at the border, could 
dramatically expand the variety of products they export to developed countries.125 Thus, 
there is scope for further improvements in supply chains in developing countries that 
could yield substantial benefits for consumers in the United States and other markets. 
 
Effects on Employment and Wages 
The effects of global supply chains on U.S. wages and employment are not well 
established in the economic literature, although empirical evidence suggests that effects 
vary by sector and by skill level of worker. Although studies suggest that, overall, U.S. 
workers are likely to benefit from global supply chains,  there may be a negative effect on 
the relative wages of less-skilled workers. Offshoring low-skilled tasks to other countries 
has three potential effects on wages:126  
 
                                                          
122 These techniques include continuous replenishment programs, vendor-managed inventory, and the 
use of radio frequency identification (RFID) technologies. See Lummus and Vokurka, “Defining Supply 
Chain Management,” 1999; Angeles, “RFID Technologies,” 2005. 
123 One study found that Wal-Mart sells identical food items at prices 15 to 25 percent lower than 
traditional supermarkets. Hausman and Leibtag, “CPI Bias from Supercenters,” 2004. 
124 Broda and Weinstein, “Globalization and the Gains from Variety,” 2006. 
125 Persson, “Trade Facilitation and the Extensive Margin,” 2010. This study finds that if all countries 
were as efficient at the border as the most efficient country at the same level of development, the number of 
product varieties exported to the EU would increase by 64 percent for more differentiated products, such as 
high-end manufactured goods, and 29 percent for more uniform products such as agricultural goods.  
126 Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, “Trading Tasks,” 2008; Baldwin, “Integration of the North 
American Economy,” 2009. 
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• First, there is a labor supply effect, as low-skilled workers whose tasks have been 
offshored seek other jobs in the economy. This effect tends to push down the wages 
of less-skilled workers.127 
 
• Second, offshoring can have a terms-of-trade effect, which can raise or lower wages 
by changing the relative prices of U.S. imports and exports. If offshoring increases 
the world supply of a good or service that the U.S. exports, its price will tend to 
decrease, while a relative decrease in the world supply of a good or service will 
increase the U.S. export’s price. If the price shift leads to a decrease in U.S. export 
prices relative to U.S. import prices, this would tend to lower U.S. wages, while if 
U.S. export prices increase in relative terms, workers would benefit. 
 
• Third, there is a productivity effect. When U.S. firms reduce costs by offshoring 
some tasks, the increased productivity could benefit all workers (both less-skilled and 
more-skilled) that remain employed. The widespread use of supply chains has 
generated economy-wide productivity gains, and thus potential increases in the wages 
of all kinds of workers.128  
 
Studies conducted in the 1980s and 1990s often found at least some evidence for the 
labor supply effect. Increased imports of goods using less-skilled labor exerted downward 
pressure on the wages of less-skilled labor in the United States, though the effect of 
imports was often estimated to be modest compared to other factors affecting workers, 
such as technical change.129 Since that time, global activities have been split into 
narrower tasks, and still more less-skilled activities have been sent to low-wage countries, 
while new high-skilled activities have migrated to the United States. Increased 
outsourcing can place additional downward pressure on the wages of less-skilled labor. 
One early study of this effect estimated that outsourcing accounted for 15 to 40 percent of 
the decline in the wages of production workers (such as assemblers, repair personnel, and 
maintenance workers) relative to nonproduction workers (such as managers, 
salespersons, and professionals) over 1979–90.130  
 
The effect of global production fragmentation on wage inequality in the United States 
and elsewhere continues to be actively researched. Since the first intensive studies into 
the relationship between trade and wages in the 1990s, the share of U.S. imports from 
developing countries has expanded. One recent study, focusing on the impact of U.S. 
imports from China on U.S. local labor markets, found that increasing Chinese imports 
explain one-third of the aggregate decline in U.S. manufacturing employment between 
1990 and 2007.131 Another study found that average hourly compensation in the top 10 
U.S. trading partners, weighted by trade, has fallen substantially: from 81 percent of the 
U.S. level in 1990, when China ranked 10th among U.S. trading partners, to 65 percent in 
                                                          
127 This effect is not specific to supply chains—imports from developing countries could exert 
downward pressure on the wages of less-skilled workers in the United States, even in a world in which 
production fragmentation did not exist. 
128 Some work has questioned the extent to which these gains have been transmitted to workers and the 
broader economy, however. One study associated offshoring with an increase in the share of corporate profits 
in value-added and a decrease in the share of labor, and argued that increased profits from offshoring have 
been largely invested in financial assets, rather than in assets that are more likely to raise productivity and 
employment. Milberg and Winkler. “Financialisation and the Dynamics of Offshoring in the USA,” 2010. 
129 USITC, The Impact of Trade Agreements, 2003. 
130 Feenstra and Hanson, “The Impact of Outsourcing,” 1999. According to this study, the effect of 
advances in technology on wages is substantially greater than the effect of outsourcing. The study estimated 
that expenditures on computers, a measure of technology upgrading, accounted for 35 to 70 percent of the 
falling relative wage of production workers. 
131 Autor et al., “The China Syndrome,” 2011. 
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2005, when China ranked 3rd.132 This suggests at least the possibility that increasing 
production fragmentation in manufacturing may continue to place downward pressure on 
wages of less-skilled labor, and may also reduce employment of such workers. Future 
research may aid in disentangling the various ways in which global supply chains may 
have affected the structure of wages and employment in the U.S. economy and abroad. 
Box 3.5 discusses ways in which improved data could better show how participation in 
global chains affects the United States. 
 
The effects of offshoring on U.S. manufacturing workers vary significantly for workers in 
different industries or occupations. Overall, U.S. multinationals tend to hire more 
workers in the United States when they are also expanding employment in high-income 
countries, and fewer U.S. workers when they are expanding employment in low-income 
countries in industries employing a high share of workers in routine occupations such as 
clerical work than in industries employing a high share of workers in nonroutine work 
such as management, communication, analytical reasoning, or skilled eye-hand 
coordination. Possibly as a result, workers in routine occupations experienced lower 
employment and wages when U.S. multinationals in their industries hired more workers 
in low-income countries, but higher employment and wages when U.S. multinationals in 
their industries hired more workers in high-income countries.133  
 
Relatively few U.S. services jobs have been offshored so far. Researchers remain divided 
as to the potential effects of offshoring services on U.S. employment and wages, although 
the U.S. comparative advantage and trade surplus in services sectors are highlighted as 
reasons for positive effects on U.S. workers.  
 
Some analysts believe the potential for future offshoring of such jobs is substantial. One 
study estimates that while the total number of U.S. services jobs offshored so far may be 
well less than a million, the total number of services jobs susceptible to offshoring is two 
to three times greater than the total number of manufacturing jobs.134 However, another 
study argues that only “about one-third of tradable services activities are at risk of being 
offshored to low-wage labor-abundant countries like India and China,” noting that the 
United States appears to have a comparative advantage in services and is a net exporter of 
services.135 The same study noted that U.S. workers in tradable services sectors have 
more education and higher skill levels than in the lower-paying nontradable service 
sectors, and argued that the United States will likely gain good jobs in tradable services 
as services exports grow and become more integrated into global supply chains.136 Other 
studies also question the calculations indicating that very large numbers of service jobs 
are offshorable, stating that they do not always consider the possibility of increased U.S. 
services exports to developing countries and, again, do not take into account the 
substantial U.S. trade surplus in services.137  
  
                                                          
132 Krugman, “Trade and Wages, Reconsidered,” 2008. 
133 Ebenstein et al., “Estimating the Impact of Trade and Offshoring on American Workers,” 2009. 
134 There were 14 million U.S. manufacturing jobs in 2006, the year the study was published. Blinder, 
“Offshoring,” 2006. 
135 Jensen and Kletzer, “‘Fear’ and Offshoring,” 2008. Jensen and Kletzer estimate that 15–20 million 
jobs are at risk with about half in the manufacturing sector, which has long been at risk.  
136 U.S. workers may also benefit from exports of skill-intensive services such as engineering, design, 
and architecture as demand in developing countries grows for improved infrastructure such as airports, sea 
ports, and large construction projects. USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010, 74–76 (testimony of J. 
Bradford Jensen, associate professor, Georgetown University). 
137 Baldwin, “Integration of the North American Economy,” 2009; Amiti and Wei, “Fear of Service 
Outsourcing,” 2005. 
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  BOX 3.5 Improved data would give a better picture of U.S. participation in global supply chains and its 
effects 
 
There are several areas in which research into global supply chains could be enhanced by improved data 
and quantification. These include the tracking of intermediate goods and services trade on an industry-
by-industry basis, the contribution of the logistics sector to economic activity, and the extent to which 
better global supply chain management has reduced transaction costs or may be expected to do so in the 
future. 
 
In order to do the type of analysis of value added in U.S. trade presented earlier in this report it is 
necessary to have some idea of the amount of intermediate inputs used by particular U.S. industries that 
comes from specific exporting countries. At present there are no direct measures of such linkages, a lack 
that has been noted as a significant gap in available trade data.a Analyses of value-added trade must 
thus estimate these trade linkages, since they cannot be directly observed. Significant progress has been 
made in improving these estimates, but it is likely that they still fail to capture significant differences in the 
import sourcing patterns of different industries. Improvements in direct measurement of such linkages 
would help more precisely identify industry-specific connections to the global economy.  
 
The contribution of the logistics industry to value chains is another area where improved data would 
further analysis. The activities of this industry generally do not appear as a coherent unit in statistical 
reporting systems but are broken up among a wide variety of areas, such as transport, warehousing, and 
business services. This reflects the industry’s role in integrating a number of service sectors that used to 
be provided separately, or self-provided by manufacturing firms.b 
 
Data on trade costs, by product and country, would help analysts estimate the effect of global supply 
chain management on these costs as well as assess its potential for reducing them further. Total trade 
costs include all transport and transaction costs linking the producer in the exporting country to the final 
consumer in the importing country. Some isolated estimates of total trade costs are available. For 
example, it has been estimated that the average retail markup for manufactured goods traded among 
developed countries is 170 percent, reflecting the difference between the price received by the producer 
in the exporting country and the retail price in the importing country.c  
 
In a well-known example, the markup on Barbie dolls produced in China and sold in the United States is 
about 900 percent.d Case studies tracking price increases of particular products as they pass through 
global supply chains would be a useful first step in developing more comprehensive databases for the 
study of global trade costs.e 
 
 
   aFeenstra et al., “Report on the State of Available Data,” 2010, 5–8. 
   bUSITC, Logistic Services, 2005, chap. 1. 
   cAnderson and van Wincoop, “Trade Costs,” 2004. 
   dFeenstra, “Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Global Production in the Global Economy,” 1998. 
   eFerrantino, “Quantifying the Trade and Economic Effects of Non-Tariff Measures,” 2006, 38–40. 
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In 2008, researchers examined the effects on U.S. workers of offshoring of services to 
China, as well as those of inshoring.138 They found that small positive effects from 
inshoring outweighed smaller negative effects from offshoring, which were concentrated 
on less-skilled white collar workers.139 On balance, according to this study, U.S. workers 
in occupations exposed to both offshoring and inshoring spent 0.1 percent less time 
unemployed, were 2 percent less likely to change occupations, and would earn 1.5 
percent more than in the absence of such changes.140 
 
Industry Case Studies 
These case studies provide a detailed examination of the U.S. participation in three 
sectors in which U.S. trade and production have been substantially integrated into global 
supply chains. Supply chains in these industries differ considerably from one another, 
both in the activities performed by U.S. firms (figure 3.5) and the power that these firms 
have to set prices and other terms. In the first two case studies (apparel and motor 
vehicles), U.S. firms continue to hold dominant positions in supply chains, though they 
perform markedly different activities. In the third industry (televisions), the previous 
generation of dominant U.S. firms largely failed to transition to the world of global 
sourcing, though one U.S.-headquartered firm has grown to account for a substantial 
share of U.S. sales without being a dominant producer. Supply chains in these industries 
also differ considerably in their geographic extent and the factors important to their 
development. These characteristics are summarized below: 
 
• Apparel: U.S. apparel firms engage in design, logistics, marketing, and sales 
activities. Almost all production is done abroad and, though they remain core 
activities of some U.S. firms, design and logistics are increasingly performed by 
foreign full-package suppliers as well. Asian countries have increasingly become the 
source of global apparel production, though U.S. firms continue to rely on suppliers 
in regions with U.S. FTAs and preferential trade agreements. 
 
• Motor vehicles and parts: U.S. firms engage in nearly all supply chain activities, 
though specialized outside firms provide logistics and other services (except for 
financing). Auto manufacturers and their suppliers pursue a regional strategy, 
tailoring these activities to produce cars for local markets within regional supply 
chains. Europe, North America, and China are the major production locations. 
 
• Televisions: U.S. production of televisions ended in 2009, and only one company 
(Vizio) is headquartered in the United States. This company engages in some design, 
but mainly provides distribution, marketing, and sales support to U.S. retailers. 
Globally, Japanese and Korean companies produce the major television components, 
while assembly occurs in China and Mexico. 
 
                                                          
138 Liu and Trefler, “Much Ado about Nothing,” 2008, 1. This study defined offshoring as sales of 
U.S.-produced services to unaffiliated buyers abroad. 
139 Including workers in occupations such as sales and office and administrative support. Liu and 
Trefler, “Much Ado about Nothing,” 2008, 32–34. 
140 Specifically, Liu and Trefler report estimated changes in unemployment duration, occupation 
switching, and wages for a scenario under which the rate of inshoring and offshoring in business, 
professional, and technical services grew at the same rate as that observed during 1996–2005 for the 
following nine-year period. 
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FIGURE 3.5  Major activities of U.S. lead firms in global supply chains, at home and abroad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Commission compilations; apparel based on Gereffi and Frederick, “The Global Apparel Value 
Chain, Trade, and the Crisis,” 2010. 
 
   aAs noted in the apparel case study below, much of the R&D in the sector is provided by textile 
companies. 
 
In addition to the three studies of industrial value chains, this section also examines the 
role of U.S. logistics firms. As noted earlier, logistics firms coordinate the movement of 
goods and services, an activity essential to the efficient operation of global supply chains. 
These firms have extended beyond the movement of freight, and now provide services 
such as customs brokerage, product repair, parts procurement, and distribution 
management. The case study discusses U.S. logistics providers’ activities and global 
reach, and also presents examples of their integration into supply chains in industries 
such as electronics. 
 
Apparel  
Activities of U.S. Lead Firms at Home and Abroad 
Like many other labor-intensive industries, the apparel supply chain for the U.S. market 
has evolved from one in which most activities took place in the United States to one with 
an increasingly global profile. Today, many of the early and especially late supply chain 
activities take place in the United States, but a large share of the intermediate steps, 
particularly apparel production, occur in one or more countries overseas. In large part 
reflecting this shift, U.S. apparel employment in the United States has dropped; in 2010, 
it was only 17 percent of its 1990 level.141 Despite the fact that more supply chain 
activities are taking place offshore, much of the value and decision-making in the supply 
chain is still associated with the lead firms.142 Such firms own the brands, and include 
mass market retailers (e.g., Wal-Mart and Macy’s), specialty retailers (e.g., Gap and  
 
 
 
                                                          
141 BLS, Current Employment Statistics, 1990–2009. 
142 Gereffi and Frederick, “The Global Apparel Value Chain, Trade, and the Crisis,” 2010, 11–12; 
Nathan Associates Inc., “Exporting Apparel to the United States,” 2009, 9–16. 
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Chico’s FAS), and large apparel firms (e.g., VF Corporation, The Jones Group, and 
Hanesbrands).143 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the basic steps of the global apparel supply chain (in blue). The top row 
indicates supply chain activities, which take products from research to sales. Most of the 
R&D takes place in the United States and abroad in the upstream product sectors—
particularly in the development of new fibers, coatings, and fabric finishes—and so R&D 
is generally not included with the activities of apparel firms.144 The bars below the supply 
chain illustrate three simplified examples of lead firm involvement (shown in green) in 
the global apparel supply chain. In all three examples, the lead firms are heavily involved 
in the branding and marketing of products (shown on the right side of the diagram). 
Although the lead firms typically employ several different combinations of supply chain 
sourcing, the trend has been to outsource more and more steps in the supply chain. As 
lead firms look for avenues to improve their competitiveness, many have shifted some or 
most of the supply functions offshore to other firms to manage for them. 
 
In example 1, apparel firms control most or all of the activities in the global supply chain, 
from design through marketing. These firms own their own brands, design their products, 
select their raw materials, and maintain control of their production networks. They either 
own the production facilities themselves or supply the fabrics to a contractor who cuts the 
fabric, makes (sews) the garment, and trims it (trims the thread and packages the 
garment)—a process collectively known as cut, make, trim (CMT). This was a common 
form of apparel sourcing when domestic apparel manufacturing firms initially started 
moving production offshore to seek lower labor costs. Today, however, this is the least 
common form of sourcing for U.S. lead firms, although some U.S. apparel firms (e.g., 
Hanesbrands and VF Corporation) still operate at least part of their supply chain using 
this model, particularly for apparel manufactured in the CAFTA-DR region.145 
 
In example 2, the U.S. lead firm designs the product, but outsources the procurement of 
raw materials and the manufacturing of the garment to a “package contractor.” The 
logistics and financing involved in procuring fabrics and other raw materials is shifted 
from the lead firm to the package contractor. Under this example, production also likely 
takes place offshore. Some lead firms have also moved their sourcing offices closer to 
their main apparel suppliers (mainly Asia), and some have moved the design process and 
materials selection offshore as well, though not to different companies. 
 
 
 
                                                          
143 Mass market retailers sell apparel under their own private-label brands, as well as international 
branded apparel. Specialty retailers sell apparel exclusively under their own brand names. The large apparel 
firms each control several different brands, and many have also entered the retail sector with their own 
specialty retail stores (e.g., Levi Strauss, Polo Ralph Lauren, and Nike). 
144 Examples of U.S. firms involved in such R&D include Invista (a subsidiary of Koch Industries, 
Inc.), International Textile Group, and Polartec. These firms have developed intermediate branded products 
that are inputs to apparel articles (e.g., fibers, fabrics, and finishes). For the purposes of this discussion, 
design of the garment is treated separately from R&D. Nevertheless, apparel firms are sometimes involved in 
R&D. For example, apparel firms making clothing for extreme weather or physical activities will likely go 
beyond design for an average garment and be involved in developing and testing the garment for specific 
applications. Apparel firms may also work with textile firms in the development of applications for new 
fibers, fabrics, and finishes. 
145 VF Corporation, for example, states on its Web site that it manufactures products in its own or 
contract facilities in Nicaragua, Honduras, and Mexico, though it has extensive operations elsewhere. It also 
states that it oversees production at more than 1,400 owned or sourced facilities around the world. VF 
Corporation Web site, http://www.vfc.com/about/global-presence (accessed February 24, 2011); Gereffi and 
Frederick, “The Global Apparel Value Chain, Trade, and the Crisis,” 2010, 16. 
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FIGURE 3.6  Apparel global supply chain: Selected examples 
 
 
 
Source: Commission compilation based on Gereffi and Frederick, “The Global Apparel Value Chain, Trade, and the 
Crisis,” 2010, and industry sources. 
 
 
In example 3, most of the steps in the supply chain are undertaken offshore, including 
design, production, and logistics. The lead firm relies on a full-package supplier to 
perform all the elements of the supply chain except marketing and perhaps shipping.146 
Some of the larger full-package suppliers have factories located around the world, which 
allows them to offer lead firms a greater diversity of products as well as more options to 
balance costs, lead times, and order quantities. 
 
In addition to working directly with package contractors or full-package suppliers, large 
U.S. apparel companies and retailers are increasingly working with intermediary sourcing 
agents who provide a link between themselves and the manufacturer. In the case of 
examples 2 and 3 in figure 3.3 above, the sourcing agent assumes the responsibilities of 
the foreign manufacturer (shown in white). The sourcing agents may perform some of the 
functions themselves (such as raw materials selection), but generally source the 
production of the garment itself to another firm. Since sourcing agents often have access 
to a large network of fabric suppliers and apparel manufacturers around the world, they 
can also help retailers and apparel firms have more flexibility about order quantities and 
lead times, as well as save on costs.  
 
Li & Fung Limited, based in Hong Kong, is an example of a large sourcing firm that 
offers a wide range of services to lead firms, including product design and development, 
raw material sourcing, factory sourcing (for production of the apparel articles), and 
logistics. In 2010, Wal-Mart signed a non-exclusive strategic alliance with Li & Fung for 
                                                          
146 Sometimes the full package supplier will ship the goods directly to the lead firm’s distribution 
center or even its customer. However, U.S. lead firms may also arrange for their own shipping from the 
factory or port, particularly if they have negotiated good rates with the shipping firms.  
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sourcing some of its goods, including apparel items.147 Liz Claiborne also has a sourcing 
agreement with Li & Fung that provides everything except design and marketing.148  
 
Important Drivers Affecting U.S. Participation 
One of the most important drivers shaping U.S. participation in the global apparel supply 
chain in recent years has been the expiration in 2005 of U.S. and EU textile and apparel 
import quotas under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC).149 Because 
the quotas no longer limited quantities that could be obtained from a single country, U.S. 
retailers and apparel companies consolidated their supply bases and developed new 
supply chains to reduce lead times and costs.150 At the same time, there was extensive 
consolidation in the retail and branded sectors: the number of department store chains in 
the United States dropped from 50 in 1990 to 17 in 2008.151 This trend has greatly 
expanded U.S. lead firms’ purchasing power.152 Since 2004, the year before the ATC 
expired, the consumer price index (CPI) for apparel has remained relatively flat; it 
actually declined 0.7 percent between 2004 and 2010, whereas the CPI for all products 
increased by 15.5 percent during the same period.153 
 
Although the quotas are gone, the rules of origin under U.S. FTAs and preferential trade 
arrangements have also influenced U.S. firms’ involvement in global apparel supply 
chains. For example, the rules of origin for most apparel under NAFTA and CAFTA-DR 
require the apparel to be made from yarns and fabrics produced in the United States or an 
FTA partner country for it to enter the United States duty free. In 2010, these FTA 
partner countries accounted for 72 percent of the value of U.S. yarn and fabric exports.154 
Nevertheless, U.S. yarn and fabric exports to these countries have declined in recent 
years—down by 15 percent from 2004 levels—in part because U.S. lead firms have 
shifted their sourcing strategies (box 3.6). Asian manufacturers have been able to provide 
more services at overall lower costs, despite having to pay tariffs on imported goods (as 
in examples 2 and 3).  
 
In addition, U.S. retailers and branded apparel firms are looking to expand their global 
presence by opening new retail outlets and/or selling their merchandise in established  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
147 Just-Style.com, “Wal-Mart Deal ‘tip of the iceberg’ for Li & Fung,” February 1, 2010; Walmart, 
“Walmart Leverages Global Scale to Lower Costs,” news release, January 28, 2010 (accessed February 28, 
2011).  
148 Einhorn, “Li & Fung: A Factory Source Shines,” May 14, 2009; Li & Fung Limited, “Liz Claiborne 
Inc. and Li & Fung,” news release, February 23, 2009 (accessed February 28, 2011).  
149 The ATC entered into force in 1995 and mandated the gradual elimination of quotas that had been in 
place under the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) since the 1970s. All MFA quotas were eliminated after a 10-
year transition period that ended on January 1, 2005. Some quantitative restraints on Chinese apparel 
remained in place after this date, as permitted under the China WTO accession protocol. These safeguard 
quotas were also eliminated by the end of 2008. USITC, Import Restraints, Fifth Update 2007, 2007, 58–62. 
150 USA-ITA, written submission to the USITC, January 6, 2011. 
151 Barrie, “Brand Bias Drives New Retail Strategies,” April 17, 2008. 
152 David Birnbaum described the increase in power as an “oligopsony where a small number of 
customers control entire retail markets.” Birnbaum, “Comment: The Changing Value of the Garment 
Worker,” October 18, 2010. 
153 Based on BLS, “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers,” 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. 
154 Based on exports under NAICS code 313 (textile mills) from USITC DataWeb/USDOC (accessed 
March 3, 2011).  
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retail outlets in international markets.155 Using full package suppliers (example 3) and/or 
sourcing agents gives branded apparel firms and retailers greater flexibility in supplying 
different markets, for more cost-effective results. For example, such arrangements may 
offer U.S. retailers and apparel firms access to a wider selection of fabrics and 
manufacturing bases, as well as duty-free access to certain markets under other countries’ 
bilateral or regional trade agreements and preferential trade arrangements.156 
 
Most recently, another driver affecting U.S. participation in the global supply chain has 
been shrinking consumer expenditures on apparel. During 2007–09, average annual 
consumer expenditures on apparel declined by 8 percent,157 putting added pressure on 
retailers to cut costs and minimize excess inventory. In response, retailers have shifted 
additional sourcing functions offshore to other firms, allowing lead firms to reduce lead 
times while ordering fewer garments in greater assortments. 
 
Autos and Parts 
The motor vehicle industry158 manages a large, diversified set of suppliers in nearly every 
region of the world, making for a complex supply chain with global, regional, and local 
characteristics. Although a completely global car or platform is an attractive concept to 
automakers because of the potential for scale economies and reduced design and 
engineering costs, the most prevalent manufacturing strategy employs a regional supply 
chain. With this approach, automakers and suppliers are better able to meet local pricing 
and consumer preferences, reduce inventory costs, and manage currency fluctuations. 
Motor vehicle companies perform nearly all supply chain activities within these regions, 
with the exception of logistics services, which are largely provided by specialized firms. 
  
                                                          
155 For example, VF Corporation, which describes itself as world’s largest apparel company, states that 
its brands are sold in 150 countries through 47,000 retailers. VF Corporation Web site. 
http://www.vfc.com/about/global-presence (accessed February 24, 2011). See also Driscoll, Standard & 
Poor’s Industry Surveys, 6; Just-Style.com, “US: Aeropostale Inks Deal to Expand into Asia,” March 9, 
2011; Juststyle.com, “US: A&F to Expand Global Reach,” February 17, 2011. 
156 For example, access to the Japanese market under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations-Japan 
FTA. USITC, ASEAN: Regional Trends in Economic Integrations, 2010, 4-10 to 4-11. 
157 BLS, Consumer Expenditures–2009, October 5, 2010, 1, table A. 
158 The motor vehicle industry includes firms that assemble vehicles, such as passenger cars and light 
trucks, as well as those that produce vehicle components, such as gearboxes and braking systems. 
BOX 3.6  Recent shifts in sources of global value in textiles and apparel 
 
As reported earlier in chapter 3, China’s share of the valued added in U.S. apparel imports was 11 
percent in 2004 (table 3.3), but it is likely that China’s share has increased significantly since then. 
China’s share of total U.S. apparel imports has more than doubled since 2004, growing from 19 percent 
in 2004 to 41 percent in 2010. China is also a large supplier of textile inputs to other major Asian 
apparel-producing countries, such as Vietnam, which also ship large quantities of apparel to the United 
States. Recent reports reveal, however, that some U.S. apparel firms and retailers are starting to move 
some of their apparel sourcing back to the Western Hemisphere to help diversify their supply base and 
minimize their risk, such as unexpected delivery delays.a  
 
 
   aFreeman, “Apparel Firms Eye Central America Sourcing,” March 24, 2011. 
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Regional Manufacturing Approach 
Regional manufacturing is common to most of the world’s leading automakers and to tier 
one (large multinational) parts makers,159 including those in the United States. These 
firms manufacture vehicles and parts throughout the world, and although they are 
considered global in terms of their footprint and reach, they typically organize their 
manufacturing activities within high-demand regions, such as Europe, North America, 
and China.160 The level of demand in these regions is high enough to support volume 
production of vehicles and parts, a leading prerequisite for firms when deciding where to 
locate manufacturing. Countries within these regions also share certain common features, 
such as regionwide safety standards in Europe, which make local production more 
attractive. Taken in combination, these factors often encourage vehicle and parts makers 
to establish regional or local R&D and design centers to tailor vehicles and components 
to local preferences, standards, and pricing and technology levels, although global 
headquarters may remain in the home country. Logistics services for the industry, on the 
other hand, are usually handled by globally established firms with local operations and 
specialized expertise.161 
 
The NAFTA region is a notable example of regional automotive industry integration. 
Regional integration began in the mid-1960s, when the Automotive Products Trade 
Agreement between the United States and Canada eliminated tariffs on imports of motor 
vehicles and parts between the two countries. This agreement is considered by some to be 
the initial model for regional integration in the motor vehicle industry. North American 
integration took an additional step with the ratification of NAFTA, drawing Mexico 
further into the regional automotive industry. For example, automakers Ford, General 
Motors, Chrysler, and Toyota manufacture in all three NAFTA countries, as do tier one 
suppliers such as Visteon (United States) and Denso (Japan). 
 
As noted in the section on U.S. supply chain participation earlier in this chapter, U.S. 
imports in the motor vehicles and parts sector have a substantial share of value 
(19.1 percent) that consists of U.S. value returned home from abroad. This largely 
represents U.S. value returned home from NAFTA member countries, as the U.S. 
industry sources heavily from the region’s supply chains. In terms of value added, North 
American sources account for 72 percent of the content of the U.S. motor vehicles and 
parts sector.  
  
                                                          
159 Motor vehicle parts makers are commonly referenced by their position in a particular industry “tier.” 
Tier one producers are generally large multinationals that supply components, systems, and modules directly 
to automakers. These firms may also undertake supply chain management, systems integration, foreign 
investment, and extensive design and R&D. Tier two and tier three suppliers, which number in the tens of 
thousands, are generally smaller in size and product/function scope and are less likely to have the financial 
resources and customer base to support significant foreign investment. Tier two suppliers generally provide 
parts and materials to tier one producers, whereas tier three suppliers often provide raw materials or parts to a 
wide variety of industries, including the motor vehicle sector. 
160 Sturgeon et al., “Value Chains, Networks, and Clusters,” 2008, 9. 
161 Logistics activities in the automotive supply chain are often complex. A single automaker, for 
example, may source from a global supply base of over 10,000 firms. Deloitte Research and Stanford Global 
Supply Chain Management Forum, Integrating Demand and Supply Chains, 2009, 10. Logistics firms not 
only transport, warehouse, and inventory parts and vehicles, but they also perform other services, such as 
sequencing and assembly of parts at vehicle assembly plants. With sequencing, the firms deliver the parts or 
systems to the automaker in the order in which assembly occurs as part of the just-in-time inventory process. 
Team 3 Logistics, for example, indicates that it  provides services such as materials procurement, 
warehousing, inventory control, sequencing and kitting of parts, and forwarding. Team 3 Logistics Web site, 
http://www.team3logistics.com/services.html (accessed March 7, 2011). 
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Regional Structure Factors  
Market factors 
Because different motor vehicle markets often have different requirements, automakers 
and their suppliers often find that regional production best enables them to satisfy these 
criteria. For example, the type of vehicles demanded in a given region may be determined 
by income, vehicle standards and regulations (e.g., emissions and safety), consumer 
preferences, and driving conditions.162 A regional strategy allows automakers and their 
suppliers to offer vehicles that meet local price ranges and are tailored to the market, 
often while employing just-in-time inventory practices. Transportation costs, although 
important, appear to be less of a contributing factor in the development of regional 
production arrangements for higher-value goods such as motor vehicles. Automakers also 
control retailing in local operations to manage vehicle sales and provide aftermarket 
support. 
 
Government policies 
Several types of government policies have influenced the manufacturing structure of the 
automotive industry, with local-content requirements being the most notable. These 
requirements mandate that a specific share of a locally assembled vehicle’s value must 
come from locally produced components for the vehicle to benefit from certain 
incentives, such as reduced tariffs. These policies have been a significant growth driver 
for regional motor vehicle and parts production. By stipulating a designated content level, 
governments aim to develop their domestic industry, increase local production, and 
encourage foreign suppliers to form joint ventures or set up shop locally to supply their 
automotive customers.163 The industries in China, Thailand, Australia, and Indonesia, for 
example, have at various times been subject to these requirements. 
 
Beyond local-content requirements, political considerations also weigh into decisions to 
produce and source locally. The automotive industry is often a leading source of 
economic growth for countries or regions, and may be supported to some degree by 
national governments. Political pressure on automakers and their suppliers to establish or 
retain local production facilities has also contributed to this regional production 
pattern.164 
 
Regional trade arrangements, such as NAFTA and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), provide trade and investment preferences to member countries, which 
may serve as a lure for foreign investment from manufacturers that want to benefit from 
those policies. Automakers also use regional production to cushion the effects of 
currency fluctuations.165 By spreading production in different regions, automakers and 
suppliers try to lessen the financial impact of a strong (or weak) home currency. 
 
Supply chain relationships between automakers and suppliers 
The supply chain activities undertaken by the motor vehicle industry are less 
concentrated globally than those of other industries, as motor vehicle companies perform 
many supply chain activities in all regions. In fact, automakers and component 
manufacturers perform several of the same functions on a regional basis. R&D and 
                                                          
162 Humphrey and Memedovic, “The Global Automotive Industry Value Chain,” 2003, 18. 
163 Ibid., 19. 
164 Sturgeon et al., “Value Chains, Networks, and Clusters,” 2008, 9. 
165 Kitamura, “Toyota President Says He May Move More Production,” January 14, 2011. 
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design work are performed by both automakers (vehicles) and suppliers (parts). They 
work closely together to ensure vehicle fit and finish, quality, and safety. Automakers 
procure most parts from suppliers, but generally retain manufacture of signature 
systems—typically, engines and transmissions.166 This supply chain approach allows 
automakers to lower costs by taking advantage of parts suppliers with their own core 
competencies, product expertise, and volume production.167 Honda, for example, 
reportedly relies on suppliers for more than 80 percent of the components for its 
passenger cars, with in-house production focused on engines, transmissions, and bulky, 
capital-intensive parts such as stampings.168 
 
Leading parts suppliers are often expected to invest globally to supply their auto 
customers, and they may also manage the upstream supply chain (tier two and three 
suppliers).169 In a recent survey of automotive suppliers, 52 percent of tier one 
respondents indicated that their customers exerted pressure on them to manufacture 
nearby.170 Suppliers for both Toyota and Honda, for example, followed their automotive 
customers to the United States to supply their U.S.-based vehicle assembly facilities. 
These suppliers include Denso Corp., Nippon Seiki Co., and Stanley Electric Co.171 A 
similar movement has occurred as U.S. automakers moved into China, where 26 percent 
of China’s parts producers are reportedly owned by U.S. suppliers.172 
 
With respect to vehicle sales outlets, automakers typically control operations. In the 
United States, for example, automakers contract with one or more franchise dealers to 
represent their vehicles. The automakers then provide financing for dealerships to 
purchase vehicles (called floorplan financing) and also offer an avenue for customer 
financing (dealer-arranged financing). The dealer, however, takes on most of the 
investment risk in providing dealership services.173 
 
Televisions 
The U.S. supply chain for televisions, like that of many other products in the electronics 
sector, has migrated from a pattern in which a high concentration of activities, including 
production, occurs in the United States to one in which production is exclusively 
offshore. Unlike some other U.S. consumer electronics firms, however, U.S. television 
producers failed to adapt swiftly enough to technological change and lost their former 
position as global industry leaders. In 2011, U.S. supply chain activity by the sole 
remaining U.S. firm is limited to design, marketing, and to a lesser extent, logistics 
(figure 3.5).  
 
While the United States developed color televisions, and was a significant producer of 
televisions for decades, U.S. production ended in 2009.174 The primary factors 
contributing to the loss of U.S. production were superior technology and marketing 
strategies employed by Japanese firms;175 competitive, and in some cases, unfair pricing 
                                                          
166 One industry source estimates that automakers add less than 25 percent to a vehicle’s value, with the 
remainder (over 75 percent) added by suppliers. A.T. Kearney, “Automotive Suppliers: Management 
Strategies & Value Enhancement” (accessed April 1, 2011). 
167 Furtado and Andrade, “Outsourcing In Different Production Models,” 2005, 2. 
168 SupplierBusiness Ltd., “Honda Purchasing Strategy and Relationship with Suppliers,” 2009, 21. 
169 See, for example, Sedgwick, “Toyota Expects Tier 1s to Check on Subsuppliers,” January 17, 2011.  
170 KPMG International, “Global Location Strategy for Automotive Suppliers,” 2009, 10. 
171 SupplierBusiness, Ltd., “Honda Purchasing Strategy and Relationship with Suppliers,” 2009, 21. 
172 KPMG International, “Global Location Strategy for Automotive Suppliers,” 2009, 11. 
173 Canis and Platzer, “U.S. Motor Vehicle Industry Restructuring and Dealership Terminations,” 2009. 
174 Zacks Investment Service, “Sony Partially Exits LCD Plant,” 2010. 
175 Hart, “The Consumer-Electronics Industry in the United States,” 1991. 
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of televisions and parts over a period extending back into the 1960s by producers in 
China, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan;176 and, more recently, the shift in display technology 
from cathode ray tubes (CRTs) to flat panel displays (FPDs) such as liquid crystal and 
plasma displays.177 Rules of origin provisions for CRTs under NAFTA were unsuccessful 
in maintaining U.S. production and jobs after the industry switched to FPDs. 
 
Global Supply Chains for Televisions 
There are two key components for FPD televisions, the display panel and the chipset, 
which together account for 94 percent of the costs.178 The global supply chain for FPD 
televisions uses glass produced in Japan and Korea; displays incorporating the glass, 
assembled in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan; and semiconductor chip sets designed in the 
United States and elsewhere and produced in China, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
Assembly occurs principally in China, the world’s largest television producer, although 
most sets destined for the U.S. market are assembled in Mexico.179 These sourcing 
patterns are consistent with tables 3.2 to 3.5 above, which illustrate the significant value 
added by East Asia, Japan, and China in U.S. imports of electronic equipment. 
 
An investment in the hundreds of millions of dollars is required to be in the vanguard of 
glass production for FPD televisions.180 The need for such investment has led to 
collaboration by multinational corporations. The biggest investment for production is in 
the tooling to produce the glass for the displays, followed by the production of the display 
itself, and then by the assembly into the finished consumer good. Investments in FPD 
technology have been concentrated in Asia, reflecting Asia’s increasing importance as a 
global production center for televisions and other electronics. 
 
U.S. Participation in the Global Supply Chain 
U.S. participation in the global supply chain is now limited to the design of chips, some 
product development, distribution, marketing, and customer service. The last U.S. 
television factory (owned by Sony) closed in 2009. All televisions sold in the United 
States now are imported from original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)181 with factories 
outside the United States (principally in Mexico) or from contract manufacturers with 
factories principally in Mexico and China.182 
 
The sole remaining U.S.-headquartered television brand, Vizio, entered the U.S. market 
in 2002. Vizio has no factories of its own, but rather uses contract manufacturers in 
                                                          
176 For example, see USITC, Certain Color Television Receivers from China, May 2004; USITC, 
Television Receiving Sets from Japan, June 1981; U.S. Tariff Commission, Television Receiving Sets from 
Japan, March 1971. 
177 FPD technology was largely developed in American laboratories. However, U.S. companies capable 
of manufacturing FPDs either decided not to do so or were unable to obtain funding for their efforts. U.S. 
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Flat Panel Displays in Perspective, 1995. 
178 Palepu and Kind, “Vizio Inc.,” 2009, 7. 
179 China Economic Net, “3D TV Sets Booming in China” (accessed May 18, 2011).  
180 Corning Display Technologies, “Corning Announces Investment in Gen 10 LCD Glass Substrates,” 
December 5, 2007. 
181 An OEM is an organization that makes the products it sells under its own brand name or buys 
products and resells them under its own brand name. The OEM typically designs the product and owns the 
intellectual property for the product, which is made to order. A contract manufacturer is an organization that 
makes products under contract for resale by the OEM, using the OEM’s design. 
182 In 2010, Mexico and China accounted for 70 percent and 29 percent, respectively, of the value of 
U.S. imports of televisions. 
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China, Taiwan, and Mexico to produce goods to Vizio’s specifications.183 Although Vizio 
builds products that incorporate current technology, it does no R&D; instead, it purchases 
patents or licenses the technology from other patent owners. Vizio has also acquired other 
patents, which it licenses to other television manufacturers.184 The principal suppliers of 
finished televisions to Vizio are two contract manufacturers in Taiwan, Foxconn and 
Amtran. These companies are also part owners of Vizio.185 
 
Policies and Institutions That Affected the U.S. Industry 
Most of U.S. television production, which then used CRT technology, gradually moved 
to Mexico in the late 1990s. NAFTA included provisions that allowed televisions to enter 
the United States duty free if specific rules of origin were followed. These rules required 
that either of the two major glass parts of a tube be of North American origin for NAFTA 
origin to be conferred on the finished tube.186 In addition, the rules of origin for 
televisions virtually required the inclusion of a picture tube of NAFTA origin in order for 
NAFTA origin to be conferred on the television itself. Because of the sizable U.S. 
investment in tube and glass factories, those goods continued to be produced in the 
United States for some time even after CRT-based television assembly moved to Mexico. 
However, new display technology made those NAFTA provisions irrelevant when  FPDs 
became affordable alternatives to CRTs in televisions.187 In addition to being price-
competitive, televisions incorporating FPDs could have much larger screens than 
televisions incorporating CRTs, take up less space, consume less energy, and be more 
easily moved around. The switch to FPDs accelerated in 2009, when the United States 
adopted a digital broadcast standard such that signals could only be received by 
televisions incorporating a digital tuner or connected to a digital-to-analog converter. As 
consumers bought new televisions with digital tuners, many opted to buy televisions with 
FPDs rather than CRTs. As a result, demand for CRT-type sets (which constituted the 
majority of U.S. production) fell and production in the United States declined, from $4.0 
billion in 2000 to $127 million in 2009.188 The value of imports grew as demand for 
televisions with FPDs grew, from $245 million (4 percent of the value of television 
imports in 2001) to $19.2 billion in 2010, or 100 percent of the value of imports. 
 
Although the North American industry producing televisions with FPDs survives, in part 
the result of NAFTA rules of origin, the largest part of what survives is in Mexico, and 
consists of assembling mostly imported components of Asian origin. Like contract 
manufacturers in China, the factories in Mexico (some of which are themselves contract 
manufacturers) take advantage of lower labor costs. Meanwhile, some higher-value 
activities (such as R&D) occur overseas, while others (including design and marketing) 
remain in either the country where headquarters are housed or the United States.  
  
                                                          
183 Vizio also markets other consumer electronic products, including Blu-ray players and home theater 
systems. 
184 Vizio, “Sony, Vizio Reach DTV Patent Agreements,” 2009. 
185 As of 2008, Amtran reportedly owned 23 percent of Vizio. Flannery, “Vizio’s Flat-Screen Burst,” 
2008. 
186 North American Free Trade Agreement, Annex 401; Jensen-Moran, “Trade Battles as Investment 
Wars,” 1996. 
187 Although liquid crystal display displays were invented in the United States, there has been only 
limited commercial production of such displays in the United States. 
188 U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of Manufactures, various years. 
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Effects on U.S. Companies and Employment 
The number of companies producing televisions in the United States declined from seven 
in 2003189 to one in 2009, which closed its plant that year. U.S. television production 
declined as manufacturers (mostly headquartered in Japan) moved U.S. production to 
Mexico, which had lower-cost labor.190 In 2010, Vizio had 196 employees, with 76 in 
South Dakota, 3 outside the United States, and the remainder in California. None of the 
Vizio employees, however, either in the United States or elsewhere, would be considered 
production workers. 
 
Logistics 
U.S. firms are among the leading logistics providers worldwide and hence have become 
essential participants in global supply chains.191 Logistics, the coordinated movement of 
goods and services, encompasses diverse activities that oversee the end-to-end transport 
of raw, intermediate, and final goods between suppliers, producers, and consumers.192 As 
noted above, improvements in logistics services—both in-house and third-party—have 
promoted the growth of global supply chains.193 Manufacturing firms, for example, 
increasingly outsource certain logistics activities to third-party logistics service providers 
(3PLs) in order to focus on their core competencies and avoid or minimize the costs of 
developing in-house logistics capacity (table 3.6).194  
 
The ability of firms to move materials faster and over greater distances has become key, 
if not critical, to maintaining competitive advantage.195 New sourcing arrangements with 
3PLs help manufacturers achieve these goals. As discussed below, the benefits of 
integrating fully with 3PLs often exceed what those companies could obtain under 
traditional contractual arrangements where the 3PL performs discrete functions, but has 
limited knowledge of a company’s internal operations.196 In addition, where companies’ 
sourcing, production, and distribution activities are spread across multiple countries, 
procuring services from 3PLs permits the manufacturers to take advantage of the 3PLs’ 
transportation and supply chain networks.197 
 
Leading Logistics Firms 
The largest and most diversified U.S. logistics firms are FedEx and UPS, although for 
both firms, primary revenues are derived from the express delivery of letters and small  
 
 
                                                          
189 USITC, Certain Color Television Receivers from China, May 2004. 
190 Contreras and Carrillo, “E-commerce and Regional Integration,” July 2002. 
191 Mullen, written testimony to the USITC, December 16, 2010. 
192 Logistics most commonly include freight forwarding; multimodal transport (i.e., transport by air, 
ship, truck, or rail); warehousing and storage; tracking; and customs brokerage. They may also encompass 
other services such as order fulfillment, product repair, and supply chain management. Supply chain 
management refers to the design and management of transportation and distribution networks. Along with 
goods, certain services may also be transported by logistics firms, for example, in the forms of architectural 
plans, legal briefs, and franchising materials. USITC, Logistic Services: An Overview, May 2005, 2-1. 
193 Mullen, written testimony to the USITC, December 16, 2010. 
194 Bolumole, “The Supply Chain Role of Third-Party Logistics Providers,” 2001, 90. 
195 Bhatnagar and Viswanathan, “Re-engineering Global Supply Chains,” 2000, 13–34. 
196 Global 3PLs have developed areas of competency that are based on the industries of their largest 
customers, including, for example, healthcare and high-tech manufacturing. As 3PL firms accumulate 
knowledge of these industries, they can more effectively serve their customers. See, for example, UPS, 
“Industry Solutions” (accessed March 16, 2011). 
197 Bhatnagar and Viswanathan, “Re-engineering Global Supply Chains,” 2000, 22–27. 
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TABLE 3.6  Examples of services supplied by U.S. 3PL firms to global clients 
U.S. 3PL firm Client and industry Services 
Location(s) 
served 
Caterpillar Logistics Caterpillar,  
heavy equipment 
Warehousing and distribution Dubai 
 
FedEx Philips Semiconductor,  
high-tech equipment 
Transportation, warehousing 
and distribution, customs 
brokerage 
United States and 
Asia 
Menlo Worldwide Maastricht,  
high-tech equipment  
Warehousing and distribution 
for service parts 
Europe, Russia, 
the Middle East, 
and Africa 
Penske Logistics General Motors,  
automotive 
Transportation, distribution, 
supply chain management 
Mexico 
Penske Logistics Continental Tire,  
transportation equipment 
Warehousing and distribution, 
customs brokerage 
China 
Ryder Boeing,  
aerospace 
Transportation (by truck or by 
air and rail, using third-party 
providers), parts procurement, 
supply chain management 
United States and 
Asia 
UPS Genzyme,  
biotechnology 
Warehousing and storage, 
tracking and tracing, 
distribution 
United States, 
Puerto Rico, and 
the Netherlands 
UPS Samsung America,  
healthcare equipment 
Transportation management, 
customs brokerage 
United States and 
Asia 
Source: Commission compilation from Armstrong & Associates Web site and company Web sites. 
 
packages (table 3.7).198 Some other large U.S.-based logistics firms include C.H. 
Robinson Worldwide, Expeditors International of Washington, Caterpillar Logistics 
Services, and Penske Logistics. All of these firms operate globally and typically have 
hundreds of offices worldwide. Like FedEx and UPS, these firms have added logistics 
and supply chain capabilities to their main lines of business which, for example, include 
the transportation of heavy freight (Caterpillar) and the arrangement of transportation 
services (C.H. Robinson and Expeditors). For all firms, supply chain management is a 
fast-growing business segment, with U.S. revenues for supply chain services having 
grown by about 20 percent during 2004–09.199 
 
Examples of Logistics Firms’ Participation in Supply Chains 
Two examples drawn from the global operations of U.S. firm Penske illustrate how 
deeply logistics firms have become integrated into their customer’s supply chains and 
highlight their growing importance in maintaining their clients’ competitiveness. In 
Brazil, Penske manages distribution operations for the large Korean electronics 
manufacturer Samsung, which produces appliances, computer monitors, and televisions. 
Penske has set up a large warehouse outside of São Paulo, Brazil, near Samsung’s 
manufacturing facility. Samsung products that are manufactured both in Brazil and in 
foreign markets are received and stored in Penske’s São Paulo warehouse. Penske also  
 
 
 
                                                          
198 In the United States, as in the global market, leading 3PLs are composed principally of 
transportation services firms that, over time, have added logistics and supply chain management capabilities 
to their core business. 
199 Armstrong & Associates, “Bigger and Better: 3PL Financial Results, 2004,” 2004; Armstrong & 
Associates, “U.S. 3PL Market Size Estimates,” 2009. Estimates are based on four services: non-asset-based 
domestic transportation management, international transportation management, warehousing and distribution, 
and software services. 
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TABLE 3.7  Top 10 U.S. 3PL firms by logistics revenues, 2009 
Company Core business of parent 
Logistics revenues 
(Millions of $) 
C.H. Robinson Freight forwarding 7,577 
UPS Supply Chain Solutionsa Express delivery 7,516 
Expeditors International of Washington Freight forwarding 4,092 
Caterpillar Logistics Heavy equipment manufacturing 3,119 
Penske Logistics Truck rental and leasing 2,387 
Schneider Logistics Truck transport 2,200 
Ryder Supply Chain Solutions Truck rental and leasing 1,611 
FedEx Supply Chain Servicesb Express delivery 1,501 
Menlo Worldwide Logistics Freight forwarding 1,326 
Source: Armstrong & Associates, “A&A’s Top 50 Global Third-Party Logistics Provider (3PL) List”; 
Armstrong & Associates’ Top 40 North American 3PLs List” (accessed February 24, 2011); company Web 
sites. 
 
   aIn 2009, total revenues for UPS were $45.3 billion. 
   bIn fiscal year 2009, total revenues for FedEx were $34.7 billion. 
 
prepares orders for outbound distribution to Samsung’s commercial customers in Brazil, 
which include large retail outlets such as Carrefour and Wal-Mart. Other services 
provided by Penske to Samsung include processing returns, repairing products, checking 
product quality, and repackaging.200 
 
In China, Penske has operated three warehousing facilities outside of Shanghai since 
acquiring a local logistics firm in 2006. The acquisition enabled Penske to receive three 
separate licenses from the Chinese government permitting Penske to function 
simultaneously as an international trading company, a freight forwarder, and a customs 
broker. Penske now performs a variety of logistics services for companies operating in 
China. For instance, the company manages import and domestic distribution for BMW; 
customs clearance and distribution for General Electric (GE); and export consolidation 
and international transportation for a furniture manufacturer, Knoll.201 
 
Transportation Networks 
The transportation networks of large logistics service providers, such as FedEx and UPS, 
are organized around primary air hubs that connect to smaller, regional hubs (or spokes). 
Each hub has a sorting, warehousing, and storage facility, as well as access to nearby 
road and rail transport.202 3PLs’ hub-and-spoke network saves costs for manufacturing 
firms by centralizing the inbound and outbound distribution of raw materials and finished 
goods. Electronic data interchange systems, which allow 3PLs to “plug into” the 
operations of their clients, let both sides track inventory and shipments in real time.203 
The networks of large logistics firms are global in scope, with each firm’s primary U.S. 
hub connecting to several hubs located abroad. The location of these hubs in Europe, 
North America, and Asia coincides with regions of major supply chain activity. 
                                                          
200 Armstrong, “Penske Logistics Leverages Local Expertise,” 2007. 
201 Armstrong, “Penske Logistics Leverages Multinational Relationships in Expanding Asian 
Operations,” 2007. 
202 Konrad, “Louisville Flies High,” 2010. 
203 Bhatnagar and Viswanathan, “Re-engineering Global Supply Chains,” 2000, 13–34; FedEx, “FedEx 
Introduces Worldwide Technology Enhancements” (accessed February 22, 2011). Electronic data interchange 
refers to the “computer-to-computer” exchange of data that is delivered in standardized formats. More 
recently, FedEx has introduced Web-based software that enables its customers to track and manage inventory 
directly via the Internet.  
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Logistics service providers set up their hubs where commercial and industrial activity is 
likely to flourish; 3PL customers often locate their operations near such hubs, creating the 
so-called logistics “corridors” that are a combination of manufacturing, transportation, 
distribution, and customs processing facilities. These operations centralize activities 
essential to the smooth flow of goods within global supply chains. For example, UPS’s 
air hub in Louisville, Kentucky, covers more than 600,000 square feet of warehousing 
and distribution space, with connections to road, rail, and water transportation. The hub 
also includes a foreign trade zone for customs processing that employs 750 people 
providing customs brokerage services.204 More than 100 firms have chosen sites close to 
UPS’ Louisville hub to take advantage of the latter’s transportation and distribution 
network.205 Such companies include online footwear vendor Zappos and biotechnology 
firm Genentech.206 
 
Similarly, numerous U.S. firms have set up distribution operations near the FedEx air hub 
facility in Memphis, Tennessee, including HP, Nike, Pfizer, and GlaxoSmithKline.207 The 
FedEx hub has also attracted more than 130 firms from 22 foreign countries to Memphis. 
Together, these firms employ roughly 17,000 workers in the Memphis area208—nearly 
half again as many as the approximately 12,000 FedEx employees in the company’s 
Memphis hub.209 
 
Policies That Affect Logistics Service Providers 
Logistics and supply chain service providers are subject to a range of government 
policies that influence where they establish, how they operate, and what services they 
provide. These policies most commonly pertain to FDI, licensing, customs procedures, 
cargo security, and air traffic rights. Unfavorable policies on air transportation rights or 
FDI, in particular, prevent logistics firms from serving new markets or from expanding 
service in countries where they are already located.210 Logistics service providers may 
also be hampered by poor transportation infrastructure in host countries, including limited 
capacity at airports and seaports, insufficient road and rail networks, and inadequate 
customs processing facilities.211 Deficient infrastructure reduces both the speed and the 
reliability with which logistics firms deliver their services and may undermine the ability 
of these firms, as well as their customers, to compete.212 One study estimates that 
removing such obstacles—both infrastructure and policy-related—would boost global 
GDP and employment, substantially increasing economic welfare overall.213 
                                                          
204 Armstrong & Associates, “UPS Revamps Supply Chain Service Offering,” April 8, 2008; 
Armstrong & Associates, “A&A’s Top 40 North American 3PLs List” (accessed April 28, 2011). 
205 Oxford Economics, “The Impact of the Express Delivery Industry,” 2009, 32.  
206 Konrad, “Louisville Flies High,” 2010.  
207 Inbound Logistics, “Memphis: North America’s Logistics Center,” October 2010, 3. 
208 Oxford Economics, “The Impact of the Express Delivery Industry,” 2009, 31. 
209 FedEx, “Video: Inside the Memphis Superhub” (accessed April 1, 2011). 
210 Oxford Economics, “The Impact of the Express Delivery Industry,” 2009, 41–42.  
211 Air traffic rights refer to the permission granted to airlines of countries that are signatories to air 
transport agreements to carry passengers and cargo to, from, or within each other’s air transport markets. 
212 Nordas et al., “Logistics and Time as a Trade Barrier,” 2006, 16, 19. 
213 Oxford Economics, “The Impact of the Express Delivery Industry,” 2009, 40. In China, for 
example, the removal of restrictions on express delivery (and logistics service) providers were estimated to 
result in an increase in output of $180 billion over a five-year period, as well as the creation of 700,000 jobs. 
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1l£ UNTED STATES lRADE AEPFESENTATIVE 
ExllCUtive Offtce of the Pruldent 
Washington. D.C. 20508 
M~( 15 !992 
The Honorable Donald E. Newquist 
Chairman 
u.s. International Trade Commission· 
500 E street, S.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20436 
Dear Mr. Chairman, 
The Commission's recent series of reports on the economic effects 
of significant u.s. import restraints (USITC publication 2222, 
dated October 1989; publication 2314, datep September 1990; and 
publication 2422, dated september 1991), prepared pursuant to a 
request from the Senate Committee on Finance dated September 12, 
1988, ha.s been an excellent source of objective, balanced 
information for the entire trade policy community. An 
understanding and appreciation of the economic implications of 
restraints imposed on trade are.critical to any informed 
assessment of the trade policy options that confront the 
President and the Congress. 
We would find it useful to have periodic updates of the,types of 
assessments that the Commission has provided in its reports for 
the Finance committee. Therefore, under authority delegated by 
the President and pursuant to section 332(g) of the Tariff Act of 
1930, as amended, I request that the Commission periodically 
provide an updated assessment of the economic effects of 
significant u.S. import restraints~ Each updating report should 
include quantitative assessments of th·e restraints' effects on 
u.s. consumers, on the activities of u.S. firms, on the income 
and employment of u.s. workers, and on the net economic welfare 
of the United States. The reports also should continue the broad 
analytical frameworks used in the original reports, namely 
partial equilibrium frameworks for the analysis of liberalization 
in individual sectors and a general equilibrium framework for 
assessment of the economy-wide effects OI the simUltaneous 
liberalization of all sectors covered. 
With the exceptions noted below, the reports should consider the 
effects of all significant restraints on u.s. imports of goods 
and services whether they result from an act of Congress, an 
action taken under the fair trade laws of the united States (such 
as section 201 investigations), an international agreement, or 
voluntary export restraints by foreign nations. The reports 
should not include import restraints resulting from final 
A-3
antidumpinq or countervailinq duty investiqations, section 337 or 
406 investiqations, or section 3'01 actions. 
I would appreciate receivinq the ~irst updatinq report 18 months 
after receipt or this request. Subsequent reports should be 
provided therearter at intervals or approximately two years until 
otherwise instructed. 
In view of the Dutstandinq instruction to the Commission on the 
security classirication of reports prepared by the Commission at 
the request of the U.S. Trade Representative, I request that all 
reports on this investiqation be made available to the public at 
the same time they are submitted to my orfice. 
The commission's assistance in this matter is qreatly 
appreciated. 
Carla A. Hills 
A-4
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 
WASH J NGTON, D.C. 20508 
The Honorable Deanna Tanner Okun 
Chairman 
U.S. International Trade Commission 
500 E Street, SW 
Washington, D.C. 20436 
Dear Madam Chairman: 
AUG 1 6 2010 
The U.S. International Trade Commission's (Commission) series of reports on the economic 
effects of significant U.S. import restraints, prepared as part of Investigation. No. 332-325, has 
been an objective and balanced source of information for the President, the Congress, the trade 
policy community, and the public. As your reports have shown, the costs imposed on U.S. 
economic welfare by U.S. import restraints have declined markedly since 1992, even as the 
volume of U.S. imports has grown substantially. 
The United States now stands as one of the world's most open economies. As the Commission 
begins work on the seventh update of the its report, and in light of the high degree of openness of 
U.S. markets to imports that has already been achieved, I am requesting that the Commission 
include in its report information on another important development in U.S. trade. 
The disaggregation of production processes among countries has altered the patterns of 
production and trade in the world economy, including those of the United States. The effect of 
these global supply chains is known by many trade professionals, but I would like this 
information accessible to a wider audience. I am therefore requesting that the Commission 
provide an overview in this seventh update on these supply chains and the economic forces 
behind them. The report should also describe the current U.S. involvement in this global 
phenomenon and include a general discussion on the effects that these supply chains may have 
on U.S. companies, workers, and consumers. The report should incorporate key indicators of 
U.S. involvement and a review of the literature. A thoughtful overview that is accessible to 
readers who may not be professional economists could be a useful contribution. 
Please provide the seventh update of this Report, with the additional section, 12 months after 
receipt of this request. As stated in the original 1992 request letter, subsequent updates of the 
report should be provided thereafter at intervals of approximately two years. USTR intends to 
make the Commission's report available to the general public in its entirety. Therefore, the 
report should not contain any confidential business or national security classified information. 
The Commission's assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated. 
A-5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
Federal Register Notice 
 
 
  
 
 
 
64351 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 201 / Tuesday, October 19, 2010 / Notices 
Alternative is similar to the Proposed 
Action in development sequence and 
facilities, but contains additional 
drainage control structures to manage 
storm water run-off. Total surface 
disturbance for this alternative is 2,748 
acres. 
The ROD approves only the Phase 1 
portion of Alternative 2, the Proposed 
Action. Phase 2 and Phase 3 of the 
Proposed Action are not authorized in 
the ROD and may be considered in the 
future when the necessary electric 
transmission upgrades are proposed. At 
that time, the BLM will prepare any 
necessary additional environmental 
review. 
Authority: 40 CFR 1506.6 and 1506.10. 
Robert V. Abbey, 
Director, Bureau of Land Management. 
[FR Doc. 2010–26264 Filed 10–18–10; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 4310–HC–P 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
COMMISSION 
[Investigation No. 332–325] 
The Economic Effects of Significant 
U.S. Import Restraints: Seventh 
Update; Special Topic: Global Supply 
Chains 
AGENCY: United States International 
Trade Commission. 
ACTION: Notice of seventh update report 
and scheduling of public hearing. 
SUMMARY: Following receipt of a request 
dated August 16, 2010 from the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR), the 
U.S. International Trade Commission 
(Commission) has announced its 
schedule for preparing the seventh 
update report in investigation No. 332– 
325, The Economic Effects of Significant 
U.S. Import Restraints, including the 
scheduling of a public hearing in 
connection with the investigation for 
December 16, 2010. 
DATES:
November 29, 2010: Deadline for 
filing requests to appear at the public 
hearing. 
November 29, 2010: Deadline for 
filing pre-hearing briefs and statements. 
December 16, 2010: Public hearing. 
January 6, 2011: Deadline for filing 
post-hearing briefs and statements. 
February 7, 2011: Deadline for filing 
all other written submissions. 
August 12, 2011: Transmittal of 
Commission report to USTR. 
ADDRESSES: All Commission offices, 
including the Commission’s hearing 
rooms, are located in the United States 
International Trade Commission 
Building, 500 E Street SW., Washington, 
DC. All written submissions should be 
addressed to the Secretary, United 
States International Trade Commission, 
500 E Street SW., Washington, DC 
20436. The public record for this 
investigation may be viewed on the 
Commission’s electronic docket (EDIS) 
at http://www.usitc.gov/secretary/ 
edis.htm. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Project Leader William Powers 
(william.powers@usitc.gov or 202–708– 
5405) or Deputy Project Leader Jose 
Signoret (jose.signoret@usitc.gov or 202– 
205–3125) for information specific to 
this investigation (the seventh update). 
For information on the legal aspects of 
this investigation, contact William 
Gearhart of the Commission’s Office of 
the General Counsel (202–205–3091 or 
william.gearhart@usitc.gov). The media 
should contact Margaret O’Laughlin, 
Office of External Relations (202–205– 
1819 or margaret.olaughlin@usitc.gov). 
Hearing-impaired individuals may 
obtain information on this matter by 
contacting the Commission’s TDD 
terminal at 202–205–1810. General 
information concerning the Commission 
may also be obtained by accessing its 
Internet server (http://www.usitc.gov). 
Persons with mobility impairments who 
will need special assistance in gaining 
access to the Commission should 
contact the Office of the Secretary at 
202–205–2000. 
Background: The Commission 
instituted this investigation under 
Section 332(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930 
(19 U.S.C. 1332(g)) following receipt of 
an initial request from the USTR dated 
May 15, 1992. The request asked that 
the Commission assess the quantitative 
economic effects of significant U.S. 
import restraints on the U.S. economy 
and prepare periodic update reports 
after the initial report. The Commission 
published a notice of institution of the 
investigation in the Federal Register of 
June 17, 1992 (57 FR 27063). The first 
report was delivered to the USTR in 
November 1993, the first update in 
December 1995, and successive updates 
were delivered in 1999, 2002, 2004, 
2007, and 2009. In this seventh update, 
as requested by the USTR in a letter 
dated August 16, 2010, the Commission 
will, in addition to the quantitative 
effects analysis similar to that included 
in prior reports, include an overview of 
global supply chains, including the 
economic forces behind them and 
current U.S. involvement in them. The 
USTR asked that the overview be 
accessible to readers who may not be 
professional economists. As in previous 
reports in this series, the seventh update 
will continue to assess the economic 
effects of significant import restraints on 
U.S. consumers and firms, the income 
and employment of U.S. workers, and 
the net economic welfare of the United 
States. This assessment will use the 
Commission’s computable general 
equilibrium model. However, as per 
earlier instructions from the USTR, the 
Commission will not assess import 
restraints resulting from antidumping or 
countervailing duty investigations, 
section 337 and 406 investigations, or 
section 301 actions. 
Public Hearing: A public hearing in 
connection with this investigation will 
be held at the United States 
International Trade Commission 
Building, 500 E Street SW., Washington, 
DC, beginning at 9:30 a.m. on December 
16, 2010. Requests to appear at the 
hearing should be filed with the 
Secretary no later than 5:15 p.m., 
November 29, 2010, in accordance with 
the requirements in the ‘‘Submissions’’ 
section below. All pre-hearing briefs 
and statements should be filed not later 
than 5:15 p.m., November 29, 2010; and 
all post-hearing briefs and statements 
should be filed not later than 5:15 p.m., 
January 6, 2011. In the event that, as of 
the close of business on November 29, 
2010, no witnesses are scheduled to 
appear at the hearing, the hearing will 
be canceled. Any person interested in 
attending the hearing as an observer or 
nonparticipant may call the Secretary to 
the Commission (202–205–2000) after 
November 29, 2010, for information 
concerning whether the hearing will be 
held. 
Written Submissions: In lieu of or in 
addition to participating at the hearing, 
interested parties are invited to file 
written submissions concerning this 
investigation. All written submissions 
(other than pre- and post-hearing briefs 
and statements) should be addressed to 
the Secretary, and should be received 
not later than 5:15 p.m., February 7, 
2011. All written submissions must 
conform with the provisions of section 
201.8 of the Commission’s Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (19 CFR 201.8). 
Section 201.8 requires that a signed 
original (or a copy so designated) and 
fourteen (14) copies of each document 
be filed. In the event that confidential 
treatment of a document is requested, at 
least four (4) additional copies must be 
filed, in which the confidential 
information must be deleted (see the 
following paragraph for further 
information regarding confidential 
business information). The 
Commission’s rules authorize filing 
submissions with the Secretary by 
facsimile or electronic means only to the 
extent permitted by section 201.8 of the 
VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:24 Oct 18, 2010 Jkt 223001 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\19OCN1.SGM 19OCN1ms
to
ck
st
ill 
on
 D
SK
H9
S0
YB
1P
RO
D 
wi
th
 N
O
TI
CE
S
B-3
64352 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 201 / Tuesday, October 19, 2010 / Notices 
rules (see Handbook for Electronic 
Filing Procedures, http://www.usitc.gov/ 
secretary/fed_reg_notices/rules/
documents/handbook_on_electronic_
filing.pdf). Persons with questions 
regarding electronic filing should 
contact the Secretary (202–205–2000). 
Any submissions that contain 
confidential business information must 
also conform with the requirements of 
section 201.6 of the Commission’s Rules 
of Practice and Procedure (19 CFR 
201.6). Section 201.6 of the rules 
requires that the cover of the document 
and the individual pages be clearly 
marked as to whether they are the 
‘‘confidential’’ or ‘‘non-confidential’’ 
version, and that the confidential 
business information be clearly 
identified by means of brackets. All 
written submissions, except for 
confidential business information, will 
be made available for inspection by 
interested parties. 
In its request letter, the USTR stated 
that his office intends to make the 
Commission’s report available to the 
public in its entirety, and asked that the 
Commission not include any 
confidential business information or 
national security classified information 
in the report it sends to the USTR. Any 
confidential business information 
received by the Commission in this 
investigation and used in preparing this 
report will not be published in a manner 
that would reveal the operations of the 
firm supplying the information. 
By order of the Commission. 
Issued: October 14, 2010. 
William R. Bishop, 
Acting Secretary to the Commission. 
[FR Doc. 2010–26235 Filed 10–18–10; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE P 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
Notice of Lodging of Consent Decree 
Under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act and 
The Clean Water Act 
Notice is hereby given that on October 
12, 2010, two proposed Consent Decrees 
in United States and State of Louisiana 
v. ConocoPhillips Company and Sasol 
North America Inc., Civil Action No. 
2:10-cv-1556, were lodged with the 
United States District Court for the 
Western District of Louisiana. 
In this action the United States, on 
behalf of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, the 
United States Department of the 
Interior, and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration of the 
United States Department of Commerce, 
and the State of Louisiana, on behalf of 
the Louisiana Department of Wildlife 
and Fisheries (‘‘LDWF’’) and the 
Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality (‘‘LDEQ’’), sought, pursuant to 
Sections 106 and 107(a) of the 
Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (‘‘CERCLA’’), 42 U.S.C. 9606 and 
9607(a), and pursuant to Section 311(f) 
of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
1321(f), (1) Reimbursement of response 
costs incurred and to be incurred by the 
governments in connection with the 
Calcasieu Estuary Superfund Site 
(‘‘Site’’), (2) injunctive relief requiring 
performance of response actions by 
Defendants; and (3) recovery of damages 
for the injury to, destruction of, or loss 
of natural resources under the 
trusteeship of the federal and state 
trustees, as a result of releases and 
threatened release of hazardous 
substances into the environment at or 
from the Site, including the recovery of 
the costs of assessing such injury and 
damages and the future costs of 
overseeing and monitoring restoration 
actions. The Calcasieu Estuary 
Superfund Site is located in Louisiana 
and includes the aerial extent of 
contamination within the area of the 
Estuary encompassing Bayou Verdine, 
Bayou d’ Inde, Coon Island Loop, 
Clooney Island Loop, Prien Lake, Lake 
Charles, and the Calcasieu River from 
the saltwater barrier to Moss Lake. 
The United States and the State have 
negotiated two separate consent decrees 
to resolve the CERCLA and CWA claims 
against Settling Defendants, as well as 
the state law claims. The proposed 
Consent Decrees resolve the liability of 
ConocoPhillips Company and Sasol 
North America Inc. for response costs 
incurred and response actions taken in 
connection with the Site and for 
damages for injury to, loss of, or 
destruction of natural resources at the 
Site as alleged in the Complaint. Under 
the Consent Decree for Removal Action 
and Recovery of Response Costs, 
Settling Defendants have agreed to: (1) 
Reimburse the United States $4,553,547 
of past response costs for the Site and 
100% of future oversight costs related to 
the selected removal action for Bayou 
Verdine, and (2) perform a non-time 
critical removal action within Bayou 
Verdine and adjacent areas at the Site in 
accordance with the Action 
Memorandum for a Removal Action at 
the Calcasieu Estuary Superfund Site, 
Bayou Verdine Area of Concern, Lake 
Charles, Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, 
executed by EPA on August 6, 2003. 
This Consent Decree includes a 
covenant not to sue by the United States 
and the State under Sections 106 and 
107 of CERCLA, under Section 311(f) of 
the Clean Water Act, and under Section 
7003 of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (‘‘RCRA’’), 42 U.S.C. 6973. 
Under the Consent Decree for Natural 
Resource Damages, Settling Defendants 
have agreed to (1) reimburse the federal 
and state trustees nearly $1,200,000 of 
past natural resource damages 
assessment costs, (2) perform 
construction of a restoration project 
selected by the trustees in accordance 
with the Final Restoration Plan and 
Environmental Assessment for the 
Bayou Verdine Site, and (3) pay an 
additional sum of $750,000 toward 
further monitoring or corrective action 
after completion of construction of the 
restoration project. Under the terms of 
the Consent Decree and the assessment 
and restoration plan finalized by the 
Trustees, the Settling Defendants will 
construct the Sabine Unit 1999 
Restoration Project to compensate for 
the natural resources losses attributable 
to Settling Defendants’ releases of 
hazardous substances into the Calcasieu 
Estuary. The Project will create over 14 
new acres of marsh, enhance the 
ecological functioning of approximately 
247 acres of existing marsh, and 
increase the expected functional life 
span of these marshes. It is to be 
performed in the Calcasieu Estuary at a 
designated site within the Sabine 
National Wildlife Refuge. This Consent 
Decree includes a covenant not to sue 
by the United States and the State under 
Section 107 of CERCLA and under 
Section 311(f) of the Clean Water Act. 
The two proposed Consent Decrees 
are to become effective only after both 
have been entered by the Court. 
The Department of Justice will receive 
for a period of thirty (30) days from the 
date of this publication comments 
relating to the Consent Decree. 
Comments should be addressed to the 
Assistant Attorney General for the 
Environment and Natural Resources 
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 
and either e-mailed to pubcomment- 
ees.enrd@usdoj.gov or mailed to P.O. 
Box 7611, NW., Washington, DC 20044– 
7611, and should refer to United States 
and State of Louisiana v. 
ConocoPhillips Company and Sasol 
North America Inc., D.J. Ref. 90–11–2– 
1284 and 1284/1. Commenters may 
request an opportunity for a public 
meeting in the affected area, in 
accordance with Section 7003 (d) of 
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6973(d). 
The Consent Decrees may be 
examined at the Office of the United 
States Attorney, Western District of 
Louisiana, 800 Lafayette Street, Suite 
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CALENDAR OF PUBLIC HEARING
Those listed below appeared as witnesses at the United States International Trade
Commission’s hearing:
Subject: The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import
Restraints: Seventh Update Special Topic: Global Supply
Chains
Inv. No.: 332-325
Date and Time: December 16, 2010 - 9:30 a.m.
A session was be held in connection with this investigation in the Main Hearing Room (room
101), 500 E Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.
ORGANIZATION AND WITNESS:
The University of California, Irvine
Irvine, CA
Professor Kenneth L. Kraemer, Research Professor, The Paul
Merage School of Business and The Donald Bren
School of Information and Computer Science; and
Co-Director, The Personal Computing Industry Center;
and Associate Director, Center for Research on IT
and Organizations
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.
Professor J. Bradford Jensen, Associate Professor of Economics
and International Business, McDonough School
of Business
The New School for Social Research
New York, NY
Professor William Milberg, Professor of Economics; and
Department Chair
ORGANIZATION AND WITNESS:
-1-
C-3
Center for Investigation, Promotion, and Advice
Fairfax Station, VA
Dr. Maria del Pilar Lodoûo-Kent, President and Founder
Express Association of America
Great Falls,  VA
Michael C. Mullen, Executive Director
Intel Corporation
Phoenix, AZ
Greg S. Slater, Director, Global Trade and Competition
Policy
Promar International
Alexandria,  VA
on behalf of
The Sweetener Users Association
Thomas Earley, Vice President, Promar International;
and Economist, The Sweetener Users Association
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P.
Washington, D.C.
on behalf of
The U.S. Association of Importers of Textiles
& Apparel (USA-ITA)
Julia Hughes, President, USA-ITA
David M. Spooner ) – OF COUNSEL
- END -
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Introduction 
The summaries of the positions of interested parties are based on information provided at 
a public hearing held on December 16, 2010, and material submitted to the Commission 
in conjunction with this investigation (table D.1). The summaries express the views of the 
submitting parties and not those of the Commission, whose staff did not attempt to 
confirm the accuracy of or make corrections to the information provided. The full text of 
the hearing transcript and written submissions associated with the current investigation 
can be found by searching the Commission’s Electronic Docket Information System.1 
 
TABLE D.1 Information provided by interested parties 
 
Hearing  
Testimony Submission 
American Apparel and Footwear Association  x 
American Sugar Alliance  x 
Bumble Bee Foods, LLC  x 
Center for Investigation, Promotion, and Advice x x 
Express Association of America x x 
Fonterra (USA), Inc.  x 
Intel Corporation x x 
Professor J. Bradford Jensen, Georgetown University x  
Professor Kenneth L. Kraemer, University of California, Irvine x x 
Professor William Milberg, New School for Social Research x x 
National Milk Producers Federation  x 
Sweetener Users Association x x 
U.S. Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel x x 
Source: USITC Electronic Docket Information System. 
 
American Apparel and Footwear Association2 
The American Apparel and Footwear Association (AAFA) said that it is a national 
association representing apparel and footwear industries and their suppliers. The 
association’s submission noted that 97 percent of all apparel and 99 percent of all 
footwear sold in the United States is imported. It said that domestic production of apparel 
and footwear is intended for certain niche markets, including the U.S. military. 
 
The submission asserted that the apparel and footwear industries are subject to the 
highest tariffs of any non-agricultural product. The AAFA went on to say that, in 2010, 
the average effective tariff rates on U.S. imports of apparel and footwear were 10–13 
percent, compared with an average effective tariff rate of 1.4 percent for all U.S. imports. 
The association said that U.S. imports of textiles, apparel, and footwear accounted for 
nearly one-half of all U.S. duties collected in 2010. 
 
In its submission, the AAFA characterized U.S. import tariffs on apparel and footwear as 
“the most regressive that exist in the entire tariff schedule.”3 It stated, for example, that 
the duty rates on most silk apparel range from 0.6 to 3.8 percent, compared with 15.9–
19.7 percent for most cotton apparel. Similarly, it reported that leather shoes are subject 
to duties ranging from 8.5 to 10 percent, compared with 37.5–67.5 percent for sneakers. 
                                                 
1 Available online at https://edis.usitc.gov/edis3-internal/app. 
2 AAFA, written submission to the USITC, February 7, 2011. 
3 Ibid., 1. 
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The AAFA submission asserted that the duties are not only passed on to consumers at 
retail, but that they are effectively doubled or tripled through the normal mark-up process 
for an item, as it passes from first cost, to wholesale, to retail. It described this situation 
as U.S. consumers paying a “hidden tax” on their clothing and footwear equivalent to 
$25–$35 billion dollars.  
 
The submission presented data from a 2002 report by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
that estimated the cost to the U.S. economy of saving a single job in various highly-
protected industries. The AAFA reported that the study indicated a cost of $1.3 million 
for every luggage manufacturing job saved, and $199,241 for every apparel and textiles 
job saved. The submission said that it is likely the “cost” per job is higher now, since U.S. 
manufacturing employment in these industries has declined since 2002.  
 
The association described how U.S. footwear firms that import fabric and rubber upper 
footwear with rubber outsoles engineer their products to reduce their import duties from 
20–67.5 percent (for footwear classified in HTS headings 6402 and 6204) to 7.5–12.5 
percent (for HTS heading 6405). Specifically, it said that these firms imbed fabric into 
the rubber outsoles, or cover outsoles with fabric, strictly for the purpose of changing the 
classification of the footwear and thereby lowering the rate of duty.  
 
The AAFA submission addressed the role of global supply chains in creating jobs in the 
apparel and footwear industries. It asserted that, although most of the jobs assembling 
clothing and footwear have moved offshore, virtually every other step in the process, 
from design to getting the product into the store, is done by workers in United States. The 
AAFA summarized by stating that the apparel and footwear industry employs over 1 
million workers in a wide variety of areas––including research, design, sourcing, logistics, 
warehousing, marketing, sales, and retail sales––adding that the apparel and footwear 
sectors also support “hundreds of thousands” of U.S. manufacturing jobs.4 
 
American Sugar Alliance5 
In a written submission to the Commission, the American Sugar Alliance (ASA) said that 
it has consistently argued that the Commission’s work on the effect of U.S. sugar import 
restraints is flawed because the Commission underestimates the number of jobs in the 
U.S. sugar industry, underestimates the potential harm to the sector if the restraints were 
lifted, and overestimates job creation if the restraints were lifted.6 
 
The ASA asserted that the number of jobs in the U.S. sugar sector should include indirect 
employment and that job losses in the sector likely would be greater than calculated by 
the Commission. The ASA asserted that the food manufacturing sector has been 
profitable and expanding, and that sugar represents a small fraction of product costs and 
food manufacturer location decisions. The ASA said that any cost savings resulting from 
the lifting of U.S. sugar import restraints would not be passed to consumers. The ASA 
contended that the elimination of U.S. sugar import restraints would not result in 
increased exports and jobs of the magnitude projected by the Commission in past 
studies.7 
 
                                                 
4 AAFA, written submission to the USITC, February 7, 2011, 5. 
5 ASA, written submission to the USITC, February 7, 2011. 
6 Ibid., 1. 
7 Ibid., 1–3. 
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The ASA asserted that U.S. imports from Mexico are unconstrained, while subject to 
rules of origin requirements, and that this has affected the industry’s ability to balance 
U.S. sugar supply and demand. The ASA asserted that U.S. sugar users would face 
difficulties in sourcing imported sugar with quality and dependability, comparable to that 
of domestic sugar should import restraints be lifted. The ASA noted that world sugar 
prices are near or at 30-year highs, that the price gap between U.S. and world sugar prices 
has narrowed, and that current world sugar prices are well above U.S. support prices, thus 
limiting the benefits of lifting import restraints.8 
 
Bumble Bee Foods, LLC9 
In a written submission, Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, stated that Bumble Bee is a privately 
held U.S. seafood company with the majority of its production facilities located in the 
United States. The firm noted that while it serves over 20 countries worldwide, Bumble 
Bee operates two of the last three canned tuna production facilities in the United States. 
The firm indicated that in 2010, Bumble Bee was the second-largest U.S. brand of canned 
tuna, with a 29 percent market share. 
 
Bumble Bee said that the vast majority of canned tuna imports are packed in water. It 
described these imports as subject to a TRQ equal to 4.8 percent of the amount consumed 
in the United States during the previous year, and to in- and over-quota tariffs of 6 
percent and 12.5 percent, respectively. The submission went on to say that canned tuna 
imports packed in oil are subject to a tariff of 35 percent. However, the firm said that this 
tariff provides few benefits to domestic producers because only 10 percent of U.S. 
canned tuna consumption is packed in oil. Tuna imports from several countries, including 
Canada, Mexico, Singapore, and Chile, receive duty-free treatment in the U.S. market 
because of free trade agreements. The firm also suggested that the current system of 
duties on imported canned tuna is overly complicated and complex to administer. 
 
The Bumble Bee submission referred to several previous Commission investigations that 
found the U.S. canned tuna industry sensitive to imports. It further described U.S. 
consumer prices for canned tuna as among the lowest of all developed economies as a 
result of the intense competition from low-cost foreign suppliers. The firm said that the 
factors that made canned tuna imports sensitive in the past still apply today, and that “the 
industry is just a fraction of what it was 30 years ago because of increased competition 
from low cost imports and declining prices (in real terms) of our products.”10 Bumble 
Bee indicated that, between 1979 and 1989, five canneries, representing 40 percent of the 
industry workforce, shut down, and that another six canneries had closed since 1990. 
 
Bumble Bee asserted that the rise of low-cost imports, particularly from Asia, is largely 
the result of significant wage disparities when compared with major tuna exporters. For 
example, it said that the average hourly wage rate in U.S. processing facilities ranged 
from about $5.50 in American Samoa to $14.22 in California, compared with only 88 
cents in Thailand and even less in Ecuador. Further, Bumble Bee asserted that U.S. 
companies are put at an additional disadvantage because they must comply with health, 
welfare, safety, regulatory and environmental standards not required of foreign 
competitors. In the face of foreign competition, Bumble Bee said that it has taken several 
steps to remain economically viable, including increasing yields by using new technology 
and automation, shifting to processing tuna loins to reduce labor costs, and investing in 
                                                 
8 ASA, written submission to the USITC, February 7, 2011, 4–5. 
9 Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, written submission to the USITC, January 12, 2011. 
10 Ibid., 5. 
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foreign sources of materials. However, the firm indicated that these measures are 
insufficient to offset the cost advantages of Bumble Bee’s competitors. 
 
The submission asserted that the current duty structure for imported canned tuna is the 
most important factor in the competitiveness of the U.S. tuna industry. It said that 
existing tariffs help maintain the 10,000 direct and indirect jobs the U.S. tuna industry 
supports, and protects direct investments in plants and facilities of more than $300 
million. The firm asserted that all the investments and jobs associated with this industry 
would be destroyed if duty-free status were granted to any of the major Asian or Latin 
American tuna producers. 
 
Center for Investigation, Promotion, and Advice11 
Dr. María del Pilar Londoño-Kent, President and Founder of the Center for Investigation, 
Promotion, and Advice, provided both a written statement and hearing testimony. In her 
written statement, and again in her testimony, Dr. Londoño-Kent summarized research 
that her center has done that compared major border crossings between Mexico and the 
United States, and between Canada and the United States—particularly a time-motion 
study that captured data on the amount of time and other activities required for trucks to 
cross these borders. She said that the team of researchers simulated the potential gains 
from trade facilitation by substituting the process used at the U.S.-Canada border for the 
one used at the U.S.-Mexico border. She said that it estimated welfare gains for the 
United States of $1.4 billion per year, and $1.8 billion per year for Mexico. She said it 
also estimated that U.S. exports to Mexico would increase by about $6.0 billion per year, 
while Mexico’s exports to the United States would increase by about $1.0 billion per year. 
 
In her hearing testimony, Dr. Londoño-Kent said that conditions at the U.S.-Mexico 
border involve a process required by Mexican law that interjects multiple steps not 
required at the U.S.-Canada border, leading to massive duplication of data, goods 
handling, and truck movement. She characterized these extra steps as increasing the time 
required to cross the border, increasing uncertainty and making just-in-time inventory 
standards difficult to implement. She reported that crossing the U.S.-Mexico border can 
take several days, when it might take only 15 minutes in a more efficient setting. She said 
that extra steps increased the cost of border crossing by $300 to $600 per truck, and that 
these payments, multiplied in turn by 9 million trucks crossing the border annually, 
creates a powerful cartel of services providers that could be likened somewhat to U.S. 
mafias. Dr. Londoño-Kent said that border crossing costs are 75 percent higher 
southbound than northbound. She explained that northbound cargos employ bonds rather 
than brokers, making the process much faster.  
 
She noted that 70 percent of trade between Mexico and the U.S. moves by truck. She also 
cited a Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas study that states that increased security measures 
since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have “thickened” the border and increased 
costs and delays associated with the border crossing of goods, services, and travelers. 
Moreover, this increased congestion has, in turn, further exacerbated security concerns. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010; and Londoño-Kent, written submission to the USITC, 
November 24, 2010. 
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Express Association of America12 
In his testimony before the Commission, Michael C. Mullen, Executive Director of the 
Express Association of America (EAA), said that EAA represents the express delivery, 
logistics, and freight forwarding industries, including the four largest global express 
delivery providers––DHL, FedEx, TNT, and UPS. In his written testimony, Mr. Mullen 
cited these four EAA member companies as having estimated total revenues in excess of 
$86 billion, employing more than 1.1 million people, using more than 980 aircraft, and 
delivering over 20 million packages each day.  
 
In his written testimony, Mr. Mullen said that the EAA aims to promote the business and 
legislative interests of these and other member firms, with a particular focus on the areas 
of supply chain security and trade facilitation. He also said that express delivery and 
logistics firms play a critical role in global production and supply chains. He said that this 
role involves providing both large and small customers access to “reliable and efficient 
delivery networks” that transport goods and services with “speed, dependability, and [at] 
low cost.”13  
 
Mr. Mullen further said that the ability of express delivery and logistics firms to fulfill 
their role in global supply chains is contingent upon having in place appropriate hard 
infrastructure (e.g., airports and roads) and soft infrastructure (e.g., customs procedures). 
He expressed the view in particular that improvements to soft infrastructure are key to 
facilitating trade and realizing the full benefits of global supply chains.  
 
In his testimony, Mr. Mullen recommended that the United States, together with its trade 
partners, adopt certain policy measures related to soft infrastructure. These measures, he 
said, might involve developing a single customs “window” through which customs-
related information can be submitted to multiple government agencies at the same time; 
harmonizing border clearance requirements; raising the de minimis level on low-value 
shipments (e.g., from $200 to $800 for the United States); and implementing cargo 
security and trade facilitation agreements under the World Customs Organization (WCO), 
such as the SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Trade, and the 
Revised Kyoto Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs 
Procedures. 
 
Fonterra (USA), Inc.14 
In its written submission, Fonterra (USA), Inc., indicated that it is a wholly owned U.S. 
subsidiary of Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited (“Fonterra”), based in Auckland, 
New Zealand. Fonterra described itself as a multinational company that manufactures and 
exports dairy ingredients and consumer products to over 140 countries. It said that 
Fonterra (USA) generates annual U.S. sales of over $2 billion and, with its partners in the 
U.S. market, employs between 600 and 700 people. Fonterra said that through its 
investments in the United States it is able to source milk for dairy exports to Mexico, 
Asia, and the Middle East. Its submission further said that exports from Fonterra assets in 
                                                 
12 USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010; Mullen, written testimony submitted to the USITC, 
December 16, 2011. 
13 Mullen, written testimony submitted to the USITC, December 16, 2010, 2. 
14 Fonterra (USA), Inc., written submission to the USITC, February 7, 2011. 
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New Zealand and Australia alone will not be able to keep up with the growth in global 
demand for dairy products. 
 
Fonterra characterized U.S. dairy product TRQs, with the exception of food preparations 
and possibly american-type cheese, as “significantly underfilled through the third quarter 
of 2010.”15 It suggested that this reflects a systemic problem with the administration of 
the U.S. dairy TRQs that has resulted in persistent underfilling of quotas, given the 
substantial U.S. demand for imported dairy products. Fonterra added that the underfilling 
also reflects fundamental change that has taken place in the structure of the international 
dairy trade. Fonterra asserts that Australia and the European Union, longstanding dairy 
exporters, are producing lower volumes of dairy products, and that these suppliers’ global 
market shares are declining. Fonterra proposes that the result is not only that traditional 
exporters are not filling their U.S. TRQs, but that they are also not available to meet 
increased demand in the rest of the world. This change, the submission suggests, has led 
to the rise of the United States as, increasingly, a dairy exporter more than an importer. 
 
Fonterra’s submission cites conclusions drawn from a study by the Innovation Center for 
U.S. Dairy, which concluded that the global demand for dairy products––particularly 
from China and other countries in Asia––will grow faster than the capacity to produce 
dairy in Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. Fonterra contends that the U.S. dairy 
industry is well positioned to take advantage of this rising global demand, particularly 
given the efficiency and inherent scalability of the U.S. grain-based production system, as 
well as the quality of U.S. dairy products. 
 
Fonterra asserts in its submission, however, that a focus on competitiveness for the U.S. 
dairy industry will require some adjustments in U.S. dairy programs to allow market 
signals to work, including the repeal of the TRQ system for dairy products. Fonterra 
suggests that, while the U.S. dairy TRQs are not currently significantly binding, their 
existence and associated administrative burdens distort market signals and inhibit trade 
because the allocation of quotas are not attractive to importers and limit the product mix 
available for them to ship. One example provided by Fonterra is that the only TRQ to be 
filled is food preparations, a category that includes nontraditional dairy products that are 
already in short supply for U.S. consumers. 
 
Intel Corporation16 
In its submission, Intel Corporation (Intel) states that it is the world’s largest 
manufacturer of high-volume computer, networking, and communications products, with 
revenue of over $37 billion in 2009 from sales to customers in over 120 countries. It says 
that, while three-quarters of its manufacturing capacity is in the United States, over three-
quarters of its revenue is generated from overseas sales. It also explained that its business 
is part of a complex and decentralized global information and communications 
technology (ICT) supply chain characterized by high-volume trade. Intel’s submission 
summarized the central theme of its comments as follows: “Border-related policy 
measures, however well-intentioned, can become ineffective and counterproductive for 
all stakeholders to the extent they disregard the complexity and decentralization of global 
supply chains.” It also indicates that it is not presently experiencing any U.S. import 
restraints. Intel outlined a fundamental change in supply chain dynamics starting in the 
1980s, in which ICT companies shifted from a vertically integrated supply chain model to 
a horizontally integrated one due to increased competitiveness. Intel also provided 
                                                 
15 Fonterra (USA), written submission to the USITC, February 7, 2011, 2. 
16 Intel Corp., written submission to the USITC, December 16, 2010. 
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examples of where it believed that a failure to understand these supply chain dynamics in 
public policy decision-making created restraints on imports: one concerning non-
preferential rules of origin, and another regarding special import admissibility and import 
declaration measures. Intel’s submission concluded with several recommendations for the 
Commission concerning possible next steps in the area of import restraints found in 
supply chains. These include addressing the general trade implications of import 
restraints found in supply chains in the next USITC Import Restraints study; preparing a 
separate and more in-depth report on the complexities of regulating imports in a global 
supply chain environment; conducting a USITC-sponsored forum for congressional, 
administration, and industry stakeholders to discuss the issue; and ensuring stakeholders’ 
awareness of the results of the U.S. government findings in this area.  
 
Professor J. Bradford Jensen, Georgetown University17 
In his testimony before the Commission, Professor J. Bradford Jensen summarized the 
results of his research examining official U.S. data for evidence of the way trade affects 
domestic firms. He pointed out that his results relate to U.S. exports, imports, and export 
participation in general, and not specifically to global supply chains. Professor Bradford 
explained that for trade in goods, exporters tend to be larger, more capital- and skill-
intensive, more productive, and pay higher wages than nonexporting firms. He suggested 
that it is not exporting that makes firms better, but that exporting firms must be better in 
order to be able to succeed. He further suggests that this result is well known, and that 
economic modeling shows that the additional costs of exporting leads to a self-selection 
of the best firms into exporting. 
 
Professor Jensen said that he found that much the same is true of importing firms: they 
also tend to be larger, more capital intensive, more productive, and pay higher wages than 
nonimporters. He said that these results for importers are less well known than those for 
exporters, and that future research and economic modeling may show similar costs to 
importing that promotes self-selection of the best firms into importing. 
 
Additionally, Professor Jensen said that he found importing and exporting to be closely 
related, with 50 percent of importers also acting as exporters, and that firms that both 
import and export account for 90 percent of all U.S. trade. He further said that such firms 
can conduct at least some of their trade with foreign affiliates, making them globally 
engaged firms from which the United States sources almost 80 percent of its trade. These 
globally engaged firms, he indicates, are qualitatively different from other firms—larger 
than even most large firms, more likely to be present in low-income countries, and more 
trade intensive per worker than other firms. 
 
Focusing on trade in services, Professor Jensen indicated that less is known about firms 
that trade services, but stated that services are also important. He pointed to the statistics 
that 50 percent of U.S. employment is in the service sector, but only 10 percent is in 
manufacturing. He said that the service sector offers higher pay than the manufacturing 
sector, moreover, with an average annual wage of $66,000 versus $50,000, respectively. 
He said that better service sector data is needed to understand the role of the U.S. service 
sector in the global economy. 
 
Professor Jensen reported that service exporters––in particular, those in engineering, 
design, and architecture––are similar to goods exporters. He cited the similarities with 
                                                 
17 USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010. 
D-10 
goods exporters that they are bigger, more productive, and pay higher wages than 
nonexporters in their sector. He said that service importers are also larger and pay higher 
wages than non-exporters. He indicated that his research, however, showed that one in 
four manufacturing firms export, whereas only one in 20 service firms export.  
 
He also said that large, rapidly developing countries have more impediments to services 
trade than developed countries do. Professor Jensen said that reducing the “myriad of 
impediments” to services trade should be a focus of trade policy.  
 
Professor Kenneth Kraemer, University of California, Irvine18 
In testimony before the Commission, Professor Kenneth L. Kraemer described research 
in which he took part that examined the effects of U.S. company participation in global 
value chains by following the production of Apple’s iPod in 2006. In this research, he 
showed that the country in which the research and innovative functions occurred captured 
the largest portion of value within the global supply chain. For the iPod, he said, this 
research suggested that the U.S. lead firm, Apple, captured the largest portion of value, 
whereas China, the place of assembly, captured only about $5 of this value even though 
China––as the final exporter––is shown capturing value of up to $144 in most trade 
statistics. He emphasized that this difference can distort trade deficit figures. He also said 
that, although the study showed that the iPod generated 13,000 jobs in the United States 
and 27,000 jobs abroad, total U.S. wages in this process were twice that of non-U.S. 
wages making the benefit in wages almost equivalent.  
 
Professor Kraemer drew a distinction between research and development. He said that 
incremental innovation can be done overseas, and that firms may be willing to outsource 
development that is not sensitive to intellectual property violations. He said that 
innovation is a key driver of economic growth, adding: “The success of domestically 
owned firms like Apple is key to financial value capture and creation of high wage jobs 
in the U.S. If Apple was a Chinese firm or a Japanese firm, those profits and jobs would 
be in those countries.” 
 
Referring to policy implications, Professor Kraemer said that innovative companies 
export, and that continued growth on the knowledge worker side, among engineers and 
marketers, for example, can in part be attributed to exports of those final products. For 
computer and peripheral equipment, he said, 72 percent of research and development 
spending is in the United States, but 58 percent of sales are outside the United States. He 
said that the United States should encourage innovation and entrepreneurship through 
education and through updating the skills of the existing workforce.  
 
Professor William Milberg, New School of Social Research19 
In his testimony and written submission, Professor Milberg addressed the consequences 
of increased organization of international trade and production through global supply 
chains, which he called global value chains (GVCs). He explained that a GVC is a system 
where lead firms govern international networks of producers and deliver goods or 
services to end users, and that they vary in degree, from fully integrated firms, to near 
                                                 
18  USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010; Kraemer, written submission to the USITC, 
November 29, 2010; and Kraemer, written testimony submitted to the USITC, December 16, 2010. 
19 USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010; Milberg, written testimony submitted to the USITC, 
December 16, 2010; and Milberg, written submission to the USITC, December 20, 2010. 
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atomistic market relationships among suppliers. According to Professor Milberg, growth 
in GVCs is evidenced by growth in offshoring.  
 
Professor Milberg’s written submission identified three measurement problems in 
analyzing GVCs: (1) there are inadequate data on imported goods by sector, which, for 
the sake of analysis, leads to the assumption that all sectors use imported goods at the 
same average proportion; (2) import price indices are not accurate at the level of specific 
goods, which can underestimate price changes of imported inputs, understate imports, 
and overstate GDP; and (3) the increasing use of imported inputs in exports, which can 
make trade balance measures between countries less informative. 
 
According to Professor Milberg, as offshoring increases, domestic labor demand 
decreases, but the domestic production cost of inputs also falls. He said that some of this 
lower cost is transmitted to lower prices for final goods, which increases market demand, 
while the rest is transmitted to profits. Some of the profits are reinvested, while some 
may be financialized. When welfare gains are reinvested, output increases (which 
increases labor demand) and productivity increases (which decreases labor demand). 
 
Professor Milberg said he believes that increased offshoring is related to increased 
financialization, or “leakage,” such as share buybacks, dividend payments, and merger 
and acquisition activity. GVC firms have been involved in massive buybacks in the 2000s. 
Professor Milberg claims that the United States must “capture greater dynamic gains” by 
“encouraging reinvestment of profits into physical and human capital and by reducing the 
attraction of share buybacks.” He recommends the regulation of share buybacks and 
executive compensation packages, more generous depreciation allowances for 
nonfinancial corporate investment, and the elimination of tax deferrals on profits held 
abroad. Repatriated profits from abroad, due to the fungibility of funds, constitute 62 
percent of the buybacks, according to his analysis. Also, if task employees can be hurt 
while firm profits and share prices grow, Milberg says, “we must be consistent by 
advocating policies so that winners compensate losers through more generous Trade 
Adjustment Assistance, for example.”  
 
Professor Milberg pointed out that growth of GVCs increases the import content of 
exports, so that any doubling of exports will have less of an impact on employment. 
Accordingly, he asserted, since China is heavily involved in GVCs, and China’s value 
added is much less than the total market value of their exports, targeting China burdens 
non-Chinese firms and countries with GVCs running through China as a consequence. 
Finally, he stated that better data, especially on the structure of imported inputs and prices, 
would aid economists’ ability to analyze the social consequences of GVCs.  
 
National Milk Producers Federation20 
The National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF) said that it represents U.S. dairy 
producers and producer-owned cooperatives. NMPF said that its 31 member cooperatives 
produce the majority of U.S. milk. 
 
NMPF said that U.S. dairy farmers and their marketing cooperatives have a major 
economic interest in the international trade of dairy products, but that global markets are 
affected by a variety of trade-distorting subsidies in many countries. NMPF said that 
import-restraining measures also vary considerably between countries. It noted, for 
example, that import tariffs for skim milk powder and butter in Canada are much higher 
                                                 
20 NMPF, written submission to the USITC, February 4, 2011. 
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than tariffs for the same goods in the United States. NMPF also said that the U.S. dairy 
industry must defend itself against export subsidies that the European Union retains the 
right to use, as needed. 
 
NMPF said that existing U.S. dairy import restraints are important, considering the 
widespread harm that would be imposed on the U.S. dairy industry in their absence. 
NMPF said that it is particularly concerned about the impact that policy changes might 
have on U.S. dairy farmers, the dairy supply chain, and supporting businesses throughout 
rural America that rely on dairy production. Therefore, NMPF’s concerns do not 
necessarily match the USITC’s charge in the current investigation, but the results of the 
USITC’s investigation do not make the concerns of dairy farmers and related rural 
businesses any less meaningful. 
 
NMPF said that its analysis of global dairy markets shows that growth in dairy demand 
among emerging economies has pushed the globally traded dairy market from conditions 
tending toward oversupply to conditions tending toward undersupply. It said that 
production among traditional low-cost dairy suppliers has been insufficient to fill the 
growing global demand, with the result that world prices have generally increased to 
ration available supply and draw additional exports from higher-cost producers such as 
the United States. 
 
NMPF expressed the view that it would be difficult to alter the USAGE-ITC model to 
specifically address dairy industry issues, and said that the model is limited in its ability 
to reflect (1) rapid and dynamic change in the globally traded dairy industry in the past 3–
5 years, and (2) increasing integration of the U.S. dairy industry into the global market. 
Because globally traded dairy markets were relatively stable prior to 2006, previous 
import restraints studies have provided little insight into the potential for rapidly 
changing market characteristics to introduce an increased margin of error into the model 
results. Moreover, the submission asserts, the potential for increased error is compounded 
when the base period estimate, which does not reflect altered market conditions, forecasts 
into the future. 
 
NMPF also said that the potential for error in the model’s estimation of overall welfare 
gains from eliminating dairy TRQs is increased because of conflicts between recent 
market conditions and the inherent characteristics of the model. NMPF asserts that 
additional analysis would demonstrate that the inherent error in the modeling process is 
likely to be biased toward an overstatement of the welfare gains associated with the 
removal of U.S. dairy import quotas. 
 
NMPF said that the U.S. domestic dairy market is not highly protected from global 
market impacts, even though restraints are imposed on certain dairy products. In support, 
it said that 135 of 392 dairy tariff lines in the HTS are not subject to TRQs, but instead 
are duty free or subject to low tariffs. Of the remaining items, it said that 126 are subject 
to lower in-quota duties and 131 represent higher, over-quota duty rates. NMPF asserts 
that the United States provides considerable, although not completely unhindered, access 
for dairy imports and cited in particular the access provided to milk protein concentrate 
(MPC), casein, and caseinates. According to NMPF, large volumes of U.S. imports of 
MPC, casein, and caseinates have interfered at times with the operation of U.S. dairy 
support programs. 
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Sweetener Users Association21 
In written submissions to the Commission, the Sweetener Users Association (SUA) stated 
that the SUA represents confectioners, beverage companies, food manufacturers, bakers, 
dairy product manufacturers, cereal makers, and other companies that use sugar. The 
submission made the following points: (1) the provisions of the 2008 farm bill increased 
the adverse effects of sugar import restraints on U.S. sugar consumers and consumers; (2) 
the integration of the U.S. and Mexican sugar markets has been beneficial, but the overall 
market is still protected; (3) the addition of a separate tariff line in the HTS for high-
quality refined sugar has been a positive development; and (4) U.S. sugar producers have 
attempted to manage sugar trade with Mexico in order to mitigate the full liberalization of 
the market under the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
 
SUA summarized the main changes to the sugar program in the 2008 farm bill and said 
the most damaging provision was the lack of flexibility to increase the minimum quota 
for raw cane sugar until the second half of the October–September marketing year.22 
SUA stated that there was a shortage of U.S. sugar supplies in the 2009–10 marketing 
year, which caused sugar users to employ extraordinary measures, such as importing 
sugar at the over-quota tariff rate.23 SUA said that the implementation of a new HTS 
statistical category for high-quality refined sugar was helpful in administering the sugar 
program. 24  SUA indicated that the implied cost of sugar import restraints to U.S. 
consumers totaled more than $5 billion in 2010. According to SUA, one result of U.S. 
sugar import restraints has been an increase in U.S. imports of sugar-containing products 
made with lower-cost, world-price sugar. 25  SUA stated that the U.S. sugar TRQ 
contributed to a contraction in the U.S. cane sugar refining industry, which relies on 
imported sugarcane.26 SUA asserted that the current country-specific TRQ for raw cane 
sugar is outdated and inefficient.27 
 
U.S. Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel28 
Julia Hughes, president of the U.S. Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel 
(USA-ITA), said in testimony before the Commission that USA-ITA represents more 
than 200 apparel manufacturers and brands, retailers, distributors, importers, and related 
service providers. In both her testimony and a post-hearing statement, Ms. Hughes stated 
that apparel retailers and importers have faced the United States’ most onerous 
restrictions on imports of manufactured goods for decades, especially from quotas that 
raised prices and limited consumer choices. 29  In its written statement, USA-ITA 
expressed the view that since the elimination of such quantitative restrictions, the most 
recent of which was the expiration of the U.S.-China apparel safeguard quotas agreement 
at the end of 2008, the U.S. textile industry has not lost competitiveness and China has 
not become the sole supplier of textiles and apparel to the U.S. consumers.30 
                                                 
21 SUA, written submission to the USITC, November 29, 2010; SUA, written submission to the USITC, 
January 11, 2011. 
22 SUA, written submission to the USITC, November 29, 2010, 2. 
23 Ibid., 3. 
24 Ibid., 4. 
25 Ibid., 7. 
26 Ibid., 8. 
27 Ibid., 9. 
28 USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010; Hughes, written testimony submitted to the USITC, 
December 16, 2010; and USA-ITA, written submission to the USITC, January 6, 2011. 
29 USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010, 59. 
30 USA-ITA, written submission to the USITC, January 6, 2011, 3. 
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In her testimony, Ms. Hughes indicated that, despite the elimination of quotas, USA-ITA 
members continue to face some of the highest tariffs of any industry––with many tariffs 
in the double digits, and some exceeding 30 percent. She said that such tariffs are 
“regressive” because higher tariffs are imposed on goods such as infant apparel that 
burden low-income consumers, whereas “the wealthy pay a 1.2 percent tariff for silk 
scarves.”31  
 
Ms. Hughes asserted that high U.S. tariffs on U.S. textile and apparel goods also motivate 
foreign governments to impose their own high tariffs on U.S. goods, as well as nontariff 
barriers. As examples of nontariff barriers she listed standards, labeling, security 
measures, and untargeted customs enforcement measures that hinder access to export 
markets for U.S. companies such as Levi Strauss & Co. and Polo Ralph Lauren. 
Removing barriers to trade to support the smooth and safe operation of global supply 
chains is vital for these companies, she said.32  
 
In her testimony, Ms. Hughes also addressed concerns about rules of origin and U.S. 
customs enforcement provisions for apparel, as well as free trade areas and preference 
programs that she stated are “complicated and differ more amongst the agreements than 
the rules for any other product.”33 She said that they disrupt the supply chain of apparel 
brands and retailers and serve as a barrier to expanded trade. Consequently, she said 
USA-ITA member countries strongly support efforts to harmonize rules of origin and 
customs regulations among trading partners in U.S. trade preference programs with 
Africa, the Caribbean, and Andean countries.34 Ms. Hughes stated that the costs and 
complications associated with complying with existing rules of origin have limited 
participation in the free trade agreements and other trade preference programs. 35  In 
addition, Ms. Hughes stated that the agreements should be revised to reflect changes in 
commercial realities; in some cases, for example, the rules of origin were written to help 
certain companies that are no longer in business.36  
 
In its written submission, USA-ITA offered several reasons to explain why China has not 
become the sole dominant supplier of textiles and apparel since the expiration of quotas 
and why a diverse supply chain is important: (1) retailers and apparel brands are willing 
to reward reliable, high-quality factories regardless of location and are reluctant to end 
business with reliable manufacturing partners for small, short-term savings; (2) China is 
not the low-cost producer for textiles or apparel it once was because its labor costs have 
been rising; (3) speed to market is an important sourcing factor prompting retailers and 
brands to place orders in the Western Hemisphere, with several Western Hemisphere 
apparel producers benefiting from the rebound in U.S. consumer demand; (4) retailers 
and apparel brands receive financial incentives to source textiles and apparel from 
countries with which the United States has free trade agreement and preference programs; 
(5) retailers and apparel brands recognize that they must mitigate risk by not placing all 
orders within one country, and that smart business planning requires more than one 
location for sourcing, as well as a flexible, global supply chain.37  
 
                                                 
31 USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010, 60–1. 
32 Ibid., 61–2. 
33 Ibid., 63. 
34 Ibid., 63. 
35 Ibid., 117–118; USA-ITA, written submission to the USITC, January 6, 2011, 5. 
36 USITC, hearing transcript, December 16, 2010, 126–127. 
37 USA-ITA, written submission to the USITC, January 6, 2011, 4–5. 
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Overview of the Modeling Framework 
The analytical framework used to analyze the economic impact of significant U.S. import 
restraints in this seventh update is quite similar to the frameworks used in the fifth and 
sixth updates. The current framework employs the U.S. Applied General Equilibrium 
(USAGE) model, a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that describes, 
among other items, consumption, production and trade in over 500 U.S. sectors.1 The 
model estimates the effects of removing (liberalizing) significant U.S. import restraints 
relative to a projection of the U.S. economy over the medium term. The model 
incorporates a baseline projection of the U.S. economy over the period 2005–15, based 
on both actual and forecast economic data, including estimates of the size of the import 
restraints. The projection assumes that current U.S. import restraints remain in place. 
Liberalizations reported in this update are alternative policy scenarios in which the 
significant import restraints are completely eliminated, either individually or all at once. 
The economic impact of liberalization is assessed by comparing the baseline and the 
alternative policy outcomes.  
 
The USAGE model framework has three components: (1) input-output (I-O) accounts for 
over 500 industries and more than 500 commodities, (2) behavioral parameters, and (3) a 
system of equations that constitute the model specification or theory. The I-O accounts 
specify the transactions among U.S. individuals, firms, and the U.S. government for 2005 
(the base year in this study), derived from I-O accounts for U.S. industries and types of 
final demand (e.g., imports, private and government consumption and investment 
expenditures, and inventory changes) published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA), U.S. Department of Commerce.2 
 
While the I-O accounts provide information on the initial equilibrium of the U.S. 
economy, a set of elasticities help the framework determine how the economy would 
respond to a policy change. Elasticities reflect the degree to which firms or consumers 
alter their behavior in response to certain economic developments, such as a drop in the 
price of imports. For example, an income elasticity of demand for a good is the 
percentage change in consumer demand for that good that occurs in response to a 1 
percent change in household income. The types of elasticities used by USAGE include 
elasticities of substitution between imported and domestic goods, elasticities of import 
supply, elasticities of export demand, elasticities of substitution between inputs in 
production, and income elasticities. 
 
Where possible, the Commission has estimated some of these parameters using time 
series data that show how consumers and firms have responded to given changes in the 
past; otherwise, it has relied on published studies for estimates. With the exception of 
textiles and apparel and meatpacking, the elasticities of substitution between imported 
and domestic goods (known as Armington elasticities) are documented in Donnelly et al.3 
The Armington elasticities for the meatpacking plants sector and for the textiles and 
apparel sectors are based on Hertel et al.4 
 
                                                 
1 For more detail on the USAGE framework, see USITC, Import Restraints: Sixth Update, 2009, app. E. 
For a complete specification of the USAGE model, see Dixon and Rimmer, “USAGE-ITC,” June 2002. 
2 The 535 industries and 539 commodities in USAGE-ITC are derived from the 498 industries and 40 
types of final demand found in the BEA I-O accounts (see Dixon and Rimmer, “MONASH-USA,” May 2001; 
Winston, “Enhancing Agriculture and Energy Sector Analysis in CGE Modelling,” January 2009. 
3 Donnelly et al., “Revised Armington Elasticities of Substitution for the USITC Model,” January 2004. 
4 Hertel et al., “How Confident Can We Be in CGE-Based Assessments of Free Trade Agreements?” 
May 2003. 
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The final component of the USAGE framework is the system of equations that model the 
U.S. economy. These equations characterize three general conditions that together 
determine a general equilibrium solution.5 First, activities are characterized by constant 
returns, so firms must earn zero real economic profits at the margin, and all the 
production technologies and preferences are derived from theoretical formulations 
constrained by these zero-profit conditions.6 Second, the quantity supplied must equal the 
quantity demanded for each good and service in the economy. Third, all income must be 
accounted for by final demand or savings.  
 
Model Projections 
The USAGE baseline is a “business as usual” projection of the U.S. economy to 2015. 
Developing this baseline involves shocking key observable variables in the model with 
projections about how the economy will behave, derived from research conducted by 
USITC staff and other sources, mainly other federal government agencies. The detailed 
theoretical and empirical structure of the model then allocates these projected shocks 
across a wide range of variables at the sectoral level. 
 
Key shocks include macroeconomic expenditure and income aggregates (consumption, 
investment, government spending, imports, and exports). This study sourced 
macroeconomic forecasts from the BEA, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and 
the Congressional Budget Office. The latest available forecasts were used, from 2010 or 
2011. As projections for specific components were not consistent across agencies, the 
resulting Commission macroeconomic baseline is an amalgam of these projections, 
modified according to further research and a consensus opinion among Commission 
economists. 
 
The USAGE baseline adjusts these projections by taking in additional information from 
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank on the growth of world GDP; from the 
BLS on population, demographics, labor supply, and employment; from government and 
the academic literature on terms of trade (the relative prices of imports and exports) and 
exchange rate adjustments; and from diverse sources (including government and 
academic) on productivity comparisons between the United States and the rest of the 
world. Table E.1 gives the projected growth in key U.S. and global macroeconomic 
variables in the forecast period.  
 
Projections for specific sectors are also informed by supplemental data from a wide range 
of sources. As discussed in chapter 1, the projections of sectors with significant restraints 
are refined using data on recent growth in prices, output, imports, and exports; sector-
specific forecasts from organizations such as the Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute (FAPRI); trade journals and industry research reports (such as those from 
IBISWorld); and policy mandates such as the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS).7 
Table E.2 presents projected values and sources for selected sectors with significant 
restraints. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Technically, this represents an Arrow-Debreu competitive general equilibrium. Debreu, The Theory of 
Value, 1959. 
6 When returns to scale are constant, the average cost of production does not decline as the volume of 
production rises.  
7 In addition to the sources given in chap. 2, dairy sources include FAPRI, “U.S. Baseline Briefing 
Book,” 2006 and 2010. Textile and apparel sources include Panteva, “Textile Mills in the US,” 2010; Panteva, 
“Apparel Knitting Mills in the US,” 2010; and Hewish, “Cut & Sew Apparel Contractors in the US,” 2010. 
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TABLE E.1  Projected growth in macroeconomic variables, 2005–15, real percentage change 
Macroeconomic variable Projected real growth 2005–15 
United States  
    GDP 20.8 
    Consumption 23.0 
    Investment 1.2 
    Government expenditure 12.6 
    Exports 59.0 
    Imports 24.0 
  
World  
    GDP 56.0 
Source: Commission estimates. 
 
TABLE E.2  Observed and projected changes in imported quantities, selected sectors 
Sector 
2005–10 
change (%) 
2005–15 projected 
change (%) Main sources of sectoral projectionsa 
Dairy    
    Butter –6.1 –6.1 FAPRI projection 
    Cheese –33.3 –27.9 FAPRI projection 
Ethanol 42.7 888.4 RFS mandate 
Sugar    
    Raw sugar 0.1 4.3 Historical trend, Commission estimate 
    Refined sugar 141.2 221.4 Historical trend, Commission estimate 
Tuna –2.1 –2.0 Historical trend 
Cigarettes –57.6 –57.6 Historical trend 
Textiles and apparel    
    Yarn finishing –38.0 –42.0 Historical trend, IBISWorld projection 
    Broad fabric –34.7 –38.0 Historical trend, IBISWorld projection 
    Apparel –6.0 12.0 Historical trend, IBISWorld projection 
   aSee chapter 2 for specific sources for each industry. 
 
Projections in other important sectors of the U.S. economy rely on trends and data 
specific to those sectors. For example, the growth in health-related sectors is assumed to 
be determined less by relative prices and other typical economic variables and more by 
demographic changes (particularly aging, population growth, and changes in morbidity 
rates) and technological change in medical services; data on these trends are sourced 
from agencies such as BEA and BLS. The analysis also uses sector-specific projections 
for energy sectors, using information on supply, production, consumption, prices, exports, 
and imports for sectors like coal, natural gas, petroleum, ethanol, and electricity. The 
world price of crude petroleum is particularly important, as it can substantially affect the 
U.S. trade balance and terms of trade. The energy sector data are sourced from the U.S. 
Department of Energy and the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The Commission 
incorporated the most recent sector-specific forecasts from 2010 or 2011, as it did with 
the macroeconomic components discussed above. These forecasts are revised periodically 
as new data become available. Updated values will generally have much larger effects on 
the projection than on the simulation results, because the effects of liberalization will 
generally be similar whether growth is high or low.8 
 
                                                 
8 In USAGE, the effect of tariff liberalization on domestic output in the directly affected sector depends 
on Armington elasticities, the tariff cut, and imports as a share of GDP; only the import share can be affected 
by U.S. growth in the projection.  If U.S. output growth is lower than assumed in the current projection, for 
example, then import share in some sectors may be lower than in the current projection, and tariff elimination 
would have slightly lower effects than reported in chap. 2. 
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The baseline incorporates trade policy adjustments expected to be made by 2015, such as 
changes to tariff rates and tariff-rate quota (TRQ) quantity allocations contained in the 
tariff staging schedules for U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) and other trade agreements. 
These agreements provide the projected path of trade policy variables during the time 
horizon of the projection. For countries that do not have such agreements with the United 
States, 2015 tariff rates and TRQs are set equal to their 2010 values. The rest of the world 
is represented by 27 regions or countries that distinguish major U.S. trading partners, U.S. 
FTA partners, and countries with preferential trading agreements.9 
 
Some key model inputs, such as changes in consumer preferences, are not observable in 
reported data or projections. Values for these components of the USAGE baseline come 
from simulation analysis of a historical period. By shocking a historical database with 
observed percentage-change data for a wide range of macroeconomic aggregates, 
production, price and volume variables, the model is able to endogenously produce 
model-consistent estimates of “unobservable” data. In addition to preferences, such 
variables include detailed technical change information, shifts in preferences between 
domestic and imported goods and services, and shifts in export demand and import 
supply functions. 
 
Additional Data and Results 
Tables E.3 to E.5 show detailed model data and results, and table E.6 presents the 
classifications of sectors discussed in chapter 2. 
 
                                                 
9 Seventeen countries are included separately in the model: Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Oman, Panama, Peru, and Singapore. The 
remaining countries in the world are included in one of 10 regions: Andean Trade Preference Act countries, 
Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement countries, Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Act countries, Caribbean Basin Trade and Partnership Act countries, the EU, GSP countries in the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), least developed GSP countries, least developed GSP 
countries in AGOA, the remaining GSP countries, and the rest of the world. 
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TABLE E.3  Initial model values, 2005 (millions of dollars) 
Sector Imports Exports Output Employmenta 
Ethanol 
 
  
 Corn-based ethanol 0 0 7,821 2,621 
Cellulosic ethanol 0 0 20 9 
Alternative feedstock ethanol 0 0 20 9 
Sugar-based ethanol 410 0 1 1 
Other ethanol 51 0 1 1 
Dairy 
    Butter 147 20 1,764 87 
Dry dairy products 529 721 5,896 1,082b 
Condensed dairy products 412 336 4,370 — 
Fluid milk 28 88 26,497 4,048 
Cheese 989 370 21,874 2,022 
Ice cream 29 164 8,025 1,270 
Tobacco 
    Unmanufactured tobacco 695 1,413 4,190 799 
Cigarettes 452 1,886 17,799 3,908 
Cigars 424 35 299 146 
Chewing and smoking tobacco and snuff 28 270 1,686 419 
Sugar 
    Sugarcane 0 1 991 86 
Sugar beets 0 9 2,210 416 
Raw cane sugar 638 141 1,628 215 
Refined cane sugar 46 (c) 4,086 389 
Refined beet sugar 23 (c) 3,865 741 
All refined sugar 70 264 7,952 1,130 
Tuna 
    Tuna in oil 22 0 78 168d 
Tuna in water 512 7 442 — 
Other canned seafood 1,282 506 814 — 
Commercial fishing 13,513 3,633 3,801 1,128 
Fresh or frozen seafood 0 21 12,817 1,514 
Canned specialties 177 151 7,150 1,164 
Footwear and leather products 
    Rubber and plastics footwear 9,324 511 722 267 
Shoes, except rubber 20,895 685 1,017 397 
Slippers 229 11 58 19 
Leather gloves 559 6 78 41 
Luggage 5,205 158 487 181 
Women’s handbags 2,396 227 374 155 
Personal leather goods 1,114 33 407 136 
Leather goods 670 146 317 133 
   aWage bill for all employees within each industry. 
   bIncludes condensed dairy products. 
   cExports of refined cane and beet sugar are not modeled separately, but are reported under “all refined sugar.” 
   dIncludes all canned seafood. 
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TABLE E.3  Initial model values, 2005 (millions of dollars)—Continued 
Sector Imports Exports Output Employmenta 
Textiles and apparel 
    Broadwoven fabric mills 3,710 3,429 26,185 4,442 
Narrow fabric mills 943 859 1,167 375 
Nonwoven fabrics 799 1,328 4,664 825 
Knit fabric mills 1,183 1,476 4,957 1,182 
Yarn mills and textile finishing, n.e.c. 1,005 1,031 9,149 2,340 
Thread mills 101 154 738 132 
Carpets and rugs 2,171 1,005 15,330 2,053 
Coated fabrics, not rubberized 607 374 1,947 426 
Tire cord 371 111 1,097 163 
Cordage and twine 242 75 804 210 
Textile goods, n.e.c. 519 314 2,550 681 
Curtains and draperies 1,178 61 1,599 647 
House furnishings, n.e.c. 7,959 378 8,520 1,765 
Textile bags 344 54 835 337 
Canvas and related products 538 37 1,194 431 
Pleating and stitching 171 108 1,028 407 
Auto applique and trim 1 38 7,299 2,722 
Embroideries 0 0 348 198 
Fabricated textile products, n.e.c. 2,429 1,149 3,718 1,124 
Women's hosiery, except socks 184 278 3,880 297 
Hosiery, n.e.c. 1,379 142 1,116 496 
   Apparel excluding hosiery 84,839 5,559 35,425 5,787 
Other high-tariff sectors 
    Ball and roller bearings 3,101 1,339 7,133 2,812 
Costume jewelry 2,796 245 2,189 664 
Glass and glass products 4,654 3,407 19,359 5,723 
Hand tools 2,209 656 7,074 2,343 
Writing instruments 1,940 292 2,630 605 
Pesticides and agricultural chemicals 1,378 2,649 10,984 1,917 
China tableware 375 39 486 272 
Earthenware 677 34 85 35 
Ceramic tile 1,813 65 738 313 
Tires  6,162 1,489 15,475 4,470 
Note: n.e.c. means “not elsewhere classified.” 
 
   aWage bill for all employees within each industry. 
E-9 
TABLE E.4  Effects of simultaneous liberalizations, 2005–15 (percent) 
 
Change in quantitya Change in 
employmentb 
Change in price 
Sector Imports Exports Output Importsc Household 
Ethanol 
      Corn-based ethanol 0.0 0.2 –5.6 –5.6 0.2 0.0 
Cellulosic ethanol 0.0 0.0 0.0 (–) 0.2 0.0 
Alternative feedstock ethanol 0.0 0.0 0.0 (–) 0.2 0.0 
Sugar-based ethanol 44.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 –19.6 0.0 
Other ethanol 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Dairy 
      Butter 52.0 4.3 –1.9 –2.0 –12.0 –1.2 
Dry dairy products 59.2 2.0 –2.4 –2.8 –11.6 –0.4 
Condensed dairy products 77.0 6.5 –5.1 –2.8 –16.9 –2.0 
Fluid milk 35.8 1.3 –0.2 –0.3 –6.9 0.1 
Cheese 64.2 12.0 –1.6 –1.6 –12.0 –0.5 
Ice cream 23.5 0.5 –0.1 –0.2 –6.6 0.1 
Tobacco 
      Unmanufactured tobacco 79.7 5.4 –3.3 –3.6 –22.7 0.0 
Cigarettes 7.2 1.8 0.1 –0.1 –3.8 –0.2 
Cigars (–) 2.1 0.5 0.4 (–) (–) 
Chewing and smoking tobacco and 
    snuff 2.0 1.4 0.2 0.1 –1.0 –0.1 
Sugar 
      Sugarcane 0.0 71.6 –7.2 –7.4 0.2 0.0 
Sugarbeets 0.0 22.4 –1.4 –1.5 0.2 0.0 
Raw cane sugar 35.6 8.8 –7.4 –7.6 –14.1 0.0 
Refined cane sugar 10.8 (d) 2.9 2.4 –3.7 (d) 
Refined beet sugar 33.3 (d) –1.6 –1.7 –6.2 (d) 
All refined sugar 17.4 10.9 0.8 –0.2 –4.4 –0.9 
Tuna 
      Tuna in oil 52.0 16.9 –8.9 –6.6 –16.0 –3.7 
Tuna in water 18.5 13.0 –8.1 –6.6 –9.2 –3.4 
Footwear and leather products 
      Rubber and plastics footwear 3.9 0.4 0.1 0.1 –9.9 –4.6 
Shoes, except rubber 3.0 0.1 –0.2 –0.2 –7.7 –3.6 
Slippers 3.8 0.4 –1.1 –1.0 –8.9 –3.7 
Leather gloves 5.9 –0.7 –2.8 –3.0 –11.3 –5.7 
Luggage 6.4 2.7 –5.9 –5.6 –11.0 –6.2 
Women’s handbags 4.9 0.4 –1.7 –1.7 –9.6 –5.0 
Personal leather goods 6.6 3.1 –5.6 –5.6 –7.9 –3.4 
Leather goods –0.2 –2.0 –1.2 –1.5 0.2 0.2 
   aChange in constant 2005 dollars. 
   bChange in full-time equivalents. 
   cChange in landed duty-paid price. 
   dExports and household price of refined cane and beet sugar are not modeled separately, but are reported under 
“all refined sugar.” 
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TABLE E.4  Effects of simultaneous liberalizations, 2005–15 (percent)—Continued 
 
Change in quantitya Change in 
employmentb 
Change in price 
Sector Imports Exports Output Importsc Household 
Textiles and apparel 
      Broadwoven fabric mills 2.5 –52.8 –11.2 –11.5 –5.6 –1.2 
Narrow fabric mills –8.4 –19.9 –12.4 –12.5 –3.1 –0.9 
Nonwoven fabrics –4.6 –3.9 –1.4 –1.3 –0.1 0.1 
Knit fabric mills –13.9 –82.6 –31.9 –22.2 –6.6 –1.1 
Yarn mills and textile finishing, n.e.c. –8.0 –45.4 –20.9 –17.8 –5.1 –1.5 
Thread mills –0.7 –45.4 –10.6 –10.7 –3.3 –0.7 
Carpets and rugs 0.8 –3.4 –0.5 –0.7 –1.3 –0.1 
Coated fabrics, not rubberized 1.6 –2.6 –1.4 –1.3 –1.7 0.0 
Tire cord 0.4 –9.9 –4.8 –5.2 –1.2 0.0 
Cordage and twine 1.5 –14.9 –2.0 –1.9 –2.1 –0.1 
Textile goods, n.e.c. 0.3 –5.5 –1.6 –1.4 –1.0 0.1 
Curtains and draperies 4.4 –7.3 –3.4 –3.3 –8.3 –1.8 
House furnishings, n.e.c. 1.5 –27.2 –2.4 –1.9 –5.9 –1.3 
Textile bags 5.1 –23.8 –3.5 –3.4 –4.1 –0.7 
Canvas and related products 4.8 –4.7 –2.4 –2.5 –5.2 –1.0 
Pleating and stitching 0.8 –15.8 –2.4 –2.4 –4.5 –0.4 
Auto applique and trim –0.7 –28.8 –2.1 –2.1 0.2 –0.1 
Embroideries 0.0 1.0 –2.0 –2.4 0.2 0.1 
Fabricated textile products, n.e.c. –0.3 –58.6 –14.8 –14.4 –3.9 –1.2 
Women's hosiery, except socks 0.6 –81.5 –11.9 –11.7 –3.4 –0.6 
Hosiery, n.e.c. 1.8 –81.7 –18.6 –14.6 –7.6 –3.0 
Apparel excluding hosiery 2.2 –89.6 –16.1 –16.0 –8.8 –3.3 
Other high-tariff sectors 
      Ball and roller bearings 10.6 0.7 –3.7 –3.7 –5.1 0.0 
Costume jewelry 4.9 1.1 –2.3 –2.3 –5.3 –1.7 
Glass and glass products 5.6 4.0 (+) (+) –3.5 –0.4 
Hand tools 2.0 0.2 –0.2 –0.2 –3.8 –0.6 
Writing instruments 4.0 1.5 –1.7 –1.8 –4.4 –0.9 
Pesticides and agricultural chemicals 3.1 1.6 0.1 0.1 –2.5 0.1 
China tableware 10.0 0.5 –4.4 –4.4 –8.3 –1.5 
Earthenware 1.3 0.5 –1.8 –1.7 –4.5 –2.1 
Ceramic tile 2.4 0.6 –4.4 –4.4 –5.4 0.0 
Tires 1.6 0.4 –0.3 –0.3 –2.0 –0.1 
Note: n.e.c. means “not elsewhere classified.” 
 
   aChange in constant 2005 dollars. 
   bChange in full-time equivalents. 
   cChange in landed duty-paid price. 
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TABLE E.5  Effects of individual liberalizations, 2005–15 (percent) 
 
Change in quantitya Change in 
employmentb 
Change in price 
Sector Imports Exports Output Importsc Household 
Ethanol 
      Corn-based ethanol 0.0 (+) –5.6 –5.7 (–) 0.0 
Cellulosic ethanol 0.0 0.0 0.0 (–) (–) 0.0 
Alternative feedstock ethanol 0.0 0.0 0.0 (–) (–) 0.0 
Sugar-based ethanol 44.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 –19.8 0.0 
Other ethanol (+) 0.0 0.0 0.0 (–) 0.0 
    Dry corn milling 0.0 (+) –5.6 –5.7 (+) 0.0 
    Wet corn milling –0.1 3.0 0.1 0.2 (+) 0.0 
    Corn –2.4 1.5 –1.4 –1.1 (–) –0.4 
    Other feed grains 0.2 –0.1 (+) –1.1 (+) 0.0 
Dairy 
      Butter 51.9 3.5 –2.0 –2.1 –12.1 –1.3 
Dry dairy products 58.4 1.8 –2.4 –2.8 –11.6 –0.6 
Condensed dairy products 75.7 6.1 –5.0 –2.8 –16.8 –2.1 
Fluid milk 35.7 0.3 –0.2 –0.3 –6.9 (–) 
Cheese 64.7 10.0 –1.6 –1.6 –12.1 –0.6 
Ice cream 24.1 0.3 –0.1 –0.2 –6.8 –0.1 
Tobacco 
      Unmanufactured tobacco 72.8 4.8 –3.2 –3.4 –21.9 0.0 
Cigarettes 7.3 1.6 0.1 –0.1 –4.0 –0.3 
Cigars (+) 1.9 0.4 0.3 –0.2 –0.2 
Chewing and smoking tobacco 
    and snuff 2.1 1.2 0.2 0.2 –1.1 –0.3 
Sugar 
      Sugarcane 0.0 51.2 –7.6 –7.7 (–) 0.0 
Sugarbeets 0.0 10.0 –1.7 –1.7 (–) 0.0 
Raw cane sugar 36.4 7.0 –7.7 –7.9 –14.2 0.0 
Refined cane sugar 11.4 (d) 2.9 2.4 –3.8 (d) 
Refined beet sugar 34.4 (d) –1.7 –1.8 –6.4 (d) 
All refined sugar 18.2 9.8 0.7 0.2 –4.6 –1.0 
Tuna 
      Canned tuna, oil-pack 52.1 16.8 –8.9 –6.6 –16.1 –3.9 
Canned tuna, water-pack 18.5 12.9 –8.1 –6.6 –9.4 –3.5 
Other canned seafood 0.9 –5.0 –3.3 –6.6 (+) 0.3 
Commercial fishing –0.6 (+) (–) (–) (+) (+) 
Fresh or frozen seafood 0.0 –6.0 –0.1 –0.2 (+) 0.1 
Canned specialties (+) –2.4 –0.1 –0.3 (+) (+) 
Footwear and leather products 
      Rubber and plastics footwear 4.0 (+) –0.2 –0.2 –10.0 –4.7 
Shoes, except rubber 3.0 (+) –0.2 –0.2 –7.9 –3.7 
Slippers 3.9 0.6 –1.0 –1.0 –9.0 –3.8 
Leather gloves 6.0 1.1 –2.3 –2.1 –11.4 –5.9 
Luggage 6.5 2.4 –6.0 –5.7 –11.2 –6.3 
Women’s handbags 5.0 0.4 –1.8 –1.8 –9.8 –5.1 
Personal leather goods 6.6 3.8 –5.3 –5.5 –8.0 –3.6 
Leather goods –0.1 –0.7 –0.4 –0.5 (+) 0.1 
   aChange in constant 2005 dollars. 
   bChange in full-time equivalents. 
   cChange in landed duty-paid price. 
   dExports and household price of refined cane and beet sugar are not modeled separately, but are reported under 
“all refined sugar.” 
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TABLE E.5  Effects of individual liberalizations, 2005–15 (percent)—Continued 
 
Change in quantitya Change in 
employmentb 
Change in price 
Sector Imports Exports Output Importsc Household 
Textiles and apparel 
      Broadwoven fabric mills 2.6 –52.8 –11.2 –11.5 –5.7 –1.2 
Narrow fabric mills –8.3 –20.0 –12.4 –12.6 –3.1 –1.0 
Nonwoven fabrics –4.6 –3.9 –1.4 –1.3 –0.1 (+) 
Knit fabric mills –13.7 –82.2 –31.7 –22.1 –6.7 –1.1 
Yarn mills and textile finishing, n.e.c. –7.9 –45.4 –20.9 –17.7 –5.2 –1.6 
Thread mills –0.6 –45.4 –10.5 –10.6 –3.4 –0.8 
Carpets and rugs 0.8 –3.4 –0.5 –0.7 –1.4 –0.1 
Coated fabrics, not rubberized 1.8 –2.7 –1.4 –1.2 –1.8 0.0 
Tire cord 0.7 –10.0 –4.7 –5.0 –1.2 0.0 
Cordage and twine 1.6 –14.9 –2.0 –1.8 –2.2 –0.2 
Textile goods, n.e.c. 0.3 –5.5 –1.6 –1.4 –1.1 (+) 
Curtains and draperies 4.4 –7.1 –3.3 –3.2 –8.3 –1.9 
House furnishings, n.e.c. 1.5 –27.0 –2.4 –1.9 –6.0 –1.4 
Textile bags 5.1 –23.4 –3.5 –3.3 –4.2 –0.8 
Canvas and related products 4.8 –4.6 –2.4 –2.5 –5.3 –1.1 
Pleating and stitching 0.8 –15.9 –2.4 –2.3 –4.6 –0.5 
Auto applique and trim –0.8 –28.4 –2.1 –2.1 0.1 –0.1 
Embroideries 0.0 1.0 –2.0 –2.3 0.1 (+) 
Fabricated textile products, n.e.c. –0.3 –58.2 –14.7 –14.3 –4.0 –1.3 
Women’s hosiery, except socks 0.6 –81.0 –11.8 –11.6 –3.4 –0.7 
Hosiery, n.e.c. 1.8 –81.0 –18.4 –14.5 –7.7 –3.1 
Apparel excluding hosiery 2.2 –89.2 –16.0 –15.9 –8.8 –3.4 
Other high-tariff sectors 
      Ball and roller bearings 10.5 0.7 –3.8 –3.8 –5.3 0.0 
Costume jewelry 5.1 1.0 –2.3 –2.3 –5.5 –1.9 
Glass and glass products 5.7 3.4 –0.1 –0.1 –3.7 –0.6 
Hand tools 2.0 0.1 –0.2 –0.2 –4.0 –0.8 
Writing instruments 4.2 1.4 –1.6 –1.7 –4.5 –1.1 
Pesticides and agricultural chemicals 5.2 0.9 –0.1 (–) –4.0 –0.1 
China tableware 10.1 0.5 –4.4 –4.3 –8.4 –1.6 
Earthenware 1.4 0.4 –1.8 –1.7 –4.7 –2.3 
Ceramic tile 2.4 0.5 –4.4 –4.4 –5.6 0.0 
Tires 1.6 0.1 –0.4 –0.4 –2.2 –0.2 
Note: n.e.c. means “not elsewhere classified.” 
 
   aChange in constant 2005 dollars. 
   bChange in full-time equivalents. 
   cChange in landed duty-paid price. 
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TABLE E.6  Classification of imports, exports, shipments, and employment, by sector, in summary tables 
Sector 
Imports 
 (HTS)  
Exports  
(Schedule B)  
Shipments 
(NAICS) 
Employment 
(NAICS) 
       
Ethanol for fuel use 2207.10.6000, 2207.20.0000, 
2207.10.6010, 2207.20.0010 
 2207.10.6000, 2207.20.0000  325193 325193 
       
Dairy       
Butter 0405  0405  31151N 31151N 
Dry/condensed milk 
   products 
0402, 0403, 0404, 1702.11, 
1702.19, 1901.10, 3501.90, 
3502.20 
 0402, 0403, 0404, 1702.11, 
1702.19, 1901.10, 3501.90, 
3502.20 
 311514 311514 
Fluid milk 0401  0401  31151N 31151N 
Cheese 0406  0406  311513 311513 
Ice cream 2105  2105  311520 311520 
       
Tobacco       
Unmanufactured tobacco 2401  2401  312210 312210 
Cigarettes 2402  2402  312221 312221 
       
Sugar       
Farming       
   Sugarcane farming (a)  (a)  111930 111930 
   Sugar beet farming (a)  (a)  111991 111991 
Processing       
   Sugarcane mills (a)  (a)  311311 311311 
   Cane sugar refining (a)  (a)  311312 311312 
   Beet sugar Manufacturing (a)  (a)  311313 311313 
Sugarcane 1212.99.0000  1212.99.0000  (a) (a) 
Sugar beets 1212.91.0000  1212.91.0000  (a) (a) 
Raw cane sugar 1701.11  1701.11  (a) (a) 
Refined cane and beet sugar 1701.19, 1701.99  1701.19, 1701.99  (a) (a) 
       
Tuna       
Tuna in oil 1604.14.10  1604.14.10  (b) (b) 
Tuna in water 1604.14.22, 1604.14.30  1604.14.22, 1604.14.30  (b) (b) 
 
Imports  
(NAICS)  
Exports  
(NAICS)  
  Textiles and apparel       
Yarn, thread, and fabric 313  313  313 313 
Other textile products 314  314  314 314 
Apparel 315  315  315 315 
       
Other high-tariff sectors       
Ball and roller bearings 332991  332991  332991 332991 
Costume jewelry 339914  339914  339914 339914 
Glass and glass products 3272  3272  3272 3272 
Hand tools 332212  332212  332212 332212 
Writing instruments 339941  339941  339941 339941 
Pesticides and agricultural 
   chemicals 
325320  325320  325320 325320 
Table and kitchenware 327112  327112  327112 327112 
Ceramic tile 327122  327122  327122 327122 
Tires 32621  32621  32621 32621 
Footwear and leather  
products 
3162, 3169  3162, 3169  3162, 3169 3162, 3169 
   aNot applicable. 
   bEstimated from fish industry testimony. 
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